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CHAPI'ER I

INTRODUCTION
In 1902 a group of Chicago residents began a campaign for a new

municipal charter which would both free the city from the domination
of the state legislature and substantially alter the existing structure
of the municipal government.

For the next five years the new charter

movement occupied a prominent place in municipal affairs.

The people

of the city debated the purposes and content of that charter, clashed
on many occasions with the state legislature over the issue, and organized into groups favoring or opposing the charter until the voters
finally rejected the proposed charter in a special referendum in 1907.
Although subsequent charter reform campaigns were undertaken in 1908
and 1914, neither were as ambitious as the initial effort, and they too
failed.

As a result, Chicago has been governed for most of the twen-

tieth century under a system designed in the previous century and under
the careful control of the state legislature.
The Chicago c?arter reform movement was just one of many similar
movements in large American cities in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. 1 Until that time the control of state govern-

~ward Banfield an.d James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York:
Vintage Books, 1966); Charles Beard, American City Government: A Survey
of Newer Tendencies (New York: Century, 1912); Ernest Griffith, A History of American City Government: The Conspicuous Failure, 1870-1900
(New York: Praeger, 1974) and A History of American City Government:
The Progressive Years and Their Aftermath, 1900-1920 (New York: Praeger,
1974); Martin J. S~hiesl, ~ne Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America, 1880-1920 (Berkeley: University of
C~lifornia, 1977) provide the best overview of this subject.
1

2

ments over the internal affairs of cities had rarezy been challenged:
no court had considered the question of an inherent right to local
self-government until 1871 and five years later the Supreme Court had
ruled that "a municipal corporation, in the exercise of all of its
duties, including those most strictzy local or internal, is but a department of the State. 112

By the last quarter of the nineteenth cen-

tury however this situation had become intolerable for both sides.
Urban constituents deluged the state legislature for more and more
special legislation to meet new needs brought on by rapid growth.
On the other hand state lawmakers often used special legislation to

keep political control of cities.

They enacted laws whether or not

desired by the city's residents--often over the city's objections-arbitrarizy changed voting dates and terms of municipal offices, and
gerrymande~ed

wards.

To relieve this problem some states tried to limit the use of
special legislation.

In Illinois, for example, the new constitution

of 1870 subjected all incorporated areas in the state to the provisions of a single incorporation act and forbade the General Assembzy
to enact special legislation for any one city.

Chicagoans soon felt

the restrictions of a law designed to apply to cities of 1000 as well
as 500,000.

By the 1880s the municipal sewerage system was hopelesszy

inadequate; the city however could not finance a new expanded system
2

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540 (1876). See also
Howard L. McBain, 11 The Doctrine of an Inherent Right to Self-Government, 11
Columbia Law Review l6 (1916), p. 190-216 and 299-322; John F. Dillon,
CommeQt~ies on the Law of Municipal Corporations, 5th ed. (Boston:
Little, Brown, l9ll); Amasa Eaton, "The Right to Local Self-Go7ernment, 11
Harvard Law Review 13-1.4 (1900-1901).
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because it had reached the level of municipal indebtedness allowed by
law.

Its only recourse was to ask the legislature to create a separate

governing body for handling this problem.

Although ninety percent of

the territory and population serviced by the resulting Sanitary District was within Chicago the city had no control over its activities.
other states attempted to control the proliferation of special
legislation by classifying cities according to size of population
and allowing special legislation for all cities within a class.
method too could be detrimental to cities.

This

In a flagrant violation

of the spirit of this law, the Ohio state legislature created eleven
classes, each applying to just one city, and thereby continued to
interfere at will in the affairs of individual cities.
Neither method satisfied city residents who accused states of
ignoring their needs and best interests and demanded municipal home
rule.

It was only logical, they argued, that local bodies could

legislate more efficiently on matters which they understood better
than anyone else.

And since large cities had outgrown their governing

structures and were urgently in need of reforms home rule would give
them the power to solve current problems and meet new ones as they
arose.

Efficiency and utility were not the only motives urban dwellers

had for advocating municipal home rule; they also strongly believed
that the antipathetic needs and lifestyles of expanding urban areas
and their largely rural, small-town states made home rule imperative.
To secure both local self-government and change their existing
municipal structures cities throughout the United States turned to
charter reform.

St. Louis led the movement for home rule.

In 1875

that city's representatives to a state constitutional convention per-

4

suaded their fellow delegates to include a clause permitting cities
over 100 ~ 000 (at the time only St • Louis) to

frame~ adopt~

and amend

their own home rule charters without any intrusion by the state legislature.

Other states followed the example of Missouri and granted

varying degrees of home rule to their cities or at least allowed them
to draft new municipal charters.
In their new or amended charters cities generally replaced the old

decentralized ward-based City Council governments with a
a city

manager~

or a strong mayor.

commission~

Regardless of the specific type of

government adopted most of the new charters had the common objective
of transferring power from the legislative to the executive branch.3
They stripped the Council of much of its powers to appoint and remove
officials~
tion~

draw up the municipal budget, and grant fra..J.chises.

In addi-

they often reduced the number of Council members and provided for

at-large elections thereby eliminating the alderman's local base of
power.

The executive's power was enhanced through increased veto power,

longer terms of office, and the replacement of old multi-member governing boards with single department heads appointed by and accountable

only to the mayor--or headed directly by a commissioner in the case of
a commission-type government.
The governments of many American cities today are the products
of the charter reforms begun in the Progressive Era.

Chicago,

however~

never experienced such reforms and this failure affected the city's
subsequent political development in three important ways.
power was never centralized as in

ma~y

3schiesl, p. 92-93 and l04-JD5.

other cities--New

First politiYork~

Boston~

5
, Houston, Detroit, Portland, among others; instead the city maintained
the ward-oriented strong City Council government.

This decentralized

system facilitated the future development of a strong party system
with patronage opportunities throughout the city, because no one city
official was inherently more powerful than any other, and control of
the political machinery could be gained best by building a loyal coalition of office-holders and voters.

Chicago's mayors from Cermak through

Daley were strong not because of the inherent power of their office but
because of a strong and loyal party system.
A second consequence of Chicago's lack of reform is that the
machinery of government itself remained divided among several separate
authorities.

The municipal corporation, the County government, Sanitary

District, Board of Education, Park District each preparas its own budget,
·levies its own taxes, and provides municipal services within Chicago's
boundaries; the city controls only the municipal corporation.

While

this division of authority enabled Chicago to avoid for years the crushing
fiscal problems suffered by other large cities such as New York, this
arrangement has also allowed Chicago to evade responsibility for providing essential public services.

For instance, though the city does

not have to finance costly public welfare and public health programs,
leaving these responsibilities in the hands of Cook County and the state
has meant many services readily available in other urban areas have been
difficult to obtain in Chicago.

The result is that in an area of sever-

al million there is only one general public hospital and that institution
has for years suffered from administration by officials from outside the
city who are often more concerned with fiscal austerity than with the
availability of medical care to those in need.

6

The recurring fiscal crises of the public school system over the
last decade also illustrate quite clearly the problems this division of
authority has caused.

The mayor appoints the school board with city

council approval but does not choose the Superintendent of Schools over
whom the city has no authority.

Furthermore the mayor has no power to

remove his or her appointees to the school board.
of Education is not a department of the

city~

Because the Board

the city cannot transfer

municipal funds to the schools in the event of a

crisis~

nor can it de-

mand accountability from the Board either for past or current

policies~

nor can it prevent the state from interfering in the affairs of the
school system.

One result is that currently a state imposed financial

authority responsible only to the legislature oversees the Board of
Education~

leaving the people of Chicago without control over their

children's schools a"'ld with no elected city official they can hold
accountable.
A third consequence of the failure of charter reform is that
until the new state constitution of 1970 Chicago exercised no municipal
home rule.

It remained firmly dominated by a state legislature con-

sistently hostile to its needs.
of over two million by
immigrants~

1910~

As an industrial city with a population

much of it immigrant or the children of

Cb.icago contrasted sharply with most of rural and small-

town "downstate."

By

the late nineteenth century downstate legislators

were already trying to restrict permanently the number of Chicago representatives and several times in the ensuing decades simply refused to
reapportion electoral districts according to population thus depriving
Chicago of its rightful representation in the General Assembly.

At its

7
best, the history of Chicago-downstate relations has been one of political.trade-offs; at its worst it has degenerated into political warfare
with Chicago far too often being denied desperately needed legislation.
W~'lile

its affect on Chicago 1 s political development in the twen-

tieth century is one important reason for examining the charter reform
movement, the movement also deserves attention for what it tells us
about the city and its people during this crucial reform period of the
early part of the century.

Historians of Chicago, and in general those

studying cities in the Progressive Era, have emphasized reformers and
their ideas and motives.

Regardless of how the reformers are described--

as upper-class businessmen and professionals, an old or new middle-class,
political bosses and machines, or working class ethnics--or what interpretations are advanced for their motives, these works have one thing
in common: the people studied are the civic and political leaders of
the community. 4 What did the majority of a city 1 s residents want from
their city and municipal government?

Did they agree or disagree with

4As representatives of the general literature see John Buenker,
Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform (New York: Norton, 1973); .
Samuel Hays, 11The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the
Progressive Era, 11 Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55 (1964); Melvin G.
Holli, Reform in Detroit: Hazen S. p· ree and Urban Politics (New York:
Qx:ford, 1969 ; Otis .A. Pease, "Urban Reformers in the Progressive &a, 11
Pacific Northwest Quarterl.v (April 1971); Bradley Rice, 11 The Galveston
Plan of City Government by Connnission: The Birth of a Progressive Idea, 11
Southwestern History Q:.1arterlv 73 (1975); Schiesl, The Politics of
Efficiency. For Chicago in particular see Alex Gottfried, Boss Cermak
of Chicago: A Study of Political leadership (Seattle: University of
Washington, 1962); Nick A. Kom.ons, "Chicago, 1893-1907: The Politics
of Reform 11 (Ph.D Dissertation, George W::ishington University, 1961);
Michael P. McCarthy, 11 l3usinessmen and Professionals in Municipal Reform:
The Chicago Experience, 1887-1920 11 (Ph.D Dissertation, Northwestern
University, 1970; Joel Tarr, A Study in .Boss Politics: William Lorimer
of Chicago (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1971).

various reform proposals and for what reasons? Did they actively
oppose some of these reforms and attempt to implement ones of their
own, and if so how did they go about this?
mained unasked, often for want of a viable

These questions have re-

method~logy. 5

These questions can be asked of the charter reform movement because it encompassed widespread popular participation.

Over half of

the delegates to the convention which wrote the charter were private
citizens, and neither political party controlled the charter's writing;
newspapers heightened public interest by reporting extensively on the
debates of the convention and throughout the city, various interest
groups sent communiques to the body urging it to include specific
provisions, and these provisions and their implications were widely
discussed.

The ensuing referendum campaign gave the citizens further

opportunity to publicly debate the charter and to organize in support
or opposition.
Middle and upper-class businessmen and professionals, reform organizations, business clubs, ethnic societies, organized labor, women,
politicians, the Socialists, and other special interest groups all expressed their opinions in the course of the charter movement.

Even

blacks, a small and relatively powerless group in the city at this time,
participated to some degree.

All these groups attempted to directly

influence the content of the charter and had the opportunity to accept

5carl V. Harris in his work Political Power in Birmingham. 18711921 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1977) has suggested using social
economic interest groups to study the distribution of urban political
power, and this interest group methodology is one which can be applied
to studying cities in the Progressive Era.
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or reject the finished product in a popular referendum (with the exception of the

women~

of course).

Because of the public character of the

discussions~

sources are

abnndant for determining the views of many groups in the city.

The

formal Proceedings of the charter convention contain the member's debates on all aspects of charter reform as well as the letters sent to
that body by outside groups.
followed the movement

E..J.glish language

closely~

dailies~

as noted

before~

as did foreign language newspapers.

In early 1906 several hnndred of the city's ethnic societies formed

into a common

organization~

the United Societies for Local Self-Govern-

ment, for promoting and protecting their interests.

Ethnic groups

conducted their charter activities through the United Societies and
because the Germans were among the principal leaders of this organization their daily newspapers are a particularly good source for information on these activities.

The German newspapers reported extensively

on the debates within the ethnic commnnities, the speeches of various
ethnic

leaders~

and printed the pamphlets and bulletins issued b,y the

United .. Societies on the questions of charter reform.
newspapers~

the monthly journal and meeting minutes of the Chicago

Federation of
Societies~

in the

The Socialist

Labor~

a special newsletter published by the United

the manuscript collections and memoirs of prominent figures

movement~

the records and publications or organized groups in

the city, among others all contain debates on charter reform.
The major issues and ideas of Chicago's charter reform movement,
as well as the nature of the city's municipal problems were those facing
all large cities in the United States during the Progressive Era.

The

focus of this study is not the similarity of these issues but how the
people of Chicago responded to their municipal problems and the measures
introduced to solve them.

It is fruitless to characterize Chicagoans

as reformers or non-reformers.

MOst of them saw that there were de-

ficiencies and corruption in their municipal government and they believed that reform was needed, but the issues involved were complex.
Few argued against municipal efficiency but they differed on how to
accomplish it and even about what efficiency meant; and those who
agreed with each other on one issue did not necessarily agree on others.
The charter reform movement reveals quite strikingly the intense
interest which so many different groups took in the political affairs
of their city.

They were determined to participate in the decision-

making process and they clearly shared in the optimisn of the Progressive

Era that they could effect changes which would make their city a much
better place.

An examination of the problems confronting Chicago by

the early twentieth century, how these directed residents to seek charter reform, and of the debates and activities of charter reform will
show how these various groups participated in the movement, why they
favored or opposed specific parts of the charter, how these reflected
their ideas of a city as a community, and the roles which they believed
the citizens themselves and the government should play in determining
the growth and direction of that community.

CHAPTER II
CHICAGO IN THE 1890s
But there is another side to Chicago. There is the back side
to her fifteen hundred million dollars of trade, her seventeen thousand vessels, and her ninety thousand miles of rail.
Away from the towering offices, lying off from the smiling
parks, is a vast wilderness of shabby houses ...
George Steevens
I

When, in 1893, the Columbian Exposition drew to Chicago tourists
from around the world, visitors had strong reactions to what they saw.
Some were overwhelmed by the Fair 1 s gleaming
a·long grand classical lines.
11

White City 11 constructed

11

A traveler from India thought the Fair

a spectacle that exceeded all my expectations of grandeur"; while a

Scottish author was dazzled by "this etheral emanation of pure and uneconomic beauty. 11 others, such as French diplomat Francois Bruwaert,
equated the Fair with the city and predicted that "the most beautiful
exhibition will be Chicago itself, its citizens, its business, its
institutions, its progress."

2

Still others lmew that the city needed

to be judged by more than its World 1 s Fair.

Walking through the streets

Italian playwright Guiseppe Giacosce was appalled by the sights.
I had two different impressions of Chicago, one sensual and immediate ... the other intellectual and gradual .••. To the eye, the

~aul M. Angle, ed., Prairie State: Impressions of Illinois. 16731967. By Travelers and other Observers (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1968), p. 426.
2

Bessie L. Pierce, As Others See Chicago: Impressions of Visitors,
1673-1933 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1933), p. 340, 352, and 358.
ll

l
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city appears abominable •.• I would not want to live there for
anything in the world •••• During JI:JY stay of one week, I did not
see anything in Chicago but darlmess: smoke; clouds, dirt and
an extraordinary number of sad and grieved persons •••• the rich
metropolis gave me a sense of oppression so grave that I still
doubt whether, beyond their factories, there exist celestial
spaces.3
But Giacosce was also attracted by the city's vibrance.
The ideas of a social order, simple and progressive; the sight
of so many ways open to human industry; the sight of so many
natural resources, and of its increase in work--all these lead
[the visitor] to a concept of actual life so clear, so openminded, so large and so powerful, and to a certain apprehension
of the fu~ure, which makes him forget quickly the disgust he
suffered.
Chicago merited both these observations yet not all visitors
were as charitable as Giacosce.
was that of Rudyard Kipling.

Probably the most vehement reaction

"Having seen it, " Kipling declared of

Chicago, "I urgently desire never to see it again.
by savages.

It is inhabited

Its water is the water of the Hughli, and its air is

dirt. 11 5 Nor did Kipling appreciate the symbols of elegance and progress of which many Chicagoans were so proud.

.Advised to go to the

Palmer House, one of the finest hotels, to observe the elite and
powerful, Kipling could only see "a gilded and mirrored rabbit-warren"".
a huge hall of tessellated marble, crammed with people talking about
money and spitting about everywhere. 116
it was a vulgar and unlivable city.

He departed Chicago convinced

A less agitated British journa-

list, George Steevens, observed the relationship between Chicago's
3 Ibid.,

P· 276-77.

4Ibid.,
P· 282-83a
5Ibid.'
P· 251.
6
Ibid.
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potential wealth, the poverty of many of its citizens, and civic
corruption.

In Chicago, he wrote, "everyone is fighting to be rich,

is then straining to be refined, and nobody can attend to making the
city fit to live in. n7
The reactions of these men were visceral; they came from seeing
the Fair, walking the streets, viewing the stockyards, and breathing
smoke-ridden air.

For a while the bright facade of the Fair hid much

of the disorder and misery, but once the Fair closed visitors and
residents alike were increasingly disturbed by what they saw.

In 1898,

the English reformer and member of the London County Council, Sidney
Webb, visited Chicago.

Webb came specifically to study the municipal

government and its relationship to municipal problems.

To his dismay

he discovered that this government was hopelessly outmoded.

Graft,

corruption, and the serious problems observed by himself and previous
visitors were the logical results, Webb believed, of a City Council
which decided on municipal improvements

11

by passing around a list of

improvements they were to vote on in that session, each alderman putting
in what·ever he wanted for his ward, and these were voted en bloc. •• 8
Webb was quite correct in his assessment.

Rapid industrialization,

a burgeoning population, new technology, and the annexation of surrounding communities had changed the city dramatically in the past twentyfive years.

The magnitude of Chicago 1 s economic and technological

achievements astounded both residents and visitors; but new problems
resulting from these changes made life unpleasant for many of the

7Angle, p. 426.
8

Thid., p. 43L
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residents and were beyond the abilities of the municipal government
to solve adequately.
Chicago had emerged from the fire of 1.871 badly scarred but
determined to rebuild; even the depression could only slow, not
blunt, the city's growth and by the end of the nineteenth century
Chicago was the premier city of the midwest.

The Union Stockyards

and over three-fourths of the city's grain elevators and lumberyards
had been outside the fire area.

Burned out plants and factories, in-

eluding the McCormick Reaper Works, were quickly rebuilt restoring the
city's economic prominence in meatpacking, livestock, grain, and
lumber.

The railroad freight terminals on the edge of the city had

also escaped the fire and when the railroads subsequently erected
grand new passenger terminals people and goods once again flowed
through Chicago. 9
External events combined with the vigor of the city's residents
to

~and

and alter Chicago's economy in the succeeding years.

Be-

tween 18'70 and 1.890 millions of people moved into the midwest, advancing
the population center of the United States westward over one hundred
mileso

Since eastern manufacturing and industrial cities were not

easily accessible for these people Chicago, with its great transportation network and thriving business community was the logical place
to ship raw materials for finishing and distributing on to customers.

9The best general account of Chicago's economic development is in
Bessie L. Pierce, History of Chicago, val. 3, The Rise of the Modern City
1871-1893 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957). For information after
1893 see Harold M. Mayer and Richard 0. Wade, Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969); Charles Merriam, Chicago:
A More Intimate View of Urban Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1929).
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Chicago eagerly accepted this challenge and by the end of the
century evolved from a city of commerce into the manufacturing and
industrial center of the midwest.

Heavy industry made substantial

gains in this period: several smaller concerns combined to form the
Illinois Steel Company in 1889 and its steel production soon worried
Pittsburgh; the Pullman Palace Car Company, Grant Locomotive Works,
and new firms building trolley cars boosted Chicago's equipment output, while six Chicago factories, led by McCormick (later International
Harvester), produced one-seventh of the country's agricultural implements.

Light industry also prospered.

Between 1880 and 1890 printing

and publishing was the city's second fastest growing industry and
employed over 20,000 people by 1900, second only to New York City.
The immigrant population of Chicago and other midwest cities attracted
the brewing industry and the city's largest German brewery was also
the fifth largest in the country.

Clothing and dry goods manufacturing

and selling increased significantly also.

The ready-to-wear women 1 s

and children 1 s garment business joined the already thriving men 1 s wear
establishments.
The growth of industry was accompanied by the development of
mercantile houses which helped keep Chicago a center of commerce.
Dry goods wholesalers supplied clothing and other Chicago products to
eager customers.

Montgomery Ward, the first nationwide mail order

company, began operations in 1872 and when twenty-one years later
Sears, Roebuck and Company opened, Chicago became the home of the
country's two largest catalog stores.

Wholesalers then founded retail

department stores to serve local customers; the largest, Marshall

16
Field and Company, increased its retail trade from $3.1 to 7.5
million in the twenty years after 1872.
To foster this economic growth and attract more industry and
money to the city, Chicago businessmen introduced the concept of the
organized industrial district where

on~

businesses could locate.

In a district plant space could be rented and services provided which

an individual business might not be able to afford.

One of the first,

the Central Manufacturing District, was organized in 1890 by the
Chicago Junction Railway and the Union Stockyards on a square mile
tract of land north of the Stockyards and along the south branch of
the Chicago River.

Enterprises locating in the District had their

own railway at their disposal; the Chicago Junction served the Stockyards and connected directly with every trackline entering the city.
Other industrial districts were soon organized as businessmen hoped
to show that Chicago was the most conventient and profitable city
in which industry could locate.
People streamed to Chicago to fill the new jobs created by economic expansion.

One half million people lived in Chicago in 1880.

In

ten years the population doubled, and by 1900 it reached almost 1.7
million. 10 Annexation of surrounding areas accounted for part of this
growth; between 1880 and 1890 the population of "old" Chicago grew from
503,000 to 792,000 with the remaining increase coming from annexed
townships. 11 But, prior to annexation, the outside townships were
10

u.s., Census Office, Tenth Census, 1880; Eleventh Census, 1890;
Thirteenth Census, 1910.
~er and Wade, p. 176.
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growing

rapid~

also and whether people were migrating directly into

the city or its suburbs, they were coming to Chicago.

For instance,

lllltil 1889 the Union Stockyards was located outside of the city limits,
therefore many of the immigrants who found jobs in the Stockyards and
wanted to live near their work lived outside the city proper.
The character of Chicago's population would be as significant
for the city's future as its size.
dren comprised

rough~

The foreign born and their chil-

seventy-five percent of the total population

for the two decades from 1890 to 19l0, giving Chicago a greater percentage of residents from foreign stock than any other major United
States city except New York and Milwaukee, and the highest percentage
of foreign born outside of New York and Boston. 12 B.f the beginning
of the twentieth century the nationalities of the new immigrants had
changed as Polish, Italian, and Bohemian immigrants replaced the
German, Irish, and Scandinavians who had arrived earlier.

Of

these

six major nationality groups only the Irish ever lost population.
As the business conmmnity sought ways to perpetuate itself and
help its members, so did the immigrants.

To give shelter against an

unfamiliar, often hostile environment, help maintain aspects of the
group 1 s culture, and provide social services which the city did not,
immigrants established their own benevolent and fraternal societies.
German Turnvereins, Bohemian Sokols, Swedish Svithiods, the Polish

~oward Chudacoff, The Evolution of American Urban Society
(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 91. In Chicago 77o5% of the
population was foreign stock; in both New York and Milwaukee it was
78.6%. Chicago's population was 35o7% foreign born compared to
40o4% for New York and 35.9% for Boston.
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National Alliance, the Italian Unione e Fratellanze, and numerous other
organizations were the focus of life for many of these people.

In

addition, a very active ethnic press served as the primary link between
:iJnmigrants and their new city. 13 Published in the native language
these papers devoted much space to news of the home country, but they
were also a major source of information about Chicago, reporting and

explaining events and issues and how they affected their readership.
Unlike the business community however, immigrants remained for
quite some time outside the mainstream of the community.

Through the

end of the century ethnic societies were fairly parochial organizations
concerned with the needs of their own members.

They showed slight

interest in the problems of the city as a whole or of immigrants in
general.

The newspapers too treated municipal affairs only insofar

as they affected their nationality group.
The experience of black-Chicagoans matched in certain respects
those of the European immigrants.

Both groups remained outside the

mainstream of politics and society for quite some time and relied on
their own political, business, and social societieso

However by the

early twentieth century blacks were still only a tiny portion of
Chicago 1 s population.

Although their aggregate numbers increased

by ten times from 1870 to 1900 they were only 1.9 percent of the
total population.

Industrial growth had yet to attract large numbers

13Among the older immigrant groups the Germans supported three
daily newspapers, the Abendpost, Illinois Staats-Zeitung, and Chicagoer
Freie Presse; the Irish had the Chicago Citizen; and the Swedish community published the Svenska Amerikanaren and Svenska-Tribunen (later
the Svenska Tribunen-Nyheter). For the newer groups the Poles read
the Dziennik Chicagoski, Narod Polski, and the daily Zgoda; the Italians
had 1 1 Italia and La Tribuna Italiana Transatlantica; and the Bohemians
the Svornost and Denni Hlasatel.

19
of blacks and the problems of this small community touched very few
of the white population.

The small size of their community and racial

discrimination combined to separate blacks decisively from the rest
of the city and keep them dependent on their old traditions of selfhelp and self-protection14 while European immigrants gradually began
to abandon their insularity and insert themselves into the larger
conmrunity.
At the same time as the city was growing in size, technological
developments were changing Chicago 1 s appearance in other ways.
car tracks, for example, crisscrossed the city.

Street

Eighty-six miles of

cable car track had been laid by 1894 while simultaneously electric
trolleys were being run experimentally along the old horse-drawn
trolley tracks.

The electric trolley cost far less than the cable

cars and traveled at double the speed of the horse-drawn ones; the
electric cars soon surpassed all other forms of rapid transit and by

1893 they ran over five hundred miles of track.

To help relieve con-

gestion in the streets the South Side Rapid Transit Company began constructing an elevated (El) line on the south side in 1890.

Using

steam locomotives the El carried passengers at fifteen miles per hour.
Three years later there was a west side El, and by the end of the
decade the Northwestern Elevated Railroad extended to Wilson Avenue
which just eleven years previously had been almost three miles north
of the city limits. 15

Public transit gave people more freedom of

~he best source on this subject is Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago:
The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago,
1967).
15Mayer and Wade, p. 138-42 and 208-14.
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movement and choice of living area and enabled the city to keep expanding.

Gas, electricity, and telephone lines made living and

business easier and Chicagoans naturally clamored for more and better
services from these utilities.
But while Chicagoans exalted in their growth, their municipal

problems worsened.

All those new people needed places to live and

schools for their children; there were more streets to be paved and
cleaned, more garbage to be removed, graver sanitation problems, and
a desperate need for more and better public transportation; the police
and fire departments had to be improved and expanded.

The municipal

government could not meet the rising demands for services.
The deterioration of the city's housing stock is perhaps typical
of the problems caused by growth.

Unlike older eastern cities, before

the fire most Chicagoans lived in single-family dwellings.

Such

buildings inefficiently used the city 1 s limited available land and
after W'?l new types of housing appeared: multi-family 11 flats" (apartment buildings) were constructed, especially along the street car
routes, and by the end of the decade six-flats had became popular.
While apartment buildings could be well-constructed, pleasant places
to live, the wooden, cheaply built tenements which also appeared
often were not.

The chief virtue of tenements was that they were

able to house many families.

To relieve further the housing shortages,

builders crammed together as many tenements as possible; little or no
passageway was left between buildings, new tenements were erected in
front of existing buildings situated on the back of a lot, and often
these buildings were joined into one large structure--the so-called
"double-decker. 11

In the older parts of the city small frame single-

21
family houses were subdivided to accommodate several families.
results were neither pleasing to live in nor to see.

The

"Street stretches

beyond street of little houses, mostly wooden, begrimed with soot,
rotting, falling to pieces, 11 was what George Steevens observed as he
16
walked through the poor sections of Chicago.
Cheap housing accommodated the immigrants however and crowded
tenements proliferated.

The Department of Health officially assessed

the state of much of the tenement housing in 1.896 as "old, dilapidated
or rotten, unventilated, badly lighted, badly drained, unprovided with
proper facilities for disposal of excreta and without adequate or even
necessary water supply. 1117 Five years later a private survey of three
Chicago neighborhoods conducted by the City Homes Association confirmed
18
Although as early as 1872 the
the Department's earlier findings.
city's health commissioners had asked the City Council to regulate
conditions within and around tenements, the incessant need for cheap
housing and a reluctance to interfere with private property frustrated
these requests.

At the turn of the century Chicago had no canprehensive

building and sanitary code and the few building codes actually enacted
were freely violated; 19 the municipal government remained aloof from
the problem.

16

Angle, p. 426.

17

chicago Department of Health, Biennial Report (1895-1.896), p. 63-64.
See also Jane Addams, Twenty Years at Hull-House (New York: Macmillan, 19J.D).
18

Robert Hunter, Tenement Conditions in Chicago: A Report by the
Investigating Committee of the City Homes Association (Chicago: City Homes
Association, 1901), passim.
19 Ibid., p. 1.61-62.
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Outside the buildings conditions were equally depressed.

Garbage

piled up rapidly, sewer 5,fstems were hopelessly inadequate, streets
were often unpaved, unrepaired, and seldom cleaned.

As with the

housing stock, the municipal government's methods of handling these
problems were obsolete.

For instance the private firms hired to col-

lect garbage seldom fulfilled their contracts in tenement neighborhoods
and the ward garbage inspectors were political appointees who likewise tended to evade their responsibilities.

Landlords contributed

to the problem by providing too few collection boxes for their buildings allowing garbage to overflow and litter the streets, alleys,
and yards.
The conditions of streets aod sidewalks throughout the city
again showed the two sides of Chicago 1 s character.

In its desire to

"present a city to World 1 s Fair visitors worthy of its much trumpeted
glories 11 Chicago had resurfaced over one thousand miles of streets
and doubled the number of its sidewalks between 1889 ·and 1893. 20

As

usual, only specific areas benefitted from this civic improvement,
so that Sidney Webb could comment three years after the Fair that the
sidewalks "are nothing but rotten planks in the slUm. streets, with
great holes rendering it positively dangerous to walk in the dark. u

21

To escape the crowding, dirt, and noise of the city many residents began moving out to the surrounding townships.

The growth of

street car lines and commuter railways enabled people to live in the
suburbs and work in the city and increasing numbers of people took

20Pierce, History of Chicago, vel. 3, p. 313.
21

Angle, p. 431.
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advantage of this new freedom.

By the late 1800s the commuter rail-

ways carried 27,000 daizy- commuters into the city; cable cars and electric street railways transported thousands more.
Street car lines along Evanston (now Broadway), Clark, Lincoln,
and Milwaukee avenues and new service on the Chicago and Northwestern
and Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul railroads drew people north into
the townships of Lake View, Rogers Park and Edgewater, and northwest
into Jefferson Park.

Chicagoans followed the Rock Island line south-

west into Beverzy- and Morgan Park.

The greatest expansion was to the

south sections of the area serviced by the Illinois Central and the
street cars along Cottage Grove Avenue.

Hyde Park township, com-

prising forty-eight square miles grew from 15, 700 residents to 133,000
in the 1880s;

22

George Pullman located his factory town at the far

south end of Hyde Park in this period.
ceeded more slowzy-.

Expansion to the west pro-

Located along Lake Michigan, Chicago 1 s beautiful

lakefront and the presence of large immigrant slums immediately west
of the central city determined the city's elongated north to south
configuration.
Cheaper land

com~ined

with new mass transit to attract families,

but also industry to the suburbs.

More and more industries located

outside the city proper making it necessary for many workers to live
there as well.

The meat packers, for instance, concentrated the

Stockyards in a one mile square area in Lake Township directly west of
Hyde Park.

22

The Rock Island railroad traversed the township and the

City of Chicago Department of Development and Planning,
Historic City: The Settlement of Chicago (Chicago, 1976), Po 43.
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trolleys of the Chicago City Railway company allowed people to commute
throughout the township 1 s thirty-six square miles.

Between 1880 and

1890 the population of Lake multiplied more than five times from
. t over 100,000. 23
18 , 000 t o JUS

Real estate speculators quickly capitalized on these desires
and began developing the areas outside the city limits enticing people
to the charms and advantages of suburban living.

S .E. Gross and

Company, for example, missed few tricks in selling its properties.
Its handbills promoted Lake View in 1883 as an ideal location,
11

only three blocks from present terminus of Street Cars.

One of the

most pleasant rides in the city, passing in front of Lincoln Park
along a finely shaded area, and away from the streets leading to the
to the cemeteries."

The handbill further promised churches, schools,

water pipes, and passenger trains running between Lake View and
downtown. 24
Realtors ran free excursion trains to their building sites
where they provided potential customers with free lunches, fireworks,
and band concerts.
advertising.

They appealed to different income groups in their

The wealthier citizens were urged to move to Hyde Park,

Kenwood, or Morgan Park where they could buy spacious single-family
homes on large lots.

For those who could not afford such amenities

cheaper housing was available.

After the fire of 1871 Chicago building

codes outlawed wooden buildings in the downtown area and realtors now
directed their appeals to people looking for less expensive housing
23 Ibid.

~otocopy in Mayer and Wade, p. 156.
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outside of the "brick area."

Lake View, proclaimed the Gross

and Company handbill was "Outside Fire Limits!

You Can Build Wooden

Houses!"
The flood of people into the townships caused more municipal
problems than it solved and led groups in the suburbs and the city
to consider annexing these areas to the city. 25

For township dwellers

annexation quickly became the only wa:y to relieve their seemingly insurmountable fiscal problems.

Each township financed its own public

utilities, school system, police and fire departments, and other essential services.

Because many of the townships were commuter suburbs

with little industry they did not have an adequate tax base to pa:y
for these services.

E~en

those with a broader tax base desired an-

nexation for several reasons. Some believed their local police forces
were too small and weak to control growing labor problems; others
hoped it would rid them of existing political corruption; and all
wanted to use the city's well-developed water supply system.

On the

other hand Chicagoans favored annexation because they wanted to recapture the wealth and industry which had fled to the suburbs and acquire
the people and territory which would enable Chicago to become a great
metropolitan area.
Leading the annexation movement, the Citizens' Association of
Chicago in 188'7 asked the state General Assembly to enact a law permitting willing townships to consolidate their governments with the
25

The best accounts of the annexation movement are in McCarthy,
p. 1-21, Pierce, History of Chicago, vol. 3, p. 331-33, and Mayer and
Wade, p. 154-78.
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city.

The Legislature agreed and citizens from Hyde Park, Lake, Lake

View, Cicero, and Jefferson Park townships petitioned for annexation.
But not all suburbanites favored annexation which first had to be
approved by the township voters at a special referendum.

Some oppo-

nents predicted the extension of Chicago's fire laws and building
codes would price workers out of the home buying market by allowing
the building only of the more expensive brick houses; some feared
that after joining the city the saloon interests in Chicago would
wipe out the township prohibition districts; others simply wanted
to keep the evils of the big city out of the suburbs; and many local
politicians, of course, knew that annexation would ruin them.

In a

November 1887 referendum citizens of Lake and Lake View rejected annexation while those in Hyde Park, Cicero, and Jefferson Park voted
to join the city.
The votes were nullified several months later when the Illinois
Supreme Court ruled the annexation law unconstitutional.

Although

this disappointed the annexationists, it gave them the opportunity
to reorganize and perhaps this time persuade recalcitrant voters of
the benefits of becoming part of the city.

In

1889 therefore they

secured a new law from the state legislature and the Chicago City
Council helped the cause by passing two ordinances guaranteeing the
preservation of township prohibition districts after incorporation,
and prohibiting the extension of Chicago's building codes to new areas
without their consent.

Despite the continued opposition of local

politicians and a few other prominent suburbanites--George Pullman
vigorously resisted the incorporation of his company town and meat

27
packer Philip Armour made a deal with local politicians in Lake township to oppose annexation in return for a law tax assessment on his
company property

26 --the voters of Hyde Park, Lake, Lake View, Cicero,

and Jefferson Park this time accepted annexation.
The city continued annexing suburban areas for the next four
years, mainly to the southwest.

In

1893 the far north townships of

Rogers Park and West Ridge joined Chicago and although a few areas on
the western periphery were added later Chicago's geographic expansion
ended.

The city's total area had been increased in this period from

thirty-five square miles to one hundred and ninety.

II

The expansion of the city offered the chance of enormous profits
for those who could provide needed municipal services.

Because few

Americans of the late nineteenth century believed in municipal ownership or operation of utilities, cities enfranchised private companies
to build and run gas, electric, telephone, and transit systems.

These

franchises generally required the company to pay an initial fee to the
city for using the municipal property along which trolley tracks, gas,
electric or telephone lines would be laid; in return for this fee the
company could keep all profits derived from the utility.
Greedy entrepreneurs and city officials milked the franchise
system for personal gain paying little attention to the consequences
for the city.

Awarding franchises at its discretion the City Council,

led by Alderman Johnny Powers, perfected the art of franchise graft.

26McCarthy, p. 13-14.

28
It granted street franchises one block at a time to the highest bidder,
required companies to purchase new franchises if they wanted to make a
major change such as converting a horsecar line to a cable or trolley
system, and sold street rights separately to each utility, 27

That

these practices drove up utility costs and often resulted in multiple
systems along one street bothered the Council little.

Bribery flour-

ished as prospective owners did whatever was necessary to obtain a
franchise: the right amount of money to the right aldermen secured a
franchise; additional sums could help eliminate competitors or lower
property assessments for tax purposes.

As a final measure of its lack

of concern for the quality of municipal services provided, the Council
rarely exercised its right to place certain performance requirements in
the franchises.

Once a company paid the initial fee it was virtually

free to do as it pleased.

One result of. these practices was that be-

tween 1860 and 1890 sixty different companies held rights to 175 city
streets. 28
The gas trust scandals of the 1890s illustrate the deplorable
consequences of the franchise system.

After receiving a suitable fee

the City Council in 1894 first passed the Universal Gas ordinance
giving the Gas Trust (nine companies combined specifically for this
purpose) rights to lay gas mains anywhere in the city.

This ordinance

in effect gave the gas trust monopoly rights to decide when and where
mains would be laid and how much customers would be charged.

Knowing

27Ray Ginger, Altgeld's America {New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1958;
reprint edition New York: New Viewpoints, 1973), p. 93-94; IJ.oyd Wendt
and Herman Kogan, Bosses in Lusty Chicago (Bloomington: University of
Indiana, 1943), p. 39.
28G·lllger, p. 94 •
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that more money could still be made from gas franchises, a year later
several aldermen had the Council grant the Ogden Gas Trust a fifty year
franchise with blanket gas rights throughout the city as long as it sold
the gas at ninety cents per lOOO cubic feet.

Since the original Gas

Trust sold at $1.20 this presumably would cut the Trust out of the
market.

The catch was that Ogden Gas existed only on paper and the

new ordinance was a blatant attempt to force the Gas Trust to
the rights of Ogden Gas. 29

b~

up

When they did the money went straignt into

the aldermen's pockets.
Even worse for Chicago residents was the traction situation
created by Charles Yerkes.

After serving time in prison in Philadelphia

for embezzlement Yerkes arrived in Chicago and began acquiring traction
franchises.

He quickly laid 250 miles of track under franchises to

eight separate companies and effectively controlled the city's transit
system.

Yerkes helped finance his empire by plundering the riders.

Buying franchises block by block he put more than one line along a route

and refused to issue transfers between lines; riders thus had to pay
multiple fares if they used separate companies.

To save money Yerkes

also regularly ran fewer cars than were necessary on his routes, contemptuously observing that it was "the straphangers who pay the dividends },30 Neither in awarding franchises nor in running the streetcars
did the Council or Yerkes consider customer convenience, the price of
29

Komons, p. 123 and J35.

30carter Harrison, Stormoc Years: The Autobiography of Carter H.
Harrison, Five Times MaYor of Chicago (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1935), p. 110-12; Wendt and Kogan, p. 38.
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fares, or what would benefit the city.
Chicago's City Council, its traditionarparty system, and the
interference of the state legislature encouraged these abuses and left
many residents feeling powerless.

The alderman manipulated the fran-

chise system so well because the city had a strong council form of
government.

The Council drew up the budget, created new boards and

departments, accepted and rejected all mayoral appointments, enacted
a broad range of ordinances, and distributed city jobs and franchises.
In the hands of less than scrupulous men, politics became a free-for-

all in which jobs, franchises, and favorable ordinances were for sale. 31
The traditional political parties had neither the inclination
nor the power to clean up the situation.

Unlike other American cities

(and highly ironic in light of its future political development)
Chicago had no solid political machine or power boss in this period.
Instead, at any one time several factions, or "rings" as they were
popularly called, jostled for political power.
cohesively unified.

Neither party was

Three factions of Republicans appealed to dif-

ferent segments of the population.

Business, the press, reformers,

and the middle-class residents of the city's outlying districts supported
Charles Deneen; north siders,

particular~

the Germans, followed Fred

Busse; and William Lorimer, the closest the Republicans came to having
a political boss, dominated west side politics.
The Democratic party was

hard~

better.

John Hopkins and his

lieutenant Roger Sullivan controlled a party machine strong enough
to elect a number of their people to the Council and keep them in line

3~oyt King, "The Reform Movement in Chicago, 11 The Armals 25
(March, 1905), p. 235.
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on crucial votes.

Hopkins was elected mayor in 1893 and 1895 and

was behind some of the more notorious franchise grant scandals of the
period, but his group was not strong enough to prevent rival Democrats
from winning the mayor 1 s office in JJ397.

Carter Harrison Jr., whose

father had been assassinated in 1893 while mayor, was himself elected
to that office four times from 1897 to 1903.

Personally popular among

the voters Harrison advocated reforming the Council and represented
moderate reform-minded Democrats.

The more radical reformers and many

workers backed Edward Dunne who successfully ran for mayor in 1905.
Although the Harrison and Dunne factions often supported one another
such support was neither automatic nor without reciprocity.

In 1905

Harrison backers forced Dunne to accept one of their men as candidate
for city treasurer in return for their support of Dunne's nomination.3 2
Lacking internal unity, neither party nor any one faction was
strong enough to control the city.

Instead all scrambled for whatever

offices and political influence they could get and spent more time and
energy attacking opponents than the city's growing problems.
The actions of the state legislature
problems.

This

body~

great~

exacerbated Chicago's

for instance, had the power to set certain terms

for granting municipal franchises and its disregard for Chicago's
residents and their needs in these matters contributed to the franchise
mess.

Charles Yerkes had many friends in the legislature and in 1895

he persuaded both houses to extend several of his traction franchises
for ninety-nine years without paying compensation.

Fortunately,

Governor Altgeld vetoed this measure but two years later the legislature

3~arrison, p. 252.
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passed the Allen Bill authorizing the City Council to grant streetcar
franchises for terms up to fifty years instead of the prevailing twenty
year limit.

Since several of Yerkes franchises expired in 1903, he

attempted to push quickly through the Council his extensions but outraged voters who lmew this meant losing all control of the street railways for another fifty years defeated all state legislators who had
voted for the Allen Bill and forced the Council to deny Yerkes' request.33
As Yerkes' dealings with the City Council and state legislature
show, the possibilities for corruption and political machinations in
the late nineteenth century were great.

These possibilities were en-

hanced by the complex structure of the city's government.
this governing structure and all municipal powers
from the state.

t~ere

Until 1.870

fixed by a charter

This individual agreement enabled the legislature to

enact laws which applied only to Chicago simply by changing a piece of
the charter.

Though the city often had cause to resent the state's

arbitrary interference--when the legislature abolished the office of
High Constable in 1839 and failed to inform the city for two months,
Chicagoans sarcastically suggested that they be ...infonned more quickly
when it decided

11

to remove Chicago from the shore of Lake Michigan"--

it was possible to replace an outmoded. charter entirely.3 4

The city

had in fact requested and received new charters in 1851 and 1863.
The state constitution of 1870 however replaced such charters
with a single general incorporation act applying to all cities and
33Ibid., p. 140 and 174-75.
3 4Albert Lepawsky, Home Rule for Metropolitan Chicago (Chicago:
University of Chicago, 1932), p. 114.
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towns regardless of size and Chicago lost this measure of flexibility.
Thereafter it operated within the strictures of a law designed to apply
as well to towns of one thousand inhabitants and to reserve significant
powers to the legislature. 35

Able to exercise only those powers specifi-

cally conferred by the incorporation act and possessing no general or
residual powers which would allow it to respond to needs as they arose,
the municipal corporation found itself constitutionally unable to per6
form vital functions at the very time the city was growing rapidly.3
As a result, Chicago was governed by a maze of over lapping administrative and fiscal authorities.

In addition to the municipal corporation,

the Cook C01.mty Board of Commissioners, the Board of Education, the
Library Board, three Park Boards, the Sanitary District and others
were independent governing and taxing bodies exercising various powers
within the city's boundaries.
The development of the Sanitary District best illustrates the
consequences of this situation.

State law limited municipal indebted-

ness to one percent of the area's full property valuation.

By

the 1880s

Chicago had reached that figure and could not raise enough new revenue
to construct desperately needed sewers and a drainage canal.

Knowing

that the legislature would not change the tax laws, the city followed
the only avenue open to it and persuaded the state to create the Metropolitan Sanitary District in 1889. 37

Ninety-two percent of the territory

35 rllinois, Constitution (1870), article 4, section 22. For the
early history of Chicago's municipal government see Hugo Grosser, Chicago:
A Review of Its Governmental History, 1837-1906 (Chicago, 1906).
36 Lepawsky, p. 115 •
37Charles Merriam, Report of an Investigation of the Municipal
Revenues of Chicago (Chicago: City Club of Chicago, 1906), p. 8-9.
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and ninety-six percent of the population serviced by the District were
within the city limits but Chicago had no control over its activities.
Instead a nine member board of trustees was authorized to choose the
District's minor officials, construct all sewers, buy and sell real
estate, borrow money, issue bonds, and levy and collect taxes and
. 1 assessment s. 38
spec1a

Similarly Chicago had little control over the other governing
bodies.

Although the mayor selected the school and library board

members, there his authority ended.

The powers of these boards were

delegated directly by the legislature and each board prepared its own
budget and levied taxes independent]J" of the city.

The three park

boards, created by the legislature in 1869, managed all park lands
and levied taxes for park purposes within their individual jurisdictions.
Chicago's powers were further diminished by the operation of the
Cook County government.

The County Board of Commissioners administered

both the jail and public hospital although these institutions were located in and much more likely to be used by the city since only ten
percent of the county's area and population was outside Chicago.

Worst

of all, from Chicago's point of view, the county assessed the city's
property and collected the taxes on it.

This important revenue was then

remitted back to the city on a schedule set by the state legislature.39
Even in those instances where Chicago had the power to provide
essential services its efforts were often duplicated by the other

38McCarthy, p. 47.
39Ibld.; Merriam, Municipal Revenues, Po 9-lD.

35
authorities who were empowered to provide the same services within
their jurisdictions.

For instance, the City, Sanitary District, and

each park board maintained separate police forces.

The park boards

operated their own electric light plants and one, the Lincoln Park
Board, had its own waterworks.

The park boards had the authority to

pave, repair, and clean streets within park lands while the municipality provided this service for the remainder of the city. 4D

Besides

being inefficient this fragmented system created a wide disparity in
how and at what cost these services were distributed among the city's
residents.
Despite the vital interest of the people of the city in the decisions and actions of these various governing bodies, many of the
offices were non-elective.

The mayor, as previously noted, appointed

the school and library board members; the Commissioners of the West
and Lincoln Park Boards were appointed by the Governor while the Circuit
Court Judges selected those for the South Park Board.

The fifteen Cook

County Commissioners were elected county-wide but only five of these
represented the city.
·Perhaps the most detrimental aspect of this fragmented governing
system was that it produced an equally disjointed revenue system.

The

state designated all of Cook County as one tax district and limited the
percentage amount of property taxes which could be levied in any one
district.

Each taxing body within the district was in turn allowed

only a fixed percent of this tax base.

Throughout the 1890s the ta.x:

base of Cook County remained around five percent of the aggregate of
4DMerriam, Municipal Revenues, p. 71-72.

36
its assessed property value; in 1901 the Juul Law legally fixed the
tax limit at this five percent. 41 Chicago 1 s share of the tax base for
corporate purposes was set at two percent of the assessed property
valuation by the Revenue Act of 1879 and the remaining authorities had
rates fixed out of the other three percent.

Only the school board levies

for school buildings and a portion of the Sanitary District's taxes were
exempt from these restrictions. 42 While this system assured all governing bodies of receiving tax revenues, it was completely inflexible.

Funds

could not be transferred from one taxing body with less need to another
which might be critically short of money.- Nor was the city free to decide on a yearly basis w.hich areas were most in need and allocate funds
accordingly.
Although property taxes were a major source of revenue for local
governments, they could also issue bonds to finance municipal projects.
Here too the s,ystem worked against Chicago because each taxing body could
incur bonded indebtedness only up to one percent of its full property
valuation.

When Chicago had reached this limit in the 1800s the inde-

pendent Sanitary District was the result; in other cases the city simply
postponed making much needed improvements in municipal services.
This complex, decentralized governing structure sustained the
political factionalism which so easily bred corruption.

Comparing the

city's government with its politics, political science Professor Charles
4

~id, pa l0-J2. The Revenue Law of 1898 fixed a ratio. of onefifth between the assessed and real value of property, therefore the
tax limit of Cook County was one percent of the total real property
value.
42Ibid., p. 6 and J2.
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Merriam observed 43
Just as there is no centralized control of community affairs,
but a division of authority among eight principal and many minor
governments, so there is no Chicago boss, but a series of four
or five major factions and innumerable minor ones distributed
among the three thousand percincts of Chicago and Cook County.
Each of these factions knew that i f it lost out in one area such as
the mayor's office, there was still the chance of obtaining power and
patronage jobs elsewhere in the Sanitary District, park systems, or
the county government.

Self-serving men outside of government quickly

learned how to trade favors with the men who were attracted to public
offices offering such potential for personal gain.

m
This untenable structure of government was retained in large part
because of the hostility Chicago faced from the rest of Illinois.
tional differences had plagued Illinois throughout the century.

SecSettlers

from the south and southeast United States had followed the Ohio, Wabash,
and Y.dssissippi Rivers into the southern and south-central parts of
the state while migrants from the northeast and mid-Atlantic areas of
the country came via the Great Lakes and overland roads into northern
Illinois.

Contact between the two areas of the state and their diverse

populations remained distant until the opening of the Illinois Central
railroad in 1856.

Shortly thereafter southern Illinois' sympathy for

the South" cause in the Civil War aroused new sectional enmities.
~

the late nineteenth century these differences had evolved

into a serious urban-rural conflict which would intrude into all attempts
43Merriam, Chicago, p. 98.
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Chicago subsequently undertook to reform its municipal government.

The

majority of the state's inhabitants were from western and northern
European Protestant stock and lived in rural areas and small towns.

As

these areas began steadily losing population after 1880 those people who
remained were increasingly alarmed by Chicago's development into a vast~
urban, industrial center with a population and lifestyle very different
from their own.

Twenty percent of the state's population was foreign

born in 1890, but forty percent of Chicago's residents were foreign
born, and immigrants kept coming into the city.

The bulk of the newer

immigrants, moreover, were Catholics and Jews from eastern and southern
Europe. 44
Reflecting the fears of their constituents downstate legislators
sought ways to minimize the city's influence in state affairs.

Chicago

held only seven of the eighty-five seats in the legislature in 1870,
and several legislators tried to restrict its future influence by permanently limiting its representation to the General Assembly by a clause
in the new constitution.

They proposed replacing the current scheme

of proportional representation with representation by county; if every
county had an equal number of representatives, Cook County would never
have any political weight in Illinois no matter how large its population.45
Enough of the representatives at the Constitutional Convention disliked this scheme and Chicago was saved from this initial attempt at

44Adna F. Weber, The
A Study in Statistics (New
Cornell, 1967), p. 2ll and
in Illinois (those smaller
between 1880 and 1890.

Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century:
York: Macmillan, 1899; reprint ed., New York:
306. Sixty-five percent of all rural areas
than a town of one thousand) lost population

45william B. Philip, 11Chicago and the Downstate: A Study of Their
Conflicts" (Ph.D, Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1940), p. 16-17.
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restriction.

But downstaters, regardless of party allegiance, kept pro-

posing new schemes in the General Assembly.

In

1891 the Republicans,

controlling both houses, refused to reapportion the state on the basis of
the new federal census.

The following year the situation changed little

when the Democrats gained control of the legislature for the first time.
Nine reapportionment bills were introduced before one finalJ.y passed
in 1.893.

The reason for the legislature's reluctance was obvious: the

Chicago-Cook County contingent was increased by fifty percent to fifteen
Senators and forty-five Representatives.

Downstate retained two-thirds

of the total seats and a tenuous command of the Assembly. 46
The knowledge that it was only a matter of time before the city
would be large enough to overshadow all of state politics affected
Chicago and downstate relations for the rest of the decade.

Hostile

legislators stepped-up their campaign to limit representation permanently, and when their bills failed to pass they adopted other obstructionist tactics.

They often rejected legislation sought by Chicago

when its representatives refused to vote for restriction; at other times
support for a general state law dista5teful to the city but desired by
downstate was the price Chicago was forced to pay for obtaining any
legislation it desired.

At still other times downstate legislators en-

acted laws for Chicago over the protests of its representatives and
residents.

The Yerkes traction bills were among the most blatant

examples of this practice.
After the turn of the century antagonism worsened as shifting
patterns of population made the rural and small town areas of Illinois

46

Ibid., p. 36-41.

increasingly frightened of Chicago.

According to the census of 1900

over fifty percent of the state for the first time lived in urban areas.
Since only eleven cities in the state had populations exceeding 20,000,
s:ixtY percent of the urbanites resided in Chicago.

While the city's

population had increased by 600,000 since the previous census, fortynine counties had lost population. 47

The political effects of this

population distribution were manifested in the 1901 reapportionment
which gave Cook County nineteen Senators and fifty-seven Representatives-one-third the membership of each house and a potential veto power over
many important bills requiring a two-thirds majority for passage.

A

bi-partisan coalition of downstaters immediately introduced a bill to
restrict Cook County's representation permanently to one-third the total
of each house.

The measure failed to secure the necessary two-thirds. 4S

Chicago thus entered the new century at a virtual standstill in
the state legislature.

It could generally thwart deleterious legis-

lation aimed at itself, but rarely could it secure the relief it needed
to cope with its serious urban problems.

Downstate legislators for their

part strove to control Chicago before it controlled the state by continuing their efforts to restrict Chicago's representation and to enforce
general state laws inimical to the lifestyle and needs of the city's
diverse and growing citizenry.

Ultimately as more and more Chicago resi-

dents became preoccupied with finding ways to alleviate their municipal
problems and reform their corrupt and inefficient government, the antagonism between city and state pushed them to demand municipal home ruleo
47Ib.d
~., p. 2 and 50o
48Ib.d
__!_., p. 51-54.

CHAPTER Ill

INTEREST GROUPS AND ISSUES
By the 1890s many Chicagoans agreed that the existing governing

structure was failing in many ways to provide crucial municipal services
and to make the city a decent, safe, and democratic place to live.
There was, however, little consensus about what measures ought to be
taken to remedy this situation.

One striking characteristic of the

1890s and early twentieth century was the fervent involvement of many
different groups in municipal affairs, often with the realization that
this involvement was absolutely necessary to protect their particular
interests o Business and labor sought ways to protect and promote their
interests, and their actions and attitudes in municipal affairs were
often shaped by their mutual antagonism; women had their own, often con-·
flicting ideas; and there were also a variety of groups organized to
attack specific municipal problems.

The organizations which these

groups formed, the reform proposals they set forth, their responses to
the actions and ideas of fellow citizens, and the priorities they gave
to certain issues and not to others, reveal much about what these Chicagoans wanted from their city and the roles they hoped to play in its future
development.
I

As a booming industrial city, Chicago attracted aspiring entrepreneurs from throughout the countryo

41

By 1890 men like Marshall Field,
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George Pullman, Philip Armour, and Gustavus Swift were building companies and fortunes, and they and other businessmen organized business
1
clubs to promote their interests.
In 1877 several prominent merchants
and manufacturers formed the Commercial Club dedicated to advancing
rtby social intercourse and friendly interchange of views the prosperity
of the city of Chicago"; the club 1 s membership was limited to sixty
men "outstanding in the most important branches of Chicago business
life. u2 Other businessmen followed this lead and organized other clubs
with similar aims, among them the Mercantile, Sunset, Industrial, and
Merchant's clubs, the Association of Commerce, and the Illinois Manufacturer's Association. Through these organizations the business community
directed its response to issues and events in the city, a response which
one later observer characterized as a clash between the "respective
rights of the many and the few" in the community. 3

The business clubs

lobbied for favorable business and tax legislation from the city government, demanded a greater voice in how their tax dollars were being
spent, particularly in the running of the public schools, and championed
the franchise system as a cornerstone of free enterprise at a time when
so many others seriously questioned its efficacy.
Nowhere did the desires of business conflict as intensely as with
those of its own workers, and nowhere was business more determined to win.
Chicago's working classes had a tradition of activism that went back

~erce, History of Chicago, vol. 3, passim. Armour, for example
had been a ditch-digger in the 1850s; in 1890 he was worth $25 million.
2

Thid.' p. 190.

3Merriam, Chicago, p. llO.
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to the 1880s when the Central Labor Union--founded in 1884 by Albert
parsons, an anarchist who spurned the eight hour movement in favor of
abolishing the wage system altogether--began to attract dissatisfied
radicals out of the more moderate Chicago Trades and Labor Assembly.
Businessmen responded to this turn of events by inviting in the armed
forces: in 1885 the Commercial Club gave the federal government land
for Fort Sheridan, and the Merchant's Club donated land for building the
Great Lakes naval training station.

Milltance on both sides led swiftly

to the Haymarket "massacre" of 1886, an event that solidified the fear
and hatred of both sides and shaped the attitudes of the labor movement
toward municipal affairs over the succeeding decades. 4
The background to the massacre was a strike at the McCormick Reaper
Works.

The company, which the previous year had been forced to grant a

fifteen percent wage increase, provoked the strike by locking out unionized workers in an attempt to break the union; non-union replacements were
hired and the plant became a scene of frequent clashes between the union
pickets and the police and Pinkertons brought in to protect the replacements.

On May

3 two union men were killed and several wounded by police

who fired into a crowd harassing the new workers, and the city's radical
labor leaders responded by summoning all laboring people to protest at
Haymarket Square the next evening.

Though tensions rose the next day

when crowds clashed again with the police at the reaper works, the
meeting itself was disappointingly small and the speeches fairly uninspiring and non-inflammatory until the police (against Mayor Harrison' s
orders) waded into the crowd ordering them to disperse.

A bomb exploded

~e best account of Haymarket remains Henry David, The History of
the Haymarket Affair (New York: 1936)o
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in the midst of the police, killing seven.
The reaction of the city leaders to the massacre was not such as
to persuade workers that they could expect fair treatment from the
authorities.

Convinced that a worker 1 s revolution was imminent, news-

papers, prominent citizens, and law enforcement officials hysterically
accused the meeting's organizers of inciting the violence and demanded
they be brought to trial.

Advised by the state 1 s attorney to "make

the raids and look up the law afterward" the police conducted a ruthless
sweep of working-class neighborhoods rounding up trade unionists, foreigners, and just about anyone they wanted. 5 The business community demanded
increased police and citizen vigilance against potential labor agitation
and took its own steps to assure citizen participation. 6 Eight men were
tried and convicted of murder before a judge and jury who were presented
with no bomb thrower and no evidence linking the accused to the act; despite some citizen protest against the injustice of the trial proceedings
four of these men were subsequently hanged.
H~ket

decimated the radical labor organizations although

remnants remained in the socialist camp led by Thomas Morgan.

The ma-

jority of the trades unions regrouped into the Chicago Federation of
Labor which by the turn of the century had a membership of over two
hundred affiliated local unions.

The majority of workers were never as

radical as the leaders of the Central Labor Union but they deeply resented

5Ginger, p. 49.
6
Prominent businessmen formed the First Council of Conservators'
League of America to counteract "recent labor troubles" and guard against
future such disturbances; Cyrus McCormick, Philip Armour, Marshall Field,
and George Pullman were members of a Citizens' Association committee which
offered to help the police in these matters; and on the state level the
legislature passed the Merritt Conspiracy Bill to facilitate the arrest
and conviction of suspected radicals. See Pierce, vol. 3, p. 281 and 289.

45
the trial and the anti-labor hysteria which followed Haymarket.
If workers needed any further evidence of business hostility
they received it over the next several years.
out~g

Many businessmen in the

townships, for instance, supported annexation in 1889 because

the township police provided them inadequate protection in times of
labor unrest.

With annexation these forces would be combined with the

Chicago police and become a much stronger deterrent against strikers
and demonstrators of all kinds. 7
sive tendencies further.

In 1894 business carried its repres-

When workers struck the huge Pullman Works

to protest pay cuts which were not accompanied by a reduction of their
rent and bills in the company owned housing and stores, businessmen
repeatedly urged the Governor and then President Cleveland to send in
troops.

Governor Altgeld refused but the President complied and fed-

eral troops broke up the strike.
Such events convinced laboring men that they could expect little
support from either their government or fellow citizens and that for
the future they had to cultivate their own political power.

The CFL

therefore began developing a political program for its membership to
follow.

And a major premise of this program was that organized labor

would consciously and actively work for a municipal government and
political system which better met its needs in the community.
Women too were becoming increasingly aware of themselves as members of their community and seeking ways to participate in its affairs.
By the late nineteenth century many of them were working for reform and

they were often able to cut across class lines both to support one
7McCarthy, p • 14-15

another 1 s causes and to work toward common municipal goals

o

Women

began to participate actively in municipal affairs in the mid-l870s
when several prominent women seeking to be "socially useful" founded
the Chicago Woman 1 s Club.

Like similar organizations throughout the

country the Club was initially a place for women to meet and listen to
speakers.

But such passive affairs dissatisfied many members and in

1$76 they reorganized the Club into departments-home, education, philanthropy, reform, and later art and literature, and philosophy and
science--for discussing, studying, and acting on current problems.
The first projects undertaken by the Club reflected its concern
for the special problems of women and children.

It sponsored the

appointment of a woman to the Board of Education and a woman doctor to
the County Insane Asylum, helped establish kindergartens in the public
schools, and supported the activities of the Women and Children's Frotective League.

Nine hundred women paid a $15 entrance fee and $10

yearly dues to participate in the Club r s work. 8
The club idea appealed also to other groups of women, many of
whom had neither the spare time, money, nor inclination to JOin an organization dominated by the city's elite; instead many middle-class.
and working-class women formed neighborhood clubs.

While these local

clubs did not abandon the city-wide perspective of the Woman's Club,
they also focused much of their attention to solving specific neighborhood problems.

This was particularly important in the poorer areas where

mlL."licipal services were inadequate at best.

In the Hull-House settle-

ment neighborhood, for instance, immigrant women banded together to
8
Adade Wheeler and Marlene Wortman, The Roads They Made: Women in
Illinois History (Chicago: Charles Kerr, 1977), Po 63-64o
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clean up the streets, get better garbage collection services from the
city, and attack the frightful health and sanitation conditions of the
area. 9
Women also worked through labor organizations.

As more and more

women had joined the labor force they discovered the need for unions to
protect their economic interests.

But when they received only scant sup-

port from their male counterparts Chicago women formed their own craft
and trade unions and labor federations.

Through the Chicago Working

Women's Union, the Ladies Federated Labor Union, and later the Chicago
chapter of the National Women Trades Union League working women expanded
their activities into municipal affairs.
The experience of the Chicago Federation
this process.

~f

Teachers illustrates

Catherine Goggins and Margaret Haley organized the pre-

dominantly female elementary school teachers into the CFT in 1897 to
fight the Board of Education' s threats to suspend their three year old
pension fund.

The next year the Board withdrew the first salary raise

the teachers had received since 1877 and the leaders of the Federation
suspected that municipal corruption and waste lay behind the city's inability to pay the teachers as well as the city's inability to provide
public services.

The CFT launched its own municipal reform campaign

by suing the city to collect unpaid public utility taxes. 10
Because they shared a common interest in the needs and problems
of women, women's groups worked together on many issues despite class

9Addams, p. 203-.205.
10
Ibid., p. 230; Wheeler and Wortman, p. 86-87; Margaret Haley,
~ Story 11 , unpublished autobiography in Chicago Federation of Teachers
Papers, Boxes 32 and 33, Chicago Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois.
11

and cultural differences.

The Woman 1 s Club lent its support to numerous

labor activities: it helped the teachers

figh~

for a pension fund, sup-

ported the founding and activities of the Women 1 s Trade Union League, and
conducted investigations of the working conditions of women in various
industries.

And though Marshall Field was a prestigious member of

chicago 1 s economic and social circles, and possibly a good friend of
their husband 1 s, clubwomen published an expose of working conditions
during the Christmas rush in his and other major department stores. ll
Working women joined clubwomen in campaigns for social reforms.

Eliza-

beth Morgan, founder of the Ladies Federated Labor Union, helped organize clubs throughout the state into the Illinois Woman's Alliance,
and together the Union and Alliance worked to enforce truancy and compulsory education laws and to pass the Factory Act of 1893 which regulated child labor and mandated the eight hour day for women and children.
Women from all these social and economic groups quickly agreed
that the key to the success of their efforts was suffrage, for without
this power they were constantly dependent on the good will and acquiescence of men.

Working women were tired of having to rely on men to

protect their economic interests

12

; other women recognized that having

to plead for passage of reform legislation as a personal favor, as was
often the case, was both distasteful and inefficient.

A bill pertaining

to the Juvenile Court languished in the legislature, for instance, until
one of the city 1 s leading clubwomen, Louise DeKove."l Bowen, met with a
prominent legislator and convinced him that nothing in it conflicted
L1wheeler and Wortman, p. 85.
12
chicago Federation of Labor, Minutes, April 4, 1906.
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with important interests of any of his colleagues.

Jane Addams experi-

enced the same type of problem of having to appeal to all male voters
when she tried unsuccessfully to oust her ward's notoriously corrupt
1
alderman Johnny Powers. 3
The right to vote therefore became a vital issue for all these
women.

Some of them favored total suffrage while others sought to vote

only in municipal and state elections.

In both cases they followed the

lead of the National American Woman Suffrage Association and inaugurated
petition campaigns throughout the state.

In

1893 the legislature re-

ceived more petitions on suffrage than on any other issue and these petitions kept coming in the succeeding years.
for support.

In

Women looked everywhere

1899 the Chicago teachers collected the signatures of

25,000 tmion men, supposedly strongly anti-suffrage, on their petitions. 14
By the turn of the century however women had secured only the right to

vote for school board members.

As a result they entered the new c&itury

more determined than ever to make getting the vote one of their highest
priorities.
To address better a wide range of municipal problems many of the

.

city's prominent·men orgaDized a number of civic reform groups.

The

first of these organizations, the Citizens' Association, was founded in

1874

by a group of men seeking to upgrade the city's fire protection

methods.

After their initial successes in this endeavor, the members of

the Association resolved to became a general watchdog group, monitoring
the conduct of elected public officials for evidence of misconduct and
13

Louise DeKoven Bowen, Growing up with a City (New York: Macmillan,
1926), p. J.D?; Addams, p. 222-223.
14wheeler and Wortman, p . J.D6-J.D? •
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corruption and examining existing public policies and recommending new
ones.

The Association's first venture into municipal politics came in

1875 when the city voted on the Cities and Villages Act of the new constitution.

Since under the terms of the Act Chicago would retain its

strong Council government, a system which the Association firmly believed encouraged corruption, it drafted a substitute law creating a
strong executive department and weakening the Council. 15 The at tempt
failed as the voters ratified the Cities and Villages Act, but the
Association had commenced a campaign to reform the municipal government
which it would wage over the succeeding decades.
For two decades the Citizen's Association remained the city's
principal civic organization.

Then in 1893, in the midst of a new

nationwide depression which was severely affecting Chicago, the city's
trades unions sponsored a speech by William T. Stead, an English editor
and reformer who had been visiting and observing Chicago.

Stead 1 s criti-

cism of the city for its corruption, civic and governmental failure, and
its callous treatment of the poor and unemployed struck a responsive
chord in his audience of businessmen, professionals, social workers,
labor leaders and prominent Chicago women already alarmed by municipal
problems and growing animosity between business and labor. 16

Following

Stead's speech, several of these people formed the Civic Federation and
declared its aims to be honest economical government, tax reform, harmony
between classes, and amelioration of social ills.

These ideals gave the

Civic Federation a somewhat broader and more moralistic purpose and tone
15samuel E. Sparling, Municipal History and Present Organization
of the City of Chicago (Madison, 1898), p. 62-65.
16
Addams, p. l22.
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than the Citizens' Association, at least for awhile.

Despite its rhet-

oric about uniting classes however, the Federation's leadership was
heavily middle and upper-class: I\Yman Gage, president of the First National Bank, served as the first president and its vice-president was Mrs.
Potter Palmer, wife of one of the city's business magnates.

The member-

ships' desire for economical government quickly surpassed the other
ideals.
The Pullman Strike of 1894 decisively changed the Federation's
thrust and exposed the weak ties between the classes. "When the organization failed to secure arbitration of the worker's grievances, and the
strike was then crushed with the approval and encouragement of many
Chicagoans, labor withdrew from the Federation, again feeling embittered
and certain that it could never rely on the good will or methods of
others in the community.

Subsequently the Federation concentrated on

stemming civic corruption by closing gambling houses, promoting civil
service among municipal employees, and working to eliminate bribery in
the awarding of city contracts.

Most importantly, the Federation began

to seek legislation regulating the assessment, collection, and use of tax
monies.
One problem which neither the Citizens' Association nor the Civic
Federation had attacked effectively was the actual membership of the City
Council.

The affairs of both organizations were too diffuse to allow

them to concentrate on any one issue and besides, they were investigative organizations that did not directly enter politics.

Following the

Ogden Gas scandal and various other franchise-grabbing schemes, however,
several citizens decided in 1896 that the Council had to be purged.
was needed to accomplish this, they thought, was a new organization

What
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which would participate in the electoral process.

To this end they began

the Municipal Voters league.
Unlike the Citizens 1 Association and Civic Federation the Municipal Voters League espoused only one cause: to reform the sixty-eight
member City Council, of whom it was said at the time "there were only
siX who were suspected of being honest. rr 17

To do this the League aban-

doned the old approach of investigating those already in office in favor
of examining the past records and promises of aldermanic candidates
and recommending good candidates to the voters.

The League gave its

stamp of approval to candidates of either party who pledged to seek
fair compensation for the city for all public utility franchises and
promote municipal efficiency in general.

It also emphasized ward issues

when promoting new candidates by asking voters to consider whether the
old alderman was keeping the streets clean, seeing that the garbage was
collected, and other matters of immediate interest.

Finally the League

tried to back candidates it believed were popular enough in the ward to
get elected.

18

Half of the city's aldermen stood for election every year and
over the next four years two-thirds of the candidates approved by the
League won City Council seats.

The League was most successful in the

"silk-stocking" and newly annexed middle-class wards on the periphery
of the city, and least successful in the old slum wards where it often
found no acceptable candidates to back.

But over half of the League 1 s

l7Merriam, Chicago, p. 1D5.

~chael McCarthy, "The New Metropolis: Chicago, the Annexation
Movement and Progressive Reform," in Michael Ebner and Eugene Tobin, eds.,
The Age of Urban Reform (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1977), p. 50.
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candidates were elected from the city's old wards, enough to indicate a
1
general dissatisfaction with the City Council. 9
The Municipal Voters League crusades set the tone for future political reform in Chicago.

The "cleaned-up" Council ceased to be the

target of reformers, who turned their attention to other problems
troubling the city.

The success of the campaign against corruption gave

them every cause for optimism in new endeavors.

The reformed Council

vindicated the League 1 s belief that if issues and candidates were presented to the voters in a rational and intelligent manner, the voters
would respond with equal intelligence and reason.

The League, as well

as other reformers, would assume in the future that reasonable men would
share their views on reform issues.
One more important reform organization was formed in 1903 by several members of the Municipal Voters League who wanted to expand their more
active political approach to other reform efforts.

The City Club of

Chicago was established by these men to provide a forum for discussing
urban topics and problems and attracting new men to help implement their
plans for continuing to investigate and improve municipal conditions.
Membership in the City Club was by invitation of a Board of Directors
and "confined to those who are sincerely interested :in practical methods
of improving public conditions. n 20

Two years later the Club organized

itself into civic committees to systematically and continuously appraise
all aspects of Chicago affairs and also began issuing a weekly Bulletin.
19
McCarthy, "Businessmen and Professionals," p. 29-33.
20
walter L. Fisher to Messrs. Marx and Door, November 16, 1903,
Walter L. Fisher Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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Members of the Citizens' Association, Civic Federation, Municipal
voters League, and City Club were among the most visible and 11respectable 11
business and professional men in the city.

They believed that municipal

waste, corruption, and inefficiency resulted largely from Chicago's outmoded, patchwork government.

other less prominent, less wealthy pro-

fessional men believed that the cause of municipal problems lay elsewhere and formed their own reform organizations to pursue other solutions.
Many of these men belonged to the Chicago branch of the Independence
League, a national reform coalition headed by publisher William Randolph
Hearst.

Hearst and the Independence League believed, along with many

other Americans, that these municipal problems stemmed from a "corrupt
bargain" between the two political parties and the big trusts and corporations which gave privileges to special interests at the expense of
the majority of the people.

Because of this bargain, the League argued,

the corporations and the rich never paid their fair share of taxes and
the city lost millions of dollars in desperately needed revenues which
could otherwise have been used to provide and upgrade municipal services.
The League thus advocated a complete revision of municipal tax systems
to compel the wealthy and powerful to pay their taxes.
The members of the Independence League and the civic reform organizations differed in other ways also.

Although the former were primarily

lawyers, these men had neither the prestige nor the wealth of those
lawyers leading the civic reformers.

And while most of the members of

the Independence League who professed a political allegiance listed
themselves as Democrats, the majority of the reformers were Republicans. 21
2
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Those who joined the Independence League were also more

like~

to sym-

pathize with third party movements; HowardS. Taylor and John J.

D~nohue,

two of the League 1 s important spokesmen, had belonged to the Populist
and People's parties

respective~.

Other influential men in Chicago did not agree completely with
the ideas of any of these established groups and they proposed different
solutions which attracted a certain following within the city.

Louis

Post and Raymond Robins were two of the most important of these men;
although both men belonged to the City Club they often found themselves
as odds with their fellow members.

Post was a lawyer and newspaper editor

who, like the Independence League, believed that unfair tax laws perpetuated municipal problems.

His solution though was the single tax proposed

by Henry George in 1879.

According to disciples of George only a single

tax on_the unearned increment from land value could bring political,
social, and economic democracy to the country and its cities.

Louis

Post was able to project this philosophy into municipal affairs.

In

the case of public utilities, for instance, Post believed that since all
land belonged by right to all of the people municipal ownership of utilities was essential.

The prevailing system of "ownership by private

moneygrubbing corporations", he argued, deprived the people of their
right to the city streets and assured that there would never be adequate
. .

m~c1pa

l serv1ceso
.
22

Sociologist and social worker Raymond Robins wanted to make the
municipal government more responsible for the general welfare of the
22

Louis F. Post, "Living a Long Life Over," unpublished autobiography in Louis F. Post Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.,
Po 270-72,
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majority of its citizens, particularly the poor.

The existing munici-

pal government, he believed, functioned for the benefit of the wealthy
and the politicians and these groups had failed to provide a decent life
for many Chicagoans.

His solution was to change the municipal structure

and laws to give the people a more direct voice in all municipal affairs.
Clearly then, Chicago in the 1890s was experiencing the severe
municipal problems and the lack of agreement over how to solve them and
for what purposes which historians now see as characteristic of urban
progressivism. 23

And as the new century got under way more groups of

citizens with other priorities for reform organized and demanded a voice
in any reform process.

II

Various groups of Chicagoans confronted each other in a number
of important reform issues which emerged at the end of the century.
One of the most controversial of these issues was how to administer the
public schools.

The condition of the schools attracted the attention

of most of the residents not only because their children attended, but
also because the system was a major recipient of property tax revenues.
Under the prevailing system a Board of Education appointed by the Mayor
and a Superintendent selected by the Board ran the schools, technically
free of any outside controlo

Many residents objected to this situation

but for widely disparate reasons.

Businessmen worried about how the

schools spent their tax dollars; many of them argued that the school
system was fiscally wasteful because the Board was appointed by a poli23For a brief overview of the status of this issue see Michael H.
Ebner and Eugene M. Tobin, The Age of Urban Reform: New Perspectives on
The Progressive Era (Port Washington: Kennikat, 1977), p. 3-l2.
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tician and hence was subject to political pressure.

Led by the Commercial

and Merchants' Clubs these men wanted to diminish the Board's powers and
transfer most authority to the Superintendent, who they hoped would then
administer the schools in a more business-like fashion--that is, with
more efficiency and economyo 24
In contrast, the Teachers' Federation, Federation of Labor, and

many parents and private citizens wanted to make the school system more
democratic and directly accountable to the public.

Rather than shifting

power to the Superintendent they sought to elect the school board members,
give teachers a greater voice in planning curriculum and deciding school
policies, and to have the system place more emphasis on education than
on fiscal expertise and economy. 25

The antagonism between the businessmen

and these other groups was heightened by the former's aQvocacy of a dual
school system: the regular schools and industrial training schoolso

The

CFL suspected that business wanted to use industrial schools both to
train apprentices to oppose unions and to assign p9or children automatically to an education designed to limit their opportunities for the
future.
Any reform of the public schools clearly concerned how much influence and control the broad community would have in municipal affairsj this
was also true of the public utilities problem.

Following the Yerkes and

Allen Bill scandals of the late 1890s, labor, radical reformers and socialists in the city began demanding complete and immediate municipal ownership
2

~erriam, Chicago, p. 126-30.

25
Addams, p. 233-34; CFL, Minutes, December 2, 1906; Post, "Living
a Long Life Over," p. 315; Wheeler and Wortman, p. 87-89. In a public
policy (non-binding) referendum conducted in April 1904, two-thirds of
those voting favored an elected school board. Chicago Daily News, Almanac
(1905), p. 357.
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of the utilities as the only way out of the franchise mess.

While most

of the business community decried this insidious attack on the free enterprise system, many politicians and moderate civic reformers agreed that
some significant reform was needed and they looked for
solution than complete municipal ownership.

a

less drastic

Hardly anyone in the city

did not have an opinion about the public utilities problem; the issue
was so volatile that it determined the outcome of the 1903 and 1905
mayoral elections.
The problem was quite urgent in 1903 for existing franchises
would soon expire and a bill to allow cities to own and operate public
transit systems was stalled in the state legislature.

Mayor Harrison

and his Republican challenger both endorsed the bill, but only Harrison
promised to veto any franchise extensions granted by the City Council
before the law could be enacted.

On the strength of this pledge Harrison

was re-elected and the month after the election the legislature passed
the Mueller Law empowering cities to build or buy and operate street
car lines.
To the dismay of the advocates of municipal

o~ership,

however, the

Mueller Law touched off a series of political machinations which threatened to impede their goal.

First of all, Harrison and other influential

men had wanted the Mueller Law simply to use as a club to force existing
transit companies to renegotiate franchises more agree.able to the city. 26
The mayor authorized the City Council Committee on Transportation to
begin such negotiations even before the voters had a chance to accept or
reject the Mueller Law by public referendumo
26

Komons, p. 296.

The proponents of municipal
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ownership knew they could obtain the three-fifths majority needed to
ratify the Law and they attempted to counter the mayor's actions by
pushing for an early referendum which would place not only the Mueller
Law before the voters but also two pertinent public policy questions.
As expected the voters overwhelmingly ratified all three measures.

The

public policy questions urged the city to proceed immediately in acquiring
street railways and requested the Council to refrain from granting franchises during this process and instead license existing street railways
and compel them to provide satisfactory service. 27
D·espite this evidence of the public's sympathies, critics of municipal ownership continued to seek a more moderate solution, protesting that
it was neither financially nor legally feasible for the city to own and
operate its own transit system.

The Mueller Act had, in fact, thrown

its own roadblock in the path of municipal ownership.

It stipulated

that cities could finance transit systems either by issuing municipal
bonds or street car certificates to be paid from the revenues realized
from the transit lines.

Opponents seized upon this clause and argued

that the first method was impossible because the city had reached its
allowable level of indebtedness, and that it was also highly unlikely
that the city could raise enough money by the latter method.

In addi-

tion the traction companied threatened to test the Mueller Law in court,
and the Union Traction Company was in federal receivership and thus removed from any municipal control until the government had untangled its
financial arrangements.
Backed by the opponents of municipal ownership Harrison remained
27 Daily News, Almanac (1905), p. 357.
non-binding referenda.

Public policy questions were
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firm in his intention to secure new franchises from the transit companies.
In the late summer of 1904 he supported a settlement agreed upon by the

Committee on Transportation and the City Railway Company in which, Harrison contended, the company accepted in principle universal transfers,
the five-cent fare, and paying adequate compensation to the city.

He

then refused to submit the Tentative Ordinance, as it was called, or
28
any other franchise ordinance to popular referendum.
In response the
enraged supporters of municipal ownership secured pledges from a majority
of the City Council not to pass any franchise ordinance that did not contain a referendum clause, and prepared to place the transit question on
the ballot once again at the April 1905 election.
Harrison subsequently declined to run for another term and the
Democrats nominated Edward F. Dunne who promised to implement immediate
municipal ownership; his Republican opponent John .Harlan refused to support municipal ownership.

Durme won the election on the strength of his

pledge and the voters once again showed their preferences on the transit
issue.

They decisively rejected the Tentative Ordinance and approved

measures demanding that the Council not grant any new franchise to the
City Railway or any other traction company. 29
But the issue was far from settled.

Despite his pledge Dunne ap-

pointed Walter Fisher, a noted civic reformer and moderate on municipal
ownership question, as his advisor on traction.

Fisher proceeded to pur-

sue a moderate course and the controversy over the appropriate
regulate public utilities continued to divide the city.
28H arrJ..son,
.
p.
29Daily News, Almanac ( 1906), p. 292.
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Yet perhaps no issue caused more popular uproar in Chicago than
liquor regulation, and this issue had the additional consequence of
causing the city's ethnic groups to become involved intensely in municipal affairs.

As temperance forces in the city and throughout the

state grew more ardent in their quest, ethnic Chicagoans united to fight
what they correctly perceived as a direct assault on their lifestyle.
Once they were unified in this common cause it was only a short step for
them to shift their efforts from a negative stance--that of opposing prohibition--to the more positive one of actively deciding what kind of
city they wanted and then pursuing their ideas and objectives.

By the end of the century ethnic groups had already been alarmed
by the increasing political strength of groups such as the Hyde Park
Protective ASsociation, and the Law and Order and Anti-Saloon Leagues.
For awhile prohibition efforts had been centered in the outlying township districts.

When these townships were annexed in 1889 the prohi-

bitionists secured a guarantee for continuing these township prohibition
districts in return for their supporting annexation.

Thus when Hyde

Park was annexed eleven of its forty-eight square miles were dry and
the remainder subject to local option.

However the Columbian Exposition

of 1893 occasioned a reversal of this agreement and helped upset whatever delicate balance there had been between the residents of the dry
townships and the wet city.

Finding it unthinkable that the Exposition,

located in Hyde Park, should not be able to sell liquor, the Board of
Directors secured a temporary liquor license.

The drys believed this

was sinply a first step toward erasing the earlier agreement entirely
and began working to extend dry and local option areas into Chicago
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In the first years of the twentieth century, temperance forces

stepped up their activities by trying to compel both

th~

city and the

state to regulate more stringently the sale of liquor in the city. 30
The Anti-8aloon and Law and Order Leagues demanded that the City Cvuncil
enforce the state laws regulating all places s·erving liquor and partieularly that it close saloons on Sunday.

Although the Cities and Villages

Act of 1872 gave city councils power to license, regulate, and prohibit
the sale of liquor, the Leagues contended that local legislatures had to
stay within bounds of state laws when exercising these powers.

Knowing

that Sunday closings would be very unpopular in Chicago, in March 1906
the City Council instead attempted to placate the Leagues by raising the
saloon license fee from $500 to $])00, claiming this would force disreputable saloons out of business while providing additional revenues for
the city.

State 1 s Attorney Jol:m Healy then threatened to impeach Mayor

Dunne if he did not enforce the state law requiring all places serving
liquor to close at 1:00 AoM.

At the Mayor 1 s behest the Council voted

to stop issuing the special bar permits which allowed clubs and dance
halls to serve liquor after 1:00 A.M.
A few days later more than 30,000 people representing many of the
city's ethnic groups gathered in a mass meeting to protest this infringement of their social and leisure activities.

Addressing the crowd in

several languages speakers accused the City Council of constricting
"personal liberty" and the right of everyone to choose his or her own
form of recreation.
30

They blamed the Council's actions on a small but

Jol:m Clayton, "The Scourge of Sinners: Arthur Burrage Farwell,"
Chicago History (Fall 1974), p. 69-71; Chicago Record-Herald, February
and March, 1906, passim.
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vocal group of prohibitionists who were conspiring with temperance
throughout the state to force prohibition on Chicago.

group~

ing

The cheer-

crowd resolved to organize a society to remove systematically all

laws by which "bigots attempt to subjugate the majority," by securing
complete home rule for Chicago from the state legislature. 31 The results of this meeting were dramatic: the City Council rescinded its
order and agreed to continue issuing the special bar permitso
The size, enthusiasm, and success of this meeting impressed the
publishers of the German language press.

They placed ads in the city's

ethnic newspapers inviting ethnic societies to send delegates to a convention for organizing a permanent group dedicated to protecting and
promoting their common interests. 32 On May 27, 1906 nearly 350 ethnic
societies representing 60,000 people sent delegates to this meeting
where they organized the United Societies for Local Self-Government.33
Thus using their well-established community organizations--newspapers
and benevolent and fraternal

societies--Ghic~o's

ethnic groups were able

to launch the largest interethnic group of the Progressive Era with relative easeo
The United Societies encompassed men from most ethnic and cliss
groups in the city.

Despite German predominance the organization at-

tempted to represent directly all members by selecting a large governing
body of nine officers and fifty-eight executive committee members from
every ethnic group.34 Two Germans, a Pole, a Bohemian, and a Croatian
31Abendpost, March 26, 1906.
3

~or an example see L 1 It alia,

May

26, 1906.

33see Appendix II for a list of these societies o
34see Appendix Ill.

were vice-presidents; the secretary and treasurer were German; and a
Hungarian served as financial secretary.

Of fifty-five identifiable

executive committee members, twenty-nine were German, nine Bohemian,
six Polish, four Swedish, two Swiss, and one each Italian, Irish, Danish, Belgian, and Croatian.

In the subsequent annual conventions each

nationality was to have one vote per its first 200 or fewer members with
an additional vote for each additional 200 members.

By

occupation half

these men were workers--machinists, tailors, clerks, laborers, and
craftsmen of all kinds.

There was one doctor, eight lawyers, three

newspapermen, and eight small businessmen.

Not surprisingly tep. were

saloonkeepers and three were in the liquor business, although these men
were no more visible than anyone elseo35
<Ale group was conspicuously absent: the Irish.

Having already

made significant inroads into the regular political system perhaps they
did not feel the need for ethnic solidarity to achieve their goals;3 6
perhaps too the other groups resented their political power and balked at
including them.

Whatever the reason the Irish did not formally send

delegates to the convention, but the United Societies
men to occupy important posts in the ·organization.

di~_ask

two Irish-

Charles Gilbert, a

lawyer, was the Societies' first president, and former Congressmen
Edward Noonan who did attend the founding convention, acted as the
Societies 1 lawyer.

Since no mention of Gilbert 1 s selection appears in

3 5The nationalities and occupations of these men were compiled from
Abendpost, May 28, 1906; Chic ago, City Directory ( 1906 and 1907); the
United Societies for Local Self-Government, Constitution and By-Laws (1906).
6
3 Edward Dunne was elected Mayor in 1905; Roger Sullivan led one
of the factions in the Democratic party; and a number of Irish sat in
the City Council and occupied prominent positions in the Democratic
Party.

the convention accounts it is impossible to say for certain why he was
chosen, although Alex Gottfried in his biography of Anton German (permanent secretary of the Societies after 1907) speculated that the Societies
believed it "impolitic" to have a foreign name heading the organization. 37
The size (reputedly

]JQO

societies representing 250,000 people by

1919) made the United Societies probably the largest interethnic group
of its time; its political activities made it an important force in
Chicago in the Progressive Era.

At first glance the ideas and actions

of the United Societies do resemble the ritualistic ethnocultural orientation of "personal liberty" as described by Paul Kleppner in his study
of late nineteenth century midwestern voting patterns.

To Kleppner

"personal liberty" was the slogan utilized by ritualistic ethnic groups
opposed to 11 government whose regulatory powers are used to establish canons
of social norms, 11 and advocating government "whose presence could be
seen but not felt. rr3

8

Hence for IO.eppner and others who have followed

his lead, ethnic opposition to prohibition stemmed from a religious
antipathy toward government attempting to legislate morality.

While

the Societies indeed opposed prohibition, and sometimes used the slogan
11

personal liberty", it is shortsighted to categorize the Societies simply

as an anti-prohibition group in this mold.

Their motives were neither

as culturally static nor politically limited as the ethnoculturists
and others who study Chicago history suggest, and to apply this inter-

37Gottfried, po 53-54. Gottfried cites no source for this information.

There is no mention of Gilbert, for instance, in the Abendpost,

May 28, 1906 account of the meeting although the names of all the other

officers and executive committee members are given.

38

Paul Kleppner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850-1900 (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 169
and 178.
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pretation to the United Societies without carefully examining what the
organization was saying and doing underestimates the impact of the Progressive Era on all urban residents and misses the opportunity to examine
chicago's ethnic groups as a vital part of their community and the processes which decided municipal policies.39
The foremost task of the delegates to the Societies 1 founding convention was to adopt a statement of the purposes and principles of the
organization, and the discussion over this issue does not reveal a culturally-based concern for seeking a severely limited government.

Rather,

the speakers presented their ideas as consistent with the highly secu1ar and "American" principles of democracy, majority rule, and respect

for the law.

Fritz Glogauer, editor of the Abendpost, castigated tem-

perance laws as undemocratic, the "unreasonable and coerc:;,ve regulation"
resulting from the "agitation of a tiny, but arrogant minority, 11 and
reminded his audience that energetic resistance was "the proper think in
a democratic republic where the majority rules, not the minority; where
the dog waves the tail and not vice versa. 1140

One speaker proclaimed

that he was just as good an American as anyone else and therefore entitled to an equal voice in determining laws and government, while still
others expressed concern for the general esteem for law when one group
tries to enforce offensive laws upon the rest of society.

Speakers

39 For previous treatments of the United Societies see John Allswang,
A House for All Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Chicago, 1.890-1936 (Lexington:
University of Kentucky, 1971); John Buenker, "The Dynamics of Chicago
Ethnic Politics, 1900-1930," Journal of the Illinois State Historical Societx_ 67 (April 1974); Gottfried, Boss Cermak; Edward Kantowicz, PolishAmerican Politics in Chicago. 1888-1940 (Chicago: University of Chicago,
197 5); McCarthy, "Businessmen and Professionals. 11
40

Abendpost, May 28, 1906.
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furthermore stressed not freedom from government, but freedon of selfgovernment--an important distinction--demanding that the citizens of
Chicago, as well as other local communities, be allowed to govern themselves independent of interference from the rural elements of the state.
The convention issued a Declaration of Purposes and Principles
reflecting these ideas.

The organization's operating principles were

based on the belief that "in a democratic republic the laws should
conform to the views and wishes of the broad citizenry as well as the
actual social conditions," and that "obsolete and neglected restrictive
laws stand in contradiction with popular government."

The Societies

vowed to work for local self-government because "as city life differs
from rural life, so should laws which regulate social customs distinguish between city and country life."4l
In establishing the United Societies, Chicago's ethnic groups de-

clared themselves legitimate members of their city and served notice on
their fellow citizens that their needs and wishes could not be ignored.
As businessmen, labor, women, reformers, and others had formed organizations to promote the interests they had in shaping their community so too
did the ethnic groups.

'The. Societies gave them a vehicle through which

to articulate their concerns and desires and become involved more actively

in municipal affairs.

Most importantly, it also succeeded in uniting

the disparate and sometimes antagonistic nationality groups in the realization that they had certain interests in common; without unity they
risked remaining weak and ineffectual with each group scrambling to better
its individual situation, but unified into the Societies they learned to
41Thid.

68
exercise the power to which they were entitled by their sheer numbers.
All the groups trying to decide what to do about schools, public
utilities, prohibition, woman suffrage, municipal corruption, and the
myriad other problems facing Chicago had come to realize one important
factor--that the solutions would depend greatly on who had the power of
decision-making.

While some Chicagoans would work to keep that power

strictly limited, others pushed to broaden popular participation in
government by means of the initiative and referendum.

In 1902 the voters

approved a public policy proposition that local citizens be able to initiate legislation with signatures of eight percent of the eligible
voters, and to demand a referendum vote on local legislation by petition
of five percent.

Two years later they reinforced these earlier votes

by supporting a proposal that voters be empowered to veto any undesirable
action of their respective law-making bodies whenever five percent of the
voters petitioned to have such action referred to popular vote. 42

Be-

cause public policy questions were simply straw votes the results did
not actuate these changes, but they did reflect the prevailing sentiment of the city that the voters should have a greater say in municipal
affairs.
Thus by the first years of the new century significant numbers of
Chicagoans had organized to identify and confront a multitude of municipal problems.

They had eliminated some corruption by cleaning up the

City Council and they were anxious for more change.

It remained to be

seen how, or if, they could reconcile their conflicting desires and effectuate reforms which were acceptable to at least the majority.
42naily News, Almanac (1905), p. 356.

CHAPI'ER Dl
THE BEGINNINGS OF CHARTER REFORM
By

the turn of the century, a number of prominent men in the city

had begun to perceive that the piecemeal approach to reform stood little
chance of success.

Not

on~

did this approach allow every issue to bog

down in squabbling among different groups of people, it also failed to
get to the heart of the matter--that the city could no longer function
under the restrictions of the state incorporation act.

In 1902 there-

fore, several politicians and civic reformers proposed that Chicago
write a home rule charter.
simultaneous~

Such a charter, as they conceived it, would

empower the city to administer

pure~

local affairs

without state interference and allow the city to alter

dramatic~

its

governing structure.
The idea of writing a new municipal charter was inspired by the
city's antiquated revenue system, which made it difficult for Chicago
either to meet its existing financial obligations or fund new municipal
works.

The system of multiple taxing bodies, each with its fixed tax

levy, prevented the city from raising additional income from property
taxes or from distributing the collected property tax revenue according
to need.

Moreover, the city had reached the legal limit on bonded in-

debtedness and could not issue any new bonds.
obligations Chicago relied
taxes.

heavi~

To meet its financial

on special assessments and license

According to the Cities and Villages Act municipalities could
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finance local improvements through a special tax on continuous property
1
(e.g. that property fronting a street being repaved).
Chicago property owners were protesting this dual tax burden and demanding relief,
particularly since the city habitually over-assessed for the improvements and failed to refund adequately the monies as required by law.
The incorporation act also gave cities broad licensing powers and the
City Council steadily increased license fees and created new licenses
to help offset financial difficulties.

This was a practice to which

small businessmen in particular objected. 2
Proposals to revamp the city's governing and taxing structures
had been advanced from time to time.

As early as 1884 the Citizens 1

Association had recommended a series of constitutional amendments to
accomplish this.

Since there was a constitutional ban against the legis-

lature considering more than one amendment a session, this proposal met
with little enthusiasm.

In 1899 the Greater Chicago Committee, a group

of businessmen, wanted to draft a single amendment which would extend
the city limits to include all of Cook County and subsume all functions
of the county government under the city.
attract support.

This suggestion also failed to

However, the prospect of consolidation appealed to

many people and in 1901 Mayor Harrison asked the City Council to recommend constitutional amendments which would enable the city to consolidate all existing taxing bodies under the municipal governmento3

It was

Harrison's intention then to call a constitutional convention to con1 Illin .
o~s, Constitution (1870), article 9,

~erriam, Municipal Revenues, p. 14; Pierce, vol. 3, p. 336-37.
3Philip, p. 166-67; Chicago, Journal of the Proceedings of the City
Council, Meeting of October 14, 1901, p.
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sider the recommended amendments.
Members of the Civic Federation however had already decided to
reject this approach as too limited.

They were among the growing

number of p·eople throughout the country who believed that the existing
legal relationship between cities and states was inefficient and increasingly harmful to cities.

This point of view was summarized in the

late nineteenth century by one of the many reformers studying and
writing on this problem. 4

Our large cities, wrote Ellis Oberholtzer,

are totally diverse from the interests of the remaining sections
of the States in which they are placed by our artificial arrangement of boundaries. We have massed different people together
who have no mutual sympathies, who are opposites in political and
social standards and antipodal in wants and government requirements •••• For the good of the cities themselves, and likewise for
the good of the States, it is necessary that our large cities
should be free cities.
The solution suggested by Oberholtzer and other urban reformers was
municipal home rule.
The Chicago Civic Federation eagerly adopted the idea of home
rule.

In

W97 it pledged to work "until full control over all legis-

lation affecting local interests is removed from the State Capitol to
the city of Chicago" and began its own campaign to free the city from
the Cities and Villages Act and write a new municipal charter. 5 When
others in the city agreed that extensive local self-government was the·
best solution Mayor Harrison adopted this approach also and suggested
that the Council take appropriate steps to ensure that the "legally
authorized representatives of Chicago and the County" took the lead in

~llis P. Oberholtzer, "Home Rule for
Annals 3 (1892-1893), p. 763.

5Chicago Tribune,

May

4, 1897,

Our

American Cities, 11 The
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this matter rather than allowing citizens 1 groups to do so.
Civic Federation had already acted.

6

But the

It issued a report advocating a

new city charter which would consolidate overlapping governing

bodies~

extend the debt limit, reform the structure and powers of the City
Council, and in general make it easier for the city to expand governmentalJ.y and geographically. 7 Within a month the Federation took the
further initiative of inviting "influential" groups to send delegates
to a convention to discuss these issues and recommend a course of action.
On

October 28, 1902 seventy-four men from business and social

clubs, civic organizations, political groups, and delegates-at-large
assembled as the Chicago New Charter Convention.

The Tribune, a vig-

orous supporter of the proceedings, described the convention as "a
realJ.y representative body.

There is no prominent organization, muni-

cipal, individual, or political which will not be represented. 11

8

The

overwhelming majority of these men however, were successful businessmen
and professionals; the CFL sent two delegates and except for three men
from Jewish business clubs the city's ethnic groups were unrepresented.9
The Civic Federation believed that the convention had two main
tasks.

The first was to decide whether to ·seek a new state constitution,

or whether to write a constitutional amendment which would allow Chicago
to draft a new charter.
6

Assuming they chose the latter, the second

cmcago, Journal of the City Council, September 29, 1902, p. ll04.

7Chicago Civic Federation, ''Preliminary Report on the Need for a
New City Charter," Chicago Civic Federation Papers, Box no. 3
8
Tribune, October 28, 1902.

9List of Delegates, in Civic Federation Papers, Box no. 3.
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task was to decide if this constitutional amendment should be simply a
general grant of power to Chicago to write a charter or whether it should
specify the exact municipal powers the city wanted to include in the chartero

The Tribune was as confident of a general consensus about charter

reform as it was of the convention's representativeness.

While acknow-

ledging the existence of differing opinions, the paper called upon the
minority to surrender gracefully to the majority because a new charter
involved "policy and not principle" and hence no opposition was legitimate.

10

Opening the convention, B.E. Sunny, president of the Civic Federation, reminded the delegates that forces outside of Chicago controlled
the legislature by a margin of two to one.

These men, Sunny told the

convention, did not want a new constitution, but they were also not
happy.about the continuous stream of amendments brought before the legislature by Chicago--there were in fact twenty-three such amendments currently pending in Springfield.

This being the case, a new municipal

charter seemed the only remedy o The delegates agreed and appointed a
committee to draft an "enabling" amendment which would allow Chicago to
write a new charter.ll
The amendment which the committee drafted included three broad
proposals.

First that the legislature henceforth be allowed to provide

a scheme or charter of local government for Chicago; second that such a
scheme provide for consolidating in the municipal government the powers
currently vested in the county, city, board of education, library board,
10

Tribune, October 28, 1902.

11Chicago New Charter Convention, Proceedings, October 28, 1902.
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townships, park and sanitary districts (exactly what the Civic Federation has proposed); and third that once the city had consolidated with
two of these bodies it would assume the debts and liabilities of such
bodies and would henceforth be allowed to become indebted to an aggregate amount not to exceed five percent of the full value of taxable
property within its limits.

Under this scheme the city's debt limit

thus would jump from one percent to five percent, and it would control
the tax levies from the entire tax district instead of being restricted
to its current two percent of assessed property valuationo 12
When the committee reported its proposed amendment back to the full
convention the delegates split decisively over its contento

The majority

favored the amendment as written because it satisfied their primary concern about revenue.
was not satisfied.

James Linehan, however, a delegate from the CFL,
He objected that the amendment was too general be-

cause it neither specified who would write the charter nor enumerated
what municipal powers were to be included in it.

He feared particularly

that if the state legislators drafted a charter they would ignore substantially the desires of most Chicagoans as the CFL saw them.

Linehan

warned the CFL might refuse to support any amendment which "ignored the
will of the people and failed to include a clause endorsing initiative,
referendum, and municipal ownershipo 1113

He accused the delegates of

duplicity in refusing to consider these issues while clearly spelling
out the taxation powers they wanted in the charter.

Although Linehan

received support from Edward Dunne and other delegates in favor of a
12
see above, Chapter II, p. 35-36o
13 New Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 18, 1902.
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more democratic

government~

the convention rejected a proposal specifi-

callY to authorize municipal ownership in the anendment and adopted it
as drafted by the committee.
Linehan's expressed fear of the state legislature and his objections to the amendment foreshadowed the conflicts which would plague
the charter movement for the next five years.

At the time

the

though~

supporters of the amendment sent it to the legislature confident of
its passage and a future new charter.
setback.

They soon experienced their first

Although the legislature generally favored a Chicago charter

as a means of relief from the burden of local legislation, many legislators wanted the reform accomplished on their terms and not Chicago's. 14
Downstate legislators, representing what they called the "country element 11 attempted to exchange the amendment for new state tax laws desired by downstate and for permanent limit on the number of Chicago and
Cook County representatives.
that

One of the leaders of this move admitted

we are using this question as a club if you like. 1115 This tactic

11

failed but it certainly gave Chicago every reason to fear similar tactics in the

future~

quite conceivably over the charter itself.

And the

legislature did make a substantive change in the enabling amendment.
It limited consolidation to the

City~

Board of

Education~

library

board~

townships, and park districts; the County and Sanitary District were to
16
remain separate governing and taxing bodies.
J..4philip, p. 170-72.

l5Record-Herald~ April 23~ 1903.
16

Illinois~ House Journal, March 24~ 1903, p. 386~ and April 22~
p. 795. The amendment became article 4, section 34 of the Illinois
Constitution (1870).
1903~
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Although the revisions disappointed the proponents of charter reform, they accepted this form of the amendment as the best they could
hope to get and began preparations for submitting it to a referendum
of all Illinois voters.

They were particularly anxious to obtain a

huge affirmative vote in Chicago to offset possible negative voting
elsewhere in the state.

With the referendum scheduled for November

1904, Mayor Harrison and the City Council tried once again to bring the
entire issue under control of the city government.

The Council author-

ized Harrison to appoint a special Council Committee to be known as
the Chicago Charter Amendment Campaign Committee with power to take
whatever steps it deemed necessary to promote adoption of the amendment.

The Committee was authorized to invite the cooperation of civic

organizations and perhaps form an auxiliary committee of citizens to
assist in educating Chicago voters on behalf of the amendment. 17

But

the Civic Federation refused to relinquish its prominent role in charter reform; it cooperated with the City Council committee but continued
to work on its own also.

Through its own New Charter Campaign Committee

the Federation disseminated literature throughout the city urging voters
to ratify the amendment because Chicago desperately needed to be free
of the Cities and Villages Act. 18
Chicagoans were not unanimous in their support for the amendment.
The CFL, for example, hesitated to recommend that its membership vote
for it.

Ratification of the Mueller Law in April 1904 defused some-

17 Chicago, Journal of the City Council, January 25, 1904, p. 2lll12, February 1, 1904, p. 2125, and November 21, 1904, p. 1592-94.
18
chicago New Charter Movement, '~y the Pending Constitutional
Amendment Should Be Adopted" ( 1904), unpublished pamphlet, Chicago
Historical Society.
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what labor's dissatisfaction with the amendment's failure to ensure
municipal ownership, but the CFL still objected to the amendment's
emphasis on taxation, its failure to ensure other popular reforms, and
its vague wording which specified neither who would write the new
charter nor how much home rule Chicago would be granted.

When the

Civic Federation secured permission from the Board of Education to distribute pro-charter information in the schools, the CFL believed that
its worst suspicions about who would benefit from charter reform in its
proposed format had been confirmed.

It demanded equal opportunity to

publicize its views and to hand out literature supporting the public
policy questions on direct primary, popular veto, and local power to
assess and levy taxes which would also be on the referendum ballot. 19
Rather than prolong the controversy the Board of Education rescinded
its permission to the Civic Federation.
Four days before the referendum, labor urged its membership to
reject the amendment because it was an attempt by certain groups--"every
corporate agent, every subsidized newspaper, and every lick-spittle
syncophant 11 ---to gain control of the city. 20

Indeed, many of the largest

merchants and manufacturers had "lent" employees to help the campaign
connnittee during the final days of the campaign. 2l The CFL proposed
that to undercut these groups a constitutional convention be convened
to write a new state constitution.

Louis Post, an acknowledged leader

of the city's liberal independents, took the same position.
19 cFL, Minutes, October 16, 1904.
2/J
2

Ibid. , November 4, 1904.

~ribune, November 8, 1904.

In his
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newspaper Post argued that certain financial interests supported the
amendment because they knew that any constitutional convention would include groups antagonistic to their desires.

Both Post and the CFL be-

lieved that only in a constitutional convention would a broad segment
of the community have a voice in how Chicago would be reformed.

22

These arguments failed to impress the majority of Chicago voters
who ratified the amendment by more than ten to one.

A majority of

voters in the state, most likely heeding their representatives' explanation that it would free the legislature from continual Chicago legislation, also passed the amendment.

The outcome of the referendum showed

that most Chicagoans agreed with the need for municipal reform but not
necessarily about the shape of that reform.

And in fact the voting on

three public policy questions which had shared the ballot indicated
that the majority favored more extensive home rule and popular decisionmaking than the amendment ' s principal backers had suggested.

By a ma-

jority of ten to one the voters approved the proposition that citizens
should be able to veto any undesirable action of their local government,
and they favored by over three to one the idea that local governments
should be empowered to adopt their own system of assessing and levying
taxes subject to popular referendum.

The voters also gave their over-

whelming support to the proposition of instituting direct primaries for
nominating candidates for office. 23
The next step toward charter reform was to constitute a body to
draft a charter.
22

Since the enabling amendment provided no mechanism

CFL, Minutes, November 4, 1904; the Public, November 5, 1904.

23 Daily News, Almanac ( 190 5), p. 3 56 .
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for deciding this matter several interested groups offered their own
proposals.

Everyone realized that the finished product would reflect

the sentiments of those who drafted it on home rule, taxation, election
reform, schools, municipal ownership, and other troubling issues.
The CFL 1 s suspicion that certain business interests intended to
dominate charter reform was soon confirmed by events.

In late November

the extant executive committee of the 1902 convention, acting as though
they had priority in this matter, named a committee of seven to draft the
new charter and authorized them to seek

11

such assistance as might be

helpful. 1124 Three of these men, John P. Wilson, Judge Francis Adams
and John S. Miller, were in fact members of the executive committee;
all three were lawyers and Miller was special corporation counsel for
the Union Traction Company, one of the franchises currently engaged
in resisting municipal ownership.

The other four were Bernard E. Sunny,

president of the Civic Federation, Mayor Harrison, Judge Murray Tuley,
and B.A. Eckhart, a prominent manufacturer who had represented the Board
of Trade at the convention two years earliero 25

Furthermore, Sunny,

Miller, Wilson, and Eckhart belonged to the prestigious Union League
Club where Sunny was chairman of the political action committee.

The

Club was acutely aware of its influence to date in the charter movement
and intended to remain influentialo

A few months earlier Merritt Starr,

also a member of the political action committee, had written to Sunny
boasting about the Club 1 s activities.

He pointed out that of the seventy-

24aecord-Herald, November 24, 1904.
25 rbid., List of Delegates, in Civic Federation Papers; Marquis,
The Book of Chicagoans (1905).
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one living delegates of the 1902 convention thirty-two belonged to the
Union League Club and declared that

11

it is fair to say. that the Union

League Club has from the beginning held a

le~±ing

place in the movement

for City Charter Revision, and it desires to continue active in this
work ••• 11

In his letter Starr also commented that the members of the

Club sought a charter "drawn on rational and scientific lines and uti-

lYzing to the upmost all of the lessons of experience and embodying no
rash experiments which have no justification in experience at their
b ac k • "26

The convention's executive committee was not to have its
opposed and the matter became quite complicated.

way

un-

The CFL immediately

set out to draw up a plan for a convention to write the new chartero
Responding to a resolution from the Carriage and Wagon Workers Union
that fifty members of organized labor be representatives to any new
charter convention, the CFL appointed a fifty member special committee
to consider this question and to draw up recommendations for possible
charter provisions.

When five members of this committee met with the

City Council Charter Committee to discuss the matter they discovered
that the city's elected officials likeWise opposed the plan for the
committee of seven but were attempting to replace it with one of their
own which would place control of the charter squarely in the Council 1 s
hands. 27

Moreover the state House Charter Committee was considering

26

Merritt Starr to B.E. Sunny, April 1.4, 1905, Civic Federation
Papers, Box no. 3. The Union League Club, according to its historian,
"numbered a large portion of Chicago's most distinguished citizens in
its membership. Bankers, merchants, capitalists, railroad managers, and
officers of great corporations-the 'solid men 1 • • • " Bruce Grant, Fight
for a City (Chicago: Union League Club, 1955), p. 175.
27

cFL, Minutes, November 20 and December 4, 1904.
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introducing its own plan for constituting a charter convention.
The CFL objected that none of these plans would provide popular
participation in drafting the charter and quickly moved to formulate
its own plan.

It discarded the idea of demanding that a certain num-

ber of men from organized labor participate in any convention and instead proposed a large, elected charter convention of 350 delegates.
According to the CFL plan all Chicago citizens were to be eligible for
membership in the convention and the delegates were to be nominated by
petition and elected at-large by plurality vote.

The CFL thought that

this method was the only way to preclude the possibility of the con28
vention being controlled by one or two factions.
The CFL sent its proposed plan to the state Charter Committee
which rejected it and in its place Representative John McGoorty (DChicago) introduced a bill to constitute a smaller convention of
ninety elected and twenty-five appointed members.

But this bill and

four others failed to pass the legislature and the City Council assumed
responsibility for constituting a charter convention. 29 In the Council
Democrats and Republicans introduced separate plans for such a convention.

The Republican plan called for a convention of seventy-four ap-

pointed delegates: fifteen City Council members selected by the Council;
fifteen state legislators chosen by the presiding officers of each house;
and fifteen appointed by the Governor and fifteen by the Mayor.

To com-

plete the convention the Board of Cook County Commissioners, Trustees of
the Sanitary District, the Board of Education, Library Board, and the
28
29

Ibid., January 8, 1905.

Record-Herald, April l and 29, 1905; Philip, p. 173-74.
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south, West, and Lincoln Park Boards were each to appoint two representatives.

With the exception of Mayor Dunne and the library board,

all of the appointing agents were predominantly Republican. 30
Not surprisingly Council Democrats accused the Republicans of
designing a Republican convention to insure that certain provisions,
such as municipal ownership, were not written into a new charter.

Demo-

cratic alderman Joseph Kohout countered the first plan with one for
appointing 110 delegates: one each appointed by every City Council
member; five aldermen appointed by the Council Committee on State Legislation; and five appointed by the Governor, fifteen by the Mayor, and
two each by the previously mentioned governing boards.

This plan also

stipulated, unlike the Republican plan, that all except the governing
board appointees had to reside in Chicago

0

By removing the state legis-

lature entirely from the delegate selection process and reducing the
number of gubernatorial appointees the Democrats were attempting to
shift the political balance and possibly reduce the number of politicians
who might be convention delegates.
cil and their plan was accepted.3l

The Republicans controlled the Coun-

.

Those men instrumental in appointing the convention were not completely unmindful of the desireability of attempting to balance somewhat the convention 1 s membership.

When Governor Deneen sent him a list

of his tentative appointees Walter Fisher suggested that the Governor
revise his list to include more groups within the city.

Fisher commended

the choice of Lessing Rosenthal because he represented the Jewish element

°

3 Chicago, Journal of the City Council, May 15, 190 5, p
3

~id., June 12, 1905, p. 551-52 and June 19, 1905,

o

209-10 •

Po 633.
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and suggested that the Governor similarly seek a "prominent" Catholic
to appoint.

Fisher also observed that the list overly represented the

"conservative and property-owning element," and proposed appointing
"some representative of the labor or radical class."

On the whole though,

the men on Fisher 1 s list were predominantly Republican businessmen and
civic leaders; it is indicative of his thinking that the man he suggested
to represent the Germans and the liquor interests was also general counsel and director of Republic Steel and Iron and thus, as Fisher pointed
out, would also represent large manufacturers. 32 Fisher was most concerned, as were the other prominent figures in charter reform, that the
right people be appointed to the convention and not that the convention
be a popularly representative one.
Despite the efforts of some men like Fisher to be fair, the delegates appointed to the charter convention were, as the Democrats and
CFL feared, neither politically non-partisan nor representative of the
city•s population.

Certain groups were obviously overrepresented.33

Of sixty-two delegates whose political affiliation can be identified,
thirty-nine were Republican, twenty-two were Democrats, and one called
himself an Independent.

The City Council named ten Republicans and five

Damocrats, eight of Governor Deneen 1 s appointees were Republican, and
only one of the General Assembly 1 s choices was a Democrat.
Durme appointed more Democrats than Republicans.

Only Mayor

The West and Lincoln

32walter L. Fisher to Governor Charles Deneen, September 11, 1905,
Walter L. Fisher Papers.
33The information on the delegates was compiled from Chicago Charter Convention, 110fficers, List of Delegates, Rules and Committees, 11 unpublished, Chicago Historical Society; Daily News, Almanac ( 1906); the
Illinois Blue Book (1905); Marquis, Book of Chicagoans. See Append:ix rv.

park Boards, whose members had been appointed by Governor Deneen, chose
two Republicans each for the convention, while the "Democratic" Library
Board selected two Democratso
By

occupation the majority of convention delegates represented

prominent and important groups in· the city: twenty-six were lawyers,
thirty-two businessmen, two social workers, one professor, and one minister.

Many of these men had been active in previous reform

~vements

and many held either elected or appointed offices in municipal and state
government, including the fifteen aldermen and fifteen state legislators.
Because of this selectivity even the few ethnic delegates were mostly
well-to-do businessmen.

Chly two subsequently joined the United Socie-

ties, and one of these men also belonged to the CFL. 34 Only two delegates were members of the CFL while one delegate was a black businessman.35

These last three were appointed by Mayor Dunne.
This imbalance has not generally been acknowledged either by the

delegates themselves or in previous studies of charter reform.

Conven-

tion Chairman Milton Foreman, at the convention's concluding session,
declared that "an inspection of the membership will disclose the fact
that they represent every walk and condition and poll of thought in life. 11
One recent student of Chicago reform movements followed Foreman's lead
and concluded that "even more than before convention membership represented a cross-section of the city's interest groups," because more business
and reform groups were represented than in previous reform attempts.3 6
3

~ayor Dunne later appointed Societies' member Walter Michaelis.

35 The Broad-Ax, November 18, 1905 o
36 Chicago Charter Convention, Proceedings, March l, 1907, Po 12001201; McCarthy, "Businessmen and Professionals, 11 p. 57.
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That major segments of the community were virtually unrepresented at
the convention has been glossed over.
It is misleading however to draw easy conclusions about the consequences of the convention's composition.

First each man brought with

him his own particular background, ideas, perceptions of Chicago's prob-

lems, and visions of the best government for the city, as well as the
ideas of those groups for whom he believed he spoke.

Similar political

leanings and occupation, for instance, did not necessarily produce
similar thinking or voting behavior during the convention.

For instance,

the concerns of Republican lawyer and banker John Smulski, a leader in
the Polish community, might be expected to differ significantly from
those of Walter Fisher, a Republican lawyer and leader of the Municipal
Voters League; C.J. Vopicka, president of a small brewing company, might
disagree considerably with John Shedd, president of Marshall Field's,
the city's largest department store.
Secondly, in drafting the charter, the delegates had to confront
the myriad, often conflicting, urban political issues of the period.
Thus, while they generally desired a more efficient municipal government they did not always agree on what efficiency meant or how to accomplish it.

George Cole of the Municipal Voters League was so pleased

with the voters' response to the League crusades against the City Council that he advocated continuing to elect a number of minor public officials although this contravened the arguments that governmental efficiency required fewer elective offices.

Charles Merriam proposed that a

city tax: system be created, while other reformers argued that this would
decrease efficiency by multiplying taxing bodies.

In this case Merriam

believed that fiscal efficiency required not reducing taxing bodies, but
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rather giving Chicago the means to control its own revenue system.3 7
Obviously the issues at stake were complex, as were the problems
of governing a city as large and diverse as Chicago.

A thorough study

of the charter convention, the subsequent ratification campaign, and
the aftermath of the charter's failure can move us well beyond searching
for reformers and non-reformers, or concentrating on the ideas and needs
of a single group.
37Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 6 and December 19, 1906.

CHAPI'ER V

THE CHARTER CCNVENTION
The Chicago charter convention is of interest to historians because it reveals the concerns of many different Chicagoans and how these
concerns determined what they wanted from their municipal government.
The convention debated the issues of efficiency, expertise, the nature
of political democracy, the purposes of local government and politics,
the relationship between Chicago and the "downstate, 11 and drafted a new
city charter with these in mind; these were also the issues over which
the citizens eventually supported or opposed the charter.

Moreover, the

convention gave the people a unique opportunity to participate in restructuring their municipal government as, in a very real sense, the
1
Even before
convention became a forum for airing their diverse views.
the convention convened several groups, particularly those who felt underrepresented at the convention had circulated their own proposals on many
lcitizens in other cities generally had less input into charter
The state legislature wrote Pittsburgh's new charter; in Galveston and Houston leading businessmen secured commission charters
directly from the legislature; the City Council of Los Angeles appointed
a committee specifically to draft a commission charter; a Boston committee drafted a new charter which was approved by the state legislature without popular referendum. In Cincinnati, however, an elected
convention wrote a new charter. See Hays, "The Politics of Reform, 11
p. 165; Zane Miller, Boss Cox's Cincinnati (New York: Oxford, 1968),
p. 222-23; Schiesl, The Politics of Efficiency, p. 102-105 and 134-36;
Martin Schiesl, "Progressive Reform in Los Angeles under Mayor Alexander,
1909-1913, 11 California Historical QuarterlY 54 (Spring 1975), p. 49o
making.
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of these issues.

The delegates were to remain constantly aware of

the demands being made by people throughout the city while the convention was in session.
The convention first met in July 1906 to draw up rules.

No records

were kept of this meeting, the chief work of which appears to have been
the naming of committees to study the issues that would come before the
full convention; among the subjects assigned were the powers and duties
of the Mayor and City Council, public education, public utilities, primary and general election rules, parks, and the initiative and referendum.
The committees worked independently for the next three months and submitted their recommendations to the full body in the first week in
~tober.

When the convention held its first regular session on November 30
its deliberations concerned the articles defining the structure and
efficiency of the city's government.

The debates from this session, and

indeed the entire convention, reveal that the delegates had little interest in adopting the innovations elsewhere typical of the period's
2
. . 1 ref orm campa1gns.
.
millllclpa

In Boston and New York, for example, new

charters eliminated the Council's power to increase the municipal budget and gave the Mayor power to appoint and remove all department heads
without council confirmation.

Pittsburgh and Boston each reduced the

number of its city council members and changed to at-large elections.
Commission governments were organized in many cities, and even where
they were not instituted, reformers had often sought this change.3
2see Beard, American City Government, for an overview.
3 James Crooks, Politics and Progress: The Rise of Urban Progressivism in Baltimore, 1895-1911 (Baton Rouge: LSU, 1968), p. 102-103.
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In Chicago, on the contrary, many delegates to the convention believed

the purpose of the new charter was not to clean up the corrupt City
council or curtail its powers, but to keep Chicago advancing along the
path of reform.
The disinterest of the convention in major structural reforms
reflects the opinion of many citizens that the battle against corruption
had already been won.

They agreed with convention member Charles

Merriam that the crusades of the Municipal Voters League had "raised
the Council to a cleaner and sounder basis •.• and gave the City for
twenty years the best local legislative body in the country. "

Merriam

also attributed Chicago 1 s lack of corruption to the political realism
of Mayor Harrison who had allowed the cosmopolitan character of Chicago
to flourish, thereby avoiding splitting the city into hostile reform
and non-reform camps, each struggling for control of the Council. 4
In this same vein, Walter Fisher wrote a correspondent from Minnesota

that he could "cite Chicago as a city where non-partisan municipal politics has been a practical success." 5 Outsiders reinforced this notion
of progress.

Lincoln Steffens, in his famous expose of urban political

corruption, congratulated Chicagoans for beginning "slow, sure, political,
democratic, reform, by the people, for the people," and concluded there
was "little doubt that Chicago will be cleaned up."

6

Most delegates be-

lieved the situation was well in hand; what the city needed now, they

~erriam, Chicago, p. 21-22 and 263-67.
5walter L. Fisher to Leverett L. Lyon, M.arch 12, 1906, Walter L.
Fisher Papers.

6Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: S.S. McClure,
1902), p. 164-65.
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believed, was a little more efficiency, home rule, and popular government.

Most importantly, they also assumed that most of the citizens

shared their views.

Future events would show they misjudged the nature

and extent of opposing ideas within the city, but the delegates began
·their work in the convention under these assumptions.
The convention first passed with little dissent the resolution
consolidating the city, parks, board of education, and library board
as allowed by the amendment of 1904.

This provision eliminated over-

lapping administrative and taxing systems and centralized taxing and
decision~

powers by making the parks, schools, and library de-

partments of the city government.
No other resolution passed as easily as the delegates found out
when they next considered the issue of distinguishing more clearly between the executive responsibilities of the Mayor and the legislative
functions of the City Council.

Some delegates wanted to alter the

process of selecting the Mayor.by instituting the European method of
the City Council choosing one of its own members to serve in this capacity for an indefinite term, subject to removal by the Council.

These

delegates argued that popular election of a mayor was an American invention which functioned badly because people voted for a mayor on the
basis of his political promises not his administrative expertise. 7 In
support of this idea Charles Merriam likened the city to a corporation
in which the stockholders elect the board of directors, who then select

the corporation officers.

D·alegate Frank Bennett further argued that

7There was a tendency among reformers to seek examples of better
urban government in European cities. See Schiesl, Politics of EfficienSL, p. 149-50.
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the new method being proposed would insure the election of better council
members because voters, knowing the Council would select the Mayor, would
choose their aldermen more judiciously.

8

The majority of the delegates accepted neither this proposal, nor
an alternative proposal to divide the administrative and legislative
duties between two popularly elected officials--the first to serve as
Mayor and the second as President of the Council and chief legislative
officer of the city.

They voted instead to maintain popular election,

although for varying reasons.

George Thompson objected that the people

viewed the Mayor as the one city official responsible to all of them
and that City Council appointment would remove government from popular
control.

Delegates B.A. Eckhart and R.R. McCormick, on the other hand,

spoke against the proposal because they did not trust the City Council;
this body, they feared, might select someone they could control and not
the best qualified and hence such a method would not guarantee more
efficiency. 9
The convention found a less radical way to redefine the relationship of the Mayor to the Councilo

On two close votes the delegates re-

moved the Mayor as presiding officer over the Council and rescinded his
10
right to a vote in that body.
Under the new charter, the Council also
would select its own presiding officer from among its members while the
Mayor retained the right to introduce measures and exercise veto power.
The delegates rejected a proposal to strip the Mayor of all legislative
8

Charter C•)nvention, Proceedings, November JO, 1906, p. 62-67 and

70-71.
9 Ibid., Po 63, 68 and 62.
lOib.d

-~-0,

p. 85 and 90.
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functions including his veto powero

By making these moderate changes

in the Mayor's functions, the convention believed the charter satisfied

both those citizens seeking to insure the selection of a mayor competent
to administer the affairs of such a large city, and those who insisted
on the people's right to elect the Mayor.
Of the remaining charter provisions only the ones on the Library

Board and Penal, Charitable and Reformatory Institutions passed without
much discussion.

As the convention proceeded the issues provoked more

controversy, more pressure from groups outside the convention, and it became increasingly difficult to balance desires for efficiency, home rule,
and popular government.
Since the new charter expanded the role of the City Council in
Chicago's government, the convention carefully weighed procedures for
constituting the Council and defining its powers and duties.

At the

time the city was divided into thirty-five wards, each sending two aldermen to the Council; these served two year terms and half stood for election each yearo

A number of delegates wanted a smaller council of

thirty-five or fifty wards with one alderman each.

Fewer aldermen, they

argued, would carry out the city's business more efficiently because
they would have less time to be preoccupied with the needs of the ward
and more attentive to the whole city's needs.

But the majority remained

firmly ward oriented, insisting that servicing the ward was a vital duty
of aldermen and that the city could not operate efficiently with any
fewer aldermen. 11
11

Ibid., December 10, 1906, p. 209-10, 211, 217, 212, 2l3, and 214o
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D•3legate Alexander Revell presented an alternate proposal which
simultaneously retained ward representation, acknowledged that the interests of the entire city were greater than those of the particular
12
wards, and increased the chances of eliminating bad candidates.
He
proposed creating sixty wards with one alderman each, with each ward
nominating candidates for its alderman in a primary, and then the entire
city selecting among the nominees from all wards.

The convention tabled

Revell's plan without debate so it is impossible to know whether they
rejected it because it was too complicated and necessitated a very long
ballot at voting time, or perhaps for some other reason.

It seems likely

however; from other debates, that the majority simply preferred a strong
ward based government.

The convention passed a compromise measure to

redistrict the city into seventy wards with one alderman each.
A proposal to lengthen aldermanic terms to four years sparked
sharp disagreement.

McCormick, Walter Fisher, and Lessing Rosenthal

believed this would increase efficiency because aldermen needed time to
do a good job and the Council needed to serve as long as the Mayor. 13
Opponents of the proposal, led by James Linehan and Louis Post, feared
it would lessen the people's control of their elected representatives.
Linehan viewed the aldermanic election as a referendum.l4
The people can change their opinion inside of two years; as an
expression of that change, they would change the great body of
the aldermen, and that would be sufficient notification to the
mayor that [a] policy is no longer desirable by the people. On
12

Ibid.' December 3, 1906, p. 90 and D-ecember 11, 1906, p. 238-40.

13Ib"d
-~--, December ll, 1906, p. 242, 244-46, and 249.

14Ibid.' p. 243.
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the other hand, if [a] policy is desirable, and the aldermen are
not supporting the mayor, there will be an opportunity for the
people to send in someone that will support him.
Although Post supported Linehan's position, arguing that the mechanisms
of popular expression should be as easy as possible to avoid potentially
violent alternatives such as riots, the proponents of two year terms
were a minority and the aldermanic term was lengthened.

The issue was

quite controversial and before the convention ended the opponents of the
four year terms forced the delegates to reconsider the issue.

Although

the vote was much closer this time, the four year term was sustained.
The disappointed proponents of the two year term remained steadfast in
their view that "the only excuse an alderman has for existing at all is
because the people are too numerous to meet; therefore, it is his business to reflect the opinion, the desire, and the demand of his constituents. 1115
One of the most important changes proposed for the city government
were those concerning the nomination and election of municipal officers.
City residents throughout the country were seeking to replace the old
system of nominating candidates by party convention with a system giving
voters a more direct voice in the nominating process and thereby making
political parties more responsible for men they proposed for office.
Under the prevailing system, party voters first held a "primary" to elect
a convention of party delegates; these in turn nominated the party's
candidates for office.

Since voters tended to shun this cumbersome

method, party politicians generally controlled delegate selection and
voting.

Reformers sought to implement either one of two changes: a

l5.IQig., February 18, 1907, p. 941.
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direct primary nomination wherein party voters directly selected the
partY candidates, or petition nomination in which anyone securing the
requisite signatures would be a candidate.

The latter method had the

attraction, for some of the reformers, of eliminating the party entirely
from

. .

1 po lit•~cs. 1.6

mun~c~pa

The citizens of Chicago were virtually unanimous in advocating
some type of election reform, although their reasons for this varied.
In 1904 they had endorsed the direct primary method by voting for a

public policy proposal that the state legislature so amend the state's
1
system. 7 The CFL executive committee, just prior to the opening of
the convention, circulated a resolution to its membership and state
legislators declaring a direct primary law in Illinois as "essential to
18
free government and the welfare of the people."
The Municipal Voters
League, midway through the convention, circulated an open letter to the
voters urging them to work to ensure themselves of more say in nominating
candidates, through either a petition or a direct primary system.

While

the CFL believed the direct primary was necessary to open up government
to all citizens, the Voters League worried that the expanded fiscal and
administrative powers given to the Council by the new charter could increasethe allure of political office to grafters.

Thus the League wanted

to remove the party's control over nominations. 19
16

see Beard, American City Government, p. 58-62; Charles Merriam,
Primary Elections (Chicago: 1909), passim.
17
Daily News, Almanac (1905), p. 356.
18
CFL, Minutes, April 15, 1906.
19
Henry B. Favill and George Sikes to Voters of Chicago, January 9,
1907 in Raymond Robins Papers, Wisconsin State Historical Society, MadiSon, Wisconsin.
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The charter gave Chicago the opportunity to change the municipal
election procedure without tvaiting for the legislature.

The convention

Committee on Elections recommended that candidates for city offices be
nominated by the petition of qualified voters~ but it also submitted a
minority proposal for a system of direct primaries.
nomination by petition

precise~

parties from local elections.

because it would remove the established

He believed that national party politics

intruded into municipal affairs and that municipal
concern was the

city~

Fisher favored

parties~

whose sole

would handle city problems more efficiently and

intelligent~. 20
Although Fisher's position was popular among urban reformers of
the

period~

the majority of the convention delegates feared the power

of special interest groups to select their candidates under a petition
system more than they feared political parties.

Delegate R.A. White

cautioned that the large corporations would turn the petition method to
their advantage and observed "that a man who seeks nomination by petition~

if he has plenty of wealth for

instance~

will

certain~

have an

advantage over the man who has little or no wealth. 1121 The delegates
rejected the petition method and adopted the direct primary with
four dissenting votes.

on~

The majority of the delegates so favored elec-

tion reform that those backing the petition method endorsed the direct
primary method after losing their proposal.

George Cole epitomized

their situation when voting for the direct primary he declared 11 If I
can't get a whole loaf, I believe in taking a half a loaf. , • 1122 .
2
°Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 3, 1906, p. 102-104.
21
Ibid. , p. 98-99 and 101.
22 Ibid., p. 111.
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The Committee on Elections also recommended removing the party
designation from the ballot and simply printing the names of all candidates under the office for which they were running.

A typical ballot

at this time was arranged by "party column" with a "party circle" at
the top which voters could check to vote a straight party ticket.

Ac-

cording to Merriam and Fisher this kind of ballot was another peculiar
American innovation which discouraged independent voting and provided
yet another means for national parties to control municipal elections. 23
Few of the delegates agreed with Merriam and Fisher

however~

some of

them observing that while there was no need to facilitate straight party voting, intelligent voting did require knowing a candidate 1 s party. 24
These men

proposed~

instead~

to eliminate the party circle and column

but to print the party affiliation after each candidate 1 s n8IIle.

The

majority agreed with this compromise.
In this matter of party identification on the ballot the conven-

tion members appeared neither unduly afraid of the influence and power
of Chicago's political parties, nor committed to the principal of nonpartisan politics; before the complete charter was drafted they even
voted to reinsert the party column.

Fisher reproached his colleagues

for drafting a charter with few items of substantial progress in municipal affairs and when they reinserted the party column he rebuked them
for striking out "the one section with regard to election reform that
this Convention did make any progress with regard too u 25 It was little
23 Ibid., December 4~ 1906, p. 120-21 and 124-25o
24 rbid. , p. 119-20, 122-23, and 127-28 o
25

Ibid.~ February 16, 1907, Po 881-82.

98
consolation to Fisher when the delegates stopped an attempt supported
almost exclusively by the professional politicians in their

midst~

to

delete any ballot modifications from the charter altogether.
Once these various changes to Chicago 1 s internal government were
agreed

upon~

the convention turned its attention to the relationship of

the city and state.

Home rule had been a strong motive behind the char-

ter reform

and because a new charter would supersede the 1872

movement~

incorporation act many believed that the delegates could redefine the
balance of powers between the city and the state i f they so chose.
agreement on this issue was not easily reached.

Yet

While most Chicagoans

agreed they wanted more home rule, their reasons for· desiring it varied
and they disagreed on how extensive it should be and on how much authority the city had in defining its own home rule powers.

Since the City

Council was designated the. supreme legislative body of the city by the
new charter, the battle over home rule was fought over the statement on
the powers of the Council.
The outside pressure put on the delegates over this issue illuminates the disagreements over home rule.

The CFL had aJready declared

that home rule was the most crucial feature of the new charter,

In

early 1905, immediately after ratification of the enabling amendment,
the CFL had adopted a resolution calling for a strong home rule charter
which would grant the city complete control of its streets, public
utilities, franchises, street railways, municipal services, and all
purely local government and business affairs without any interference
or control by the state legislature.

It conceded to state interests

only in areas of safety, health, and the general commerce and communi-
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cation of the state.

26

Labor demanded that the charter specifically

grant this home rule power to the City Council, and that the specific
grant be reinforced by strong home rule statements in the charter's
various provisions.
Before the convention had even met, Alderman Edward Cullerton
(D-llth) had presented a strong home rule charter plan to the City
Council.

Cullerton proposed to reverse state domination of local

governments by giving Chicago complete power to conduct its local as
well as not purely local affairs, except as expressly forbidden by the
state or federal constitutions.

To ensure this home rule power, Culler-

ton's plan also provided that in the event of

any

legal doubt, the spe-

cific case should always be decided in favor of Chicago.27

The City

Council tabled this proposal but several days later the Chicago Socialist
published a copy of what it called the Socialists' Proposed Charter
28
which demanded many of the same things.
The United Societies, immediately following its organization, decided to use the charter to sever the state legislature's control over
liquor regulation and municipal affairs in general.

It submitted a

broad home rule resolution to the convention asking that the charter
vest the City Council With "all powers of local legislation which may
under the constitution be v~sted in a municipality. 1129
believed it had a vital interest in this matter.
26
27

The Societies

It contended that

cFL, Minutes, January 8, 1905.

Chic ago, Journal of the City C.:>uncil, January 2, 1906, p. 2014-20.
28
Chicago Socialist, January 10, 1906.
29 charter Convention, Proceedings, December 6, 1906, p, 190.

100

there was a grave danger of prohibition if the charter failed to contain a provisions about liquor regulation.

Lega.ll;y, the city would re-

main bound by any general state laws which were not specifically nulli-

fied by the new charter.

Because a new charter would supersede the 1872

incorporation act--the law which provided the legal loophole for municipalities to regulate liquor themselves-the general law on Sunday closings, as well as any future laws on liquor regulation would be applied
in Chicago.
The Societies therefore requested that the charter specifically
vest the City Council with sole power to regulate Sunday, and the sale
of liquor at social gatherings and entertainments.
phasized that such a provision

mere~

The Societies em-

legalized the prevailing customs

and would reflect, it believed, the sentiments of four-fifths of the
COIIliJlunity.

30

On the other side of the temperance issue, delegate Bennett

offered a counter resolution.

He proposed that nothing in the charter

give the City Council power to modify, impair, or conflict with the
state laws regulating the sale of liquor. 31 The organization of Chicago
Methodist Episcopal Preachers dispatched a letter to the convention endorsing Bennett's resolution and declaring that their congregations
"desire the Charter to be proposed in such a form that they can give it
their heartiest support, with the assurances that the moral interests of
Chicago are safeguarded thereby. n3 2
30 Ibid.
31Ibid., December 3, 1906, p. 114.
32 rbid., December 10, 1906, p. 2J8.
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Instead of addressing these demands, the delegates debated the
legalities of home rule.

According to Joseph O'Donnell the correct

interpretation of the 1904 enabling amendment was that it now allowed
Chicago to substitute local and special legislation of its own for general state laws, and he was dismayed that the convention did not seem
to want to take advantage of this freedom.

David Shanahan (a state

legislator) on the other hand, contended that the amendment merely gave
the state legislature authority to pass special legislation for Chicago,
and warned that the General Assembly would not pass a charter in which
Chicago attempted to assert its authority in this area.

The convention

majority agreed with Shanahan and adopted a weak home rule provision
which specified that the city did not intend to assume any home rule
powers which conflicted with any general state law.

Moreover, the

charter acknowledged the superior legal position of the state by bestowing on Chicago only those municipal powers which "can be constitutionally delegated to it by the legislatureo rr 33

The convention then

deferred considering the question of liquor regulation until same future
session.
This action truly alarmed the United Societies which believed
that prohibition was virtually certain under this provision once the
new charter nullified the 1872 incorporation act.

The group immediately

petitioned the convention to reconsider the general home rule provisions
and to provide home rule on liquor, and it accused delegates Bennett and
B.W. Snow, who were leading the fight against the latter, of collusion

33 Ibid., December 13, 1906, p. 296 and 298.
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with statewide temperance forces. 34 This weak home rule clause obviously contravened the wishes of several groups in the city and the
consequences of this action would be felt during the subsequent ratification campaign.
As the convention progressed formidable pressure from outside
and sharp differences of opinion among the delegates complicated the
convention's work.

Agreement proved difficult to reach on the issues

which had become increasingly controversial among the citizens: direct
popular democracy, municipal ownership, the school system, and others.
For ease in exposition these issues will be discussed one at a time.
Direct Damocr acy
Many Chicagoans wanted a greater share and more direct control
over their city government through the power to initiate legislation
and to approve legislation by popular referendum.

In 1902 and 1904

the voters had approved public policy referenda on these questions35 and
the CFL and Socialists now fought to include the initiative and referendum in the charter.

The CFL adamantly maintained that a charter without

these reforms was not a home rule charter and that it would urge its
membership to oppose such a charter.

The Socialists demanded the refer-

endum, initiative, and recall-in fact the explicit aim of their proposed
charter was to implement extensive popular control of the municipal
government.3 6
34ill.f!., December 26, 1906, p. 712-14; Abendpost, December 22, 1906o
35see above, Chapter 3, p. 68.
36 cFL, Minutes, December 2, 1906; the Socialist, January lD, 1906.
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The delegates divided sharply on this issuej while most expressed
support for the principle of more direct popular government they disagreed on how easy and extensive to make this, and whether some legislation, for example the granting of franchises, could be enacted
after a popular vote was taken.

on~

Delegates Snow and B.A. Eckhart wanted

a conservative referendum measure.

They proposed that the signatures

of twenty-five percent of the voters be required in order "to show that
a very respectable minority of the people" supported the calling of a
referendum.

Although few of the other delegates wanted to require that

high a percentage of signatures, they rejected a motion to set the number
at fifteen percent.37
The proponents of a low percentage requirement accused their opposition of paying only lip service to the principle and attempting to placate the people by including some provision for referendum while setting
the requirements impossibly high.

Raymond Robins declared it was a

question "of a real referendum or of a sham referendumj a power that can
really be exercised, or one that is prepared for the purpose of its not
being exercised. 11

Siding with Robins was Joseph O'Donnell who main-

tained that the high percentage favored the "public utility franchiseseeking corporations that have done their best to kill Chicago. 11

But

even the observation of Charles Merriam that if a question was so important that it could secure fifty or sixty thousand votes (approximately
fifteen percent) it was unfair to require more failed to persuade the
opponents of the fifteen percent requirement and the convention adjourned
37 charter Convention, Proceedings, December 17, 1906, po 378-79
and 388.
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for the day without resolving the issue.

38

During the convention's tenure, the people were kept well-informed

of its daily proceedings: at least one of the newspapers could be relied
on to report the debates and decisions of the day, and the convention
members themselves frequently apprised interested groups of the status
of specific issues.

Hence groups outside the convention were generally

able to respond quickly to the action of the convention.

In this case

the CFL immediately put more pressure on the convention to pass a lenient
initiative and referendum clause.

It sent a letter to the convention

demanding that the charter set only a five percent ceiling for both the
initiative and referendum "in accordance with the expressed will of the
people" as shown by the votes taken in 1902 and 1904.

These reforms were

absolutely necessary, wrote the CFL, to bring democracy to Chicago and
stop the "vulgar aristocracy" from rurming things to suit itself .39 The
CFL did not make the most radical demands on this issue.

The Socialists

wanted the charter to require only a flat ten thousand signatures for
both the initiative and referendum. 40 When the convention reconvened
James Linehan proposed the five percent limit but the delegates defeated
this and instead adopted a limit of twenty percent.
The handling of initiative and referendum was typical of the convention's attitude toward popular democracy.

In general, the delegates

preferred to let elected officials decide policy and extended few decisian-making powers to the citizens.

The convention never contemplated

38Ibid., p. 379, 385, and 386.
39 Ibid., December 17, 1906, p. 406; CFL, Minutes, December 16, 1906.
40 chicago Socialist, January 1D, 1906.
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instituting the recall which was a major component of popular government reforms elsewhere.

It also refused to provide the power to initiate

legislation--the twenty percent limit was solely for referendum--,
restricted the referendum to ordinances granting franchises, and rejected a proposal to require a mandatory city-wide referendum on franchises granted for over five years.

At its final session the delegates

reconsidered the referendum issue and voted to lower the signature
limit to ten percent.

Those men who had previously rejected ten percent

as too high now accepted it as the best they could get, and those who
had favored twenty percent now believed that other safeguards in the
charter adequately protected the city against unreasonable referenda.
Some of the delegates protested to the end against any extension of
direct democracy, warning that it was foolhardy to allow foreign voters
(i.e.the immigrants) to decide on questions they did not understando4l
Municipal Services
No issue was more volatile and controversial in cities in the early
twentieth century than that of providing and maintaining municipal service-s, and Chicago, as has been seen, was no exceptiono

Chicagoans were

demanding change in the methods of granting franchises to street railways and public utilities with many citizens actively promoting municipal ownership; various groups in the city were debating priorities and
goals in recreation and the hiring and firing of city employees

0

De-

spite the debate over these issues in the city, however, the convention
had little problem deciding what it wanted in the charter.
4 lcharter Convention, Proceedings, December 17, 1906, p. 417-1.8o
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The convention
pal ownership"

decisive~

rejected the calls for complete munici-

Instead, it took Walter Fisher's advice that adequate

and effective public control and regulation would eliminate existing intolerable public utility abuses, while abating popular desire for total
public ownership and operation. 42

The delegates therefore extended the

Mueller Law to cover all utilities and strengthened the city's power
to regulate rates charged by utilities, and forbade the City Council
ever to limit or grant away this right.

They also accepted Post 's

amendment to substitute a simple majority vote for the three-fifths
vote required by the Mueller Law, although several delegates objected.
Bennett opposed the lower total because it made municipal ownership
easier to institute.

In debating this issue he, and others, once again

voiced their fears of popular
would all;ays be a

11

decision~aking,

predicting that there

large percentage of the unthinking part of the popu-

lation that \•TOuld always be ready to vote on anything that would change
the existing conditions. u43
Having decided

ear~

in its deliberations to consolidate the parks

with the city government, the convention also had to decide how the
parks were to be administered under the new charter.

Instead of the

existing system of three park boards, each levying its own taxes and
controlling all park land within its district, the proposed charter ereated a City Department of Parks overseen by a Board of Park Commissioners
appointed by the Mayor; the City Council was granted power to levy and

L.

77.

42walter L. Fisher to John V. Farwell, February lJ, l906, Walter
Papers.

Fishe~

43 charter Convention, Proceedings, March l, l907, p. ll74 and ll76-
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distribute tax revenues and issue bonds for park purposes, enact all
necessary rules and regulations for governing and protecting parks, and
with the two-third consent of the Board, discontinue, acquire, or alter
any public park property.

There was almost no dissent within the conven-

tion on this issue and most discussion centered around whether the Mayor,
Governor, or Appellate Court Judges would appoint the Commissioners.

The

majority agreed that mayoral appointment was the only way consistent with
home rule. 44
The convention modified the city's existing civil service system
in one significant way: it empowered department heads to remove any em-

ployee with a formal hearing for any cause "which will promote the efficiency of the service. 1145

While accepting this provision because it

promised increased efficiency, the delegates rejected two other proposals
which supposedly would have brought more efficiency into the government.
First they placed the employees of the new municipal court system under
civil service, in spite of the plea from delegate Snow that these people
needed to be chosen and retained for their responsibility, judgment, and
honesty and this could be accomplished better outside of civil service.
Second, they refused to make the bailiff and chief clerk of the municipal
court appointed offices.

In this last decision the majority of delegates

were still feeling optimistic about the voters' ability to elect good men
to municipal offices--an optimism generated by the cleaned-up Council.46
44Ibid., December 15, 1906, p. 363-66.
45

Ibid.' November .30, 1906, P· 52.

46Ibid., December 6, 1906, p. 157, 162 and 185.
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The delegates clear J.y lmew what they wanted to do about public
utilities, parks, and civil service and they adopted these sections with
little dissent o

Their unity, however, did not reflect accurately senti-

ment throughout the city.

The delegates misunderstood the extent of

opposing opinions on these issues, and they were to become important
issues in the referendum campaign.
Schools
The convention did have greater difficulty handling the charter's
education section.

Schools were an emotional and divisive issue.

ents wanted some voice in their childrens 1 education;

taxp~ers

Par-

wanted

assurances that their money was properly spent; teachers and educators
held their own ideas of the proper priorities of education, and teachers
sought to protect and better their own places in the system.

Education

also divided people philosophically between those who thought it most
important to make schools accountable to the citizens as a logical extension of popular democracy and those who believed that the efficacy
and democracy of the school system depended primarily on fiscal and administrative efficiency.

Realistically, everyone worried about who con-

trolled the school system and in the convention education became a test
of power among various groups in the city.
In early October of 1906 the Merchants 1 Club asked that their com-

mittee on education be allowed to assist the convention's education committee in drafting the charter provisions to organize Chicago's schools
on a "rational and business-like basis. 1147
47 rbid., October 3, 1906, p. 2

This request evoked an out-
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pouring of criticism and counter demands.

The Public charged that

businessmen were attempting to run the schools by "business methods"
which really meant despotic rule by the Superintendent.

Speaking at a

special meeting of the CFL called to discuss the education issue, Louis
Post accused the convention of designing an educational system

11

drawn

up by a few members of the Merchants' Club in a back room of the Union
League Club" who were "attempting through the proposed charter to wrest
the control of the public schools from the people. u48

Margaret Dreier

Robins, a prominent member of the Chicago Women 1 s Trade Union League
was so alarmed by the situation that· she wrote to Lincoln Steffens
asking him to come to Chicago to e:xpose the plotting of businessmen
to take over the schools. 49

"Mass meetings are called by these rever-

end gentlemen 'to consider the crisis in the public schools'," she
wrote Steffens
a~d a petition has been signed by Mr. Gustavus Swift, packer, and
others to be sent to the Charter Convention 11to curb the power of
the School Board". The Merchants' Club is preparing a "ripper"
bill to present to the next legislature to legislate the present
school Board out of existence •••• Why have all the privileged interests of the city combined to make this attack and make it so
venomously?
···

The CFL joined the protest and wrote a letter to the convention
reminding the delegates that the voters had approved a public policy
proposal to elect the Board of Education and demanding that the charter
provide for electing school board members, paying them an adequate
48The Public, November 17, 1906; CFL, Minutes, December 2, 1906.

49Mary E. Dreier, Margaret Dreier Robins: Her Life, Letters, and
(New York: 1950), p. 96.
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salarY, and vesting full control of the public schools in their hands
and not the Superintendent 1 s.

The CFL promised to

resist by every honorable means any attempt of any and all in-·
terests and influences to take away the control of the Chicago
school system from the people of Chicago •••• and to stand opposed
to any measure ••• that would place the educational system of Chicago
in the hands and under the control of one man .••
and warned the convention it would accept nothing less than these
demands.

50

The convention's Committee on Education drafted a lengthy article
on education, and the delegates deliberated this in light of the various proposals they had received.

The debates over this education arti-

cle reflected the citiz.ens' conflicts on this issue.

From the beginning

of the debates, however, the majority of the delegates made the administrative efficiency of the schools their top priority.

Speaking for

the members of the education committee, Graham Taylor explained that
their education article embodied sufficiently detailed specifications
to "assure administrative efficiency. 11

He dismissed the CFL' s letter

as "right in theory but inefficient ••• and nothing can be worse for democracy than inefficiency. "5l
Raymond Robins immediately offered an amendment to replace the
mayoral appointment of the Board of Education with popular election, and
this issue set a standard for the remaining debates on education.

The

delegates' ideas of the role and function of the Board affected their
50Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 20, 1906, p. 561. In
1904 the voters approved the idea of an elected school board by a margin
of over two to one. Daily News, Almanac (1905), p. 385.
51
charter Convention, Proceedings, December 20, 1906, p. 562 and
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votes on other school issues and their arguments reveal a resolute
separation between those advocating efficiency and expertise and those
favoring more popular control of municipal affairs.

In general, dele-

gates voting for popular election tended to vote in favor of placing
more power in the hands of the Board than the Superintendent, guaranteeing teacher salaries, and reducing the number of school board members.
Though each side argued that its method of selecting the school
board protected the board from partisan party politics the true issue
was who controlled the board.

In fact it was somewhat ludicrous for

delegates Revell and Raymer to suggest to the convention that electing
school board members by petition nomination--the only method proposed-would open the school system to party politics when this same method
had been advocated to remove party politics from all municipal elections.5 2
Post and Robins, on the other side, believed an elected board reflected
the will of the community and kept special interests from seizing control of education.

Others assumed certain special interests ought to

be in charge of the schools and that the city could only get that "class
of men tt by appointment and not be election. 53
When the convention rejected the proposal for an elected school
board Louis Post attempted to counter the drift toward efficiency by
introducing two amendments aimed at dispersing power within the school
system to make it more democratic and aimed at treating teachers as the
real experts on education.

First he proposed giving the school board

52 Ibid., p. 570-71.
53 Ibid., p. 569, 572-74, and 575.
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rather than the Superintendent the power to introduce
to

appoint~

and

textbooks~

promote and transfer teachers and principals.

he

Second~

proposed that the charter firmly protect the position of teachers within the system by giving them direct access to the Board with their
suggestions on education and by guaranteeing that their salaries would
never be reduced during their tenure in the system.

Post made these

proposals because he concurred with the CFL's fear of giving one person
too much

control~

and his tenure as a school board member had convinced

him that differing ideas could be represented there and perhaps heeded. 54
The convention defeated both of these

amendments~

also rejecting

delegate White's proposal that the Board be able to remove the Superintendent by a majority and not a two-thirds vote.

In so

doing~

the con-

vention confirmed its desire to have a strong Superintendent of Education, independent of the Board and not subject to

removal~

as one dele-

gate put it, by the "whim or caprice of a majority." 55
The convention did stop short of regarding efficiency and
tise as the ruling criteria of public education.

Delegate

~~er-

R~er

pro-

posed reducing the Board from fifteen to nine members because a smaller
Board would transact better the "business of education." Robins lamented this tendency to view business efficiency as the supreme function of the Board of Education and suggested the Board had to "be in
touch with the people's interests because education is the hope of the
54.rhe Public, November 17, 1906; Post~ "Living a Long Life Over~"
p. 351. Post thought it only fair to guarantee teacher salaries since
the charter 1 s education provision included a clause guaranteeing the
salaries of school system officers.
55 charter Convention~ Proceedings, Dece~ber 26, 1906, p. 718 and
722; D•3cember 22, p. 675; February 25 ~ 1907, Po JD81-84.
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people and the hope of society."

Although they had turned down an

elected school board, the majority of the delegates sympathized
Robins on this issue.

wit~

They believed that once the proper people had

been appointed, the Board did represent the community interest and that
a larger board could more thoroughly investigate the educational needs
of the entire community. 56

Therefore the delegates voted to reject

the proposal to reduce the size of the Board.
The last issue which the convention had to consider on the school
system was Linehan's proposal to pay the board members $2500 a year to
make it financially feasible for more citizens to serve on the Board.
The existing school board served without pay, and--as Louis Post had already realized personally--serving on the Board could be an economic
hardship for anyone without a lot of spare time and money. 57

B.A. Eckhart

protested this proposal, saying that people willing to serve out of
public experience and civic pride would produce a more capable board,
while other delegates worried that paid positions would turn into political plums.5 8 Linehan attacked the idea of the worthiness of civic pride
as a blatant attempt to keep the board in control of only those who were
wealthy enough to afford serving without pay.

Why, he asked was the great

civic pride of a millionaire without children "any more worthy of recognition than the pride of the workmen, who supply all the children and all
the money for the maintenance of the public institutions of this city";
56 Ibid., December 21, 1906, p. 608-13, 614-16, and 617.
57 Post,

11

Living a Long Life Over, 11 p. 294.

58charter Convention, Proceedings, December 21, 1906, p. 620 and
622; February 25, 1907, p. 1065.

or why was the businessman who has spent his life chasing the "almighty dollar 11 of sounder character to serve on the Board ? 59

Robins

supported Linehan's proposal as a way to make the Board more responsible to the people whose taxes paid their salary.
The delegates opposed this matter less vigorously than the elected school board--perhaps feeling that i f they were on the Board they
would like to get paid-but they did not pass this amendment.

No one

questioned the city's financial ability to pay the Board, and since the
convention subsequently passed a resolution allowing the City Council
to pass an ordinance to this effect, it does not seem likely that money
was the reason for the delegate's refusal to concur with paying the
60
school board members.
More probably, they agreed with Eckhart's
notion of civic pride and civic duty, and some undoubtedly believed
that the wrong class of citizens could be kept off of the Board if
there was no remuneration for serving.
Municipal Revenues
Not surprisingly, revenue was an important and contentious issue
in

the charter convention.

The delegates worried abo1,1t the correct in-

terpretation of the enabling amendment and just how much freedom it gave
them to change the existing governmental and revenue structures.

They

professed to trust their strong city council government, but they hesitated giving it anything other than explicit powers.

They were often

uncertain on how to protect the rights of property owners while making
Chicago a good, safe, healthy place to live.
59Ibid., December 21, 1906, p. 622-24o
60

Ibid. , February 25, 1907, p. 1067.

As a result they chose not
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to make a strong bid for extensive home rule, instead maintaining the
framework of the existing municipal revenue system and simply and cautiously revising its internal operations.
From the beginning of the convention a few delegates worked to
secure complete home rule powers for Chicago in determining its revenue
system.

When the Committee on Municipal Taxation and Revenue proposed

sections itemizing allowable tax rates, types of permissible taxes, and
the taxing powers of the City Council, Post, Linehan, and Joseph Patterson proposed that the charter simply vest in the Council power to raise
revenue for municipal purposes.

61

Post argued that the 1904 amendment

intended Chicago to have full powers of governing itself on taxation,
and thus his proposal was not only sensible, but also assured the city
of fiscal home rule.

62 As a check against abuse of this power by the

Council, the three men recommended that the charter provide for mandatory vetoes by popular referendum on all subjects regarding revenue. 63
This proposition must have caused violent shuddering among many of the
delegates; it was hardly the way to achieve business-like efficiency in
city government.

Merriam declared that he himself regaraed "certain

financial restrictions and limitations and safeguards upon the power of
the city as essential," and that efficient home rule necessitated fixed

61Ib"d
_1._., October 3, 1906, p. 7-8.
62IQig_., December l8, 1906, p. 467.

The exact wording of the amendment allowed the General Assembly to pass "any law providing a scheme or
charter of local municipal government ••• and [such law or laws] may provide for the assessment of property and the levy and collection of taxes
within said city for corporate purposes.,. 11 The convention members disagreed on the interpretation of this clause.

63 charter Convention, Proceedings, October 3, 1906, p. 8.
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statuatory limits on bonded indebtedness, taxing rates, and other financial powers of the city. 64 The overwhelming majority of the delegates agreed with Merriam and easily defeated this proposal.

They did

not want a municipal revenue system which carried home rule and direct
democracy to their ultimate conclusions.
While the delegates acknowledged the state's authority to set tax
rates and limits on municipal indebtedness, many believed the city needed
at least to replace the system by which the Cook County Board of Assessors determined the value of city property.

Merriam, in his exhaustive

report on Chicago's municipal revenues for the City Club, concluded that
the charter needed to replace this county system with a city tax system,
and he joined Post, Linehan, and Patterson in proposing this to the convention.65

Merriam believed this change would guarantee both efficiency

and home rule

o

He argued that Chicago could only control its revenue

system if it controlled its taxation; for example, if the city could
raise its·property valuation it would be able to borrow more money and
perhaps simultaneously lower the tax rate, saving Chicagoans from higher
taxes.

Merriam believed this method would insure adequate funds for

municipal expenses, make the city government primarily responsible and
accountable to its citizens for its expenditures, and effect municipal
home rule.

To support his position he reminded the convention that

Chicago had a city tax system prior to the incorporation act of 1872,
and that all large cities in the United States controlled their own
tax assessment, collection, and distribution o
64rbid., December 18, 1906, p. 468.
65Ib"d
_1._., October 3, 1906, p. 8.

James Linehan put the

ll?
more simply, declaring he supported the proposal because it was "a
matter of home rule ••• shall ninety-two percent of the voting people do
the assessing or shall eight percent ••• u
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The convention did not agree and quickly defeated the proposition,
although the delegates raised minimal objections.

McCormick protested

that "raising valuation to raise money is dishonest" but offered no
substantive argument against the principle or efficiency of a city tax
system..

Frank Shepard opposed the change on the grounds that it would

another taxing body--an anathema to many proponents of municipal efficiency--but no other delegates voiced support for his reasoning. 67
The reasons for the defeat of a city tax system lay in other areas than
the objections of McCormick and Shepard.
Political maneuvering undoubtedly played a role.

All ten of the

appointees of the state legislature who were present voted against the
proposal, as did Shepard, an appointee of the County Board of Commissioners--this Board of course stood to lose a substantial degree of power
if Chicago was granted its own tax system.

However, the primary reason

why most of the delegates refused to create a city tax system was that
they thought consolidation itself would produce a more efficient municipal revenue system and provide adequate means for raising more money.
Consolidation automatically increased the city's bonding power to five
percent of full property valuation and its tax leVY to five percent of
assessed valuation.
66

Merriam, Municipal Revenues, p. 94-95; Charter Convention, Pro
ceedings, December 19, 1906, p. 526-28, December 20, p. 559.
6
7Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 19, 1906, p. 528-30,
December 20, p. 558-61.
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Once they had decided to rely on consolidation as the primary
means to achieve fiscal reform the delegates needed to devise a new
system under which the city would control all property tax revenue and
the issuing of

bonds~

and the disbursement of these funds.

The majority

quickly agreed that the City Council determine annually the respective
amounts levied for

corporate~ park~

school~

and library purposes from

the five percent tax on the city's assessed property valuation, as well
as

issue~

disburse, and repay municipal bonds.

They particularly liked

the flexibility of this system because unlike the prevailing one it allowed the city to vary its expenditures from year to year according to
68
where the money was needed most.
The convention was not unanimous, however; some members were skeptical of leaving the levies unspecified.

To guarantee that schools would

be adequately financed Post, Robins, and White-all members of the Board
of Education-presented

a~

amendment to set a minimum amount which would

be appropriated yearly for school expenses.

Their experience on the

school board had made them wary of trusting politicians too far when it
came to running the schools.

Post and Robins in particular thought that

in the absence of any significant popular control over the Council's

actions, the charter needed to set more specific limitations on the
Council's fiscal prerogatives. 69

Delegates Cole, Hoyne, and Bennett on

the other hand believed that the system of unspecified levies was much
more efficient and the convention easily defeated the amendment. 70
68Ib.d
-~_., December l8, 1906, P· 464.
69
Ibid.' February 25, 1907' p. 1044.-48, and 1050-51.
70Ib"d
-~_., p. 1046, and 1049-52.
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The final revenue question considered by the convention was the
problem of special licenses and assessments.

In preceding years, the

city had relied more and more on these taxes to supplement its other
inadequate tax and bond revenues, and the citizens complained bitterly
about these added burdens.

The delegates believed that the license

taxes were vital and a fair exchange for privileges received from the
city.

Although John Shedd, vice-president of Marshall Field's, protested

that the city had no power to do so, the convention authorized the
Council to impose such a tax on any trade, business, or occupation in
the city and on all persons, firms, or corporations holding franchises
from the city.

The delegates also agreed to impose a tax on all wheeled

vehicles operating within the city.7l
The question of special assessments to

p~

for local improvements

was more troublesome and the convention refused to extend the City
Council's unlimited power to levy such taxes.

As property owners many

of the convention members wanted to relieve themselves and their fellow
property owners of some of this burden and therefore they put a ceiling
on special assessments.

What this ceiling should be prompted some dis-

agreement among the delegates.

Pointing out that people from all over

the city used the streets, Smulski and O'Donnell wanted no special
assessment after the first improvement.

B.A. Eckhart supported this in

theory, but suggested that realistically the cost had to be divided,
perhaps with the city

p~g

seventy-five percent and the property owner

the remaining twenty-five percent.

While there was a great deal of sup-

port for reducing the property owner's share, most of the delegates had
71Ibida, October 3, 1906, p. 9, December 1.8, p. 470o

l20

to agree with Bernard Sunny that it was "theoretically right but financially impractical" for the city to pay the seventy-five percent.
Merriam offered what he thought was the most practical compromise:
property owners would only be assessed for fifty percent of the cost
after the first improvement.
for two reasons.

The delegates agreed to this compromise

First because it relieved the burden of property

owners while protecting property values--they all acknowledged that
unimproved streets depressed property values.

Secondly, because they

were willing to concede that the city could not pay the entire cost of
improvements and without special assessments the citizens would be reduced to fighting for available funds.7 2
The debate over special assessments is indicative of the limited
constituency of the convention, for the delegates clearly concerned themselves only with the burdens of property.

Only Louis Post seriously

asked how special assessments affected the maj.ority of Chicagoans--the
renters.

Post wanted the convention to devise a method of prohibiting

the property owners from passing their special assessment costs on to
their tenants.

After all, he argued, if the owners were the ones bene-

fitting financially, why should the tenants pay?

Furthermore, Post be-

lieved that the property owners should pay a special tax against any financial benefits which they gained from local improvements. 73

The

convention supported neither of Post's positions, and not even Post contemplated how to make non-resident property owners pay for street im72Ibid., December 18, 1906, p. 471-76, and 481.
73rb.;d.'
_._
p. 478-80 'and

LeY!
'+'-'r·
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provements, although recent investigations of city street conditions
had questioned the adequacy and fairness of a situation in which poor
renters could not afford, and absentee landlords refused to pay for
street improvements. 74
In general the convention respected the rights of property.

It

limited the special assessment taxes and defeated a motion to repeal the
municipal ordinance requiring frontage consents from property owners as
a prior condition for granting franchises.

Proponents of repeal had

spoken of placing the general good before the desires of individual
property owners, but the majority disagreed with this position.7 5 On
one issue though the delegates switched their thinking.

The new charter

empowered the City Council to enforce tenement ordinances by making reasonable repairs and then charging the owner, if the owner refused to make
the repairs after adequate notification by the city.

A few delegates

protested that this was an arbitrary violation of property rights and
at tempted to delete this section from the charter.

Ra.Ymond Robins

strongly supported the proposal arguing that tenants had a right to decent housing and the city a responsibility to provide it.

The votes

on previous issues suggest however that most of the delegates were moved
more by Merriam's argument that this provision was essential to protect
the city's health conditions.

On this issue the general good apparently

prevailed over property rights because it was easier for the delegates
to see that unhealthy, unsanitary housing posed potential dangers to the
74rfunter, Tenement Conditions in Chicago, p. ll6.
75 charter Convention, Proceedings, December 14, 1906, p. 338-39.
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whole city than to accept that the general welfare demanded the repeal
of frontage consents.

76

Woman Suffrage
The convention saved two controversial issues for lasto
was the question of giving women the municipal franchise.

The first

Many women in

the city wanted to vote in municipal elections as did women throughout
the country at this time. 77 Some women believed they should have the
municipal franchise because municipal problems resembled the problems
in the home and family; keeping a city clean, healthy, and running

smoothly, they argued, was similar to managing a house and family and who
understood these problems better than women? Women who owned property
believed it only just that they have a voice in deciding tax and property
matters, while working women sought the vote to help protect their working conditions.
In Chicago several groups urged the convention to include municipal
suffrage for women in the new charter.

The Women 1 s Trade Union League

endorsed municipal suffrage "that the women working in our city may
better protect their labor," and requested the CFL to work to get this
put into the charter. 7

8

The prestigious Chicago Woman 1 s Club sent its

members a letter informing them of the possibility of securing the franchise through the new charter and asked them to do whatever they could to
76
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February 23, 1907, p. 1015-17.

77Aileen Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement, 18901920 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 3-4.
78CFL, Minutes, April 1, 1906.
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help accomplish this. 79

Jane Addams headed a federation of one hundred

women 1 s organizations pursuing suffrage and the variety of women seeking
80
the vote and their reasons impressed her.
We were joined •• oby organizations of working women who had keenly
felt the need of the municipal franchise in order to secure for
their workshops the most rudimentary sanitation ••• by federations
of mothers 1 meetings, who were interested in clean milk and the
extension of kindergartens ••• by property-owning women, who had
been powerless to protest against unjust taxation; by organizations of professional women, of university students, and of collegiate alumnae; by women's clubs interested in municipal reforms •••
Addams herself believed that the "government of the city is now merely
81
enlarged housekeeping. u
The investigations of her Hull-House Women's
Club into garbage, street cleaning, and other sanitation problems had
effectuated the only improvements in the neighborhood's conditions, and
helped convince her that women better understood certain municipal problems.

The experience also persuaded her that voluntary efforts were in-

sufficient and needed to be reinforced with political power.

When groups

of immigrant women from the Hull-House neighborhood told Addams they
wanted the right to vote, she believed that "the time must be ripe for
political expression of that public concern on the part of women which
had so long been forced to seek indirection. 11

She urged the men to

give women the "opportunity to cooperate directly in civic life through
the use of the ballot in regard to their own affairs. 1182
79Chicago Woman 1 s Club, Minutes of Board Meetings, September 26,
1906, in Chicago Woman 1 s Club Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
80
8

Addams, p. 237.

laecord-Herald, March 7, 1906. This was in a speech given to the
Lake View Woman 1 s Club.
82
Addams, p. 203-206, and 237-38.

Not all women agreed of course and the Illinois Association
Opposed to the Extension of Suffrage to Women also communicated with the
convention.

The Association claimed that suffrage was impractical be-

cause women did not vote in large numbers when they received the franchise.

Its real emphasis, however, was on one of the more popular anti-

suffrage arguments of the period: that woman suffrage undermined the
family, children, and urban society.

Women did not help society by

voting, said the Association, but by staying home and cultivating their
children's souls because "children who are the outcome of such homes
only rarely become 'mashers' or 'hoodlums 1 or degenerates of any sort. 11
These anti-suffragists direly predicted mass voting by women in the redlight districts and that "ambitious, self-seeking, unscrupulous women"
would join forces with the ward-heelers and political bosses.

Rather

than helping solve municipal problems, they warned, woman suffrage promised to add more unfit voters to the electorate. 83

To counter these

allegations, the Illinois Equal Suffrage Association asked Raymond
Robins to lead the fight for suffrage in the convention. 84
S3Illinois Association Opposed to the Extension of Suffrage to
Women, 11A Protest Against the Granting of Municipal Suffrage to Women
in the City of Chicago, " unpublished pamphlet, Chicago Historical Society. See Kraditor, p. 12-26 for complete explanation of anti-suffrage
ideas. Also, it was the nature of the ::n.ovement for each side to attempt
to turn the other's arguments around. Hence suffragists argued that
rather than restricting themselves to the home, women needed "to exercise their purifying influence in the voting booth, 11 and that extending
suffrage would add more socially acceptable voters to the electorate to
stand against the machines and illlmigrants. See Mary P. Ryan, Womanhood
in America: From Colonial Times to the Present (New York: Franklin Watts,
1975), Po 245; Kraditor, p. 106.
84catherine Waugh McCullough to Raymond Robins, November 30, 1906,
Raymond Robins Paperso
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Women representing both sides of the issue appeared before the
convention's committee on elections, but when the committee recommended
five to four against conferring suffrage on women, proponents of suffrage
petitioned the convention to waive its rules and allow women to speak
before the entire body.

Louis Post argued that the issue was so impor-

tant and the committee vote so close that the convention might well
profit from hearing the petitions directly.

He urged his fellow dele-

gates to schedule a specific date for hearing this question and invite
women to address the group.

Post believed that this was only a fair and

just repayment to women of the city, whom he thought were partially responsible for there being a charter convention. 85
I think it is not stating too much to s~ that if it had not been
for the action of the women in this community who are in favor of
women 1 s suffrage, we would have no occasion for taking up this
question tod~ because no satisfactory amendment would have gone
to the legislature and we would not have had the opportunity.
Even more to the point Post, ever concerned with the people's right to
representation, argued that women had no direct representation in the
convention and deserved the right to be heard on this issue. 86
B.A. Eckhart protested that if the convention permitted women
to speak directly to the convention every group in the city would demand a hearing, and while some delegates sympathized with Post 1 s ideas,
they, like Eckhart, did not wish to set a precedent they might later regret.

The delegates tabled the motion to invite women to address the

body.

Fisher suggested to his fellow delegates that they could best
85
86

charter Convention, Proceedings, December 4, 1906, p. 130-31.
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acquaint themselves with the issue by attending one of the community
meetings held by suffrage advocates. 87
When the convention finally confronted the issue of woman suffrage,
the delegates 1 views mirrored those of the larger society.

Reverend

White summarized the pro-suffrage arguments: women were taxpayers, had
vital interests in urban affairs, could not be assumed to agree with
their husbands--in fact, could not be assumed to have husbands--and the
failure to allow women to vote is "an injustice to the working women of
Chicago, it is wrong and it is absolutezy un.American. 11

For White and

other supporters of suffrage, any or all of these reasons sufficed to
extend suffrage.

On the other side of the question Rosenthal contended

that onzy a small percent wanted to vote; Hoyne protested against "dragging women down from the pedestal to mix in ward politics"; and Hill
warned that the wrong class of women would vote and the
ladies that we seek to obtain will not be obtained. u

88

11

influe!lce of the

The opponents of

suffrage prevailed and defeated an amendment to give women the municipal
franchise by a vote of seventeen to twenty-six.
In January the Equal Suffrage Association asked delegates Robins,

Post, Taylor, McGoorty, White, and MacMillan to a meeting to decide ffhat
further steps they could take on the suffrage question.

Although Robins

could not attend, Catherine McCullough subsequently informed him that
those present had acknowledged there was no hope of garnering enough
votes to pass a charter provision on woman suffrage and that they had
decided to ask instead that the convention submit a separate bill for
87

charter Conve!ltion, Proceedings, December

88

4, 1906, p. 131-32.

Ibid., December 27, 1906, p. 767-72, 776, and 778.

127
suffrage to the legislature.

89

The convention however refused to do even

this, saying it preferred that the state take all initiative in this
matter.

On the issue of woman suffrage, therefore, the charter conven-

chose to ignore the desires of many Chicago women and voted on the basis
of their personal preferences, and prejudices, against giving women political power •

Louis Post castigated his fellow delegates for their cal-

lous treatment of women. 90
Liquor Regulation
Finally the convention had to confront the vexing question of
liquor regulation.

Not only was this a controversial issue throughout

the city, it was also the one for which organized groups outside the
convention put tremendous pressure on the delegates.

When the conven-

tion adopted its statement acknowledging that the state conferred all
powers of municipal government, 91 the United Societies accelerated its
campaign to have some explicit home rule provision on liquor regulation
inserted into the charter .
First the Societies worked to strengthen the resolve of its
existing membership.

It sent a letter to all member societies attacking

the state liquor laws as an affront to popular democracy and proclaiming
that the organization was "strong enough and entitled to take its place
in politics, to stand united and not be put off with poor excuses, and

89 catherine W. McCullough to Raymond Robins, January 8 and January
14, 1907, Raymond Robins Papers.
90 Charter Convention, Proceedings, February 16, 1907; the Public
January 5, 1907.
9

~ee above, p. 101.
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carry to the end a campaign against a dishonest and dependent minority. u9 2
The Societies then began issuing a bulletin to inform its membership of
the important aspects of the liquor regulation question and to enable
them to follow the debate and events of the convention on the issue. 92
Second~,

the Societies

active~

publicized its position throughout

the city, hoping to gain new support from ethnic groups and perhaps
other groups, who could in turn helf> pressure the convention.
effort the Societies succeeded.
Sunday was the

on~

In this

The CFL leadership, observing that

day on which workers could "relax, enjoy themselves,

and recover from their arduous

week~

labors," urged workers to join the

United Societies in their efforts to insure that saloons and other places
of entertainment were not closed on Sundays. 93
The Societies also succeeded in attracting more ethnic support.
The Bohemian societies of Chicago held a mass meeting just before Christmas to apprise Bohemians all over the city of the work of the United
Societies and the danger of liquor restriction.

Speakers at this meeting

contended that the general state law under which Sunday closings was
being threatened was so vague that it could be used to ban theatres,
the.running of street cars, and the publishing and selling of newspapers.
They further argued that such a law was
urban life.

hopeless~

out of touch with

The gathering passed a resolution declaring that the "so-

called blue laws" were too obsolete and undemocratic to be applied in
a cosmopolitan city, and had copies sent to the charter convention and
to the United Societies.

The Bohemians also passed a resolution asking

92Abendpost, December 3, 1906.
93 cFL, Minutes, December 16, 1906; Abendpost, December 17, 1906.
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the convention to rescind the rule which barred non-members from the
convention floor and allow a delegation from the United Societies to
take the floor and present its arguments.

The Abendpost reported that

additional societies joining the United Societies after this meeting
boosted the number of affiliated Bohemian societies to 120 with an approximate membership of 20,000.94
The Societies took the support they received as evidence that the
majority of Chicagoans wanted the city freed from Sunday closing and
any other state law designed to restrict or prohibit the sale of liquor.

The organization again warned the convention that only a specific home
rule provision in the charter could guarantee popular sovereignty on
this issue, without which its membership would not support any new chartero95

The temperance forces agreed with the Societies' assessment of

municipal sentiment on this issue, and for this reason urged the delegates to keep any home rule on liquor out of the charter.

The Law and

Order League argued that only the state laws prevented Chicago from
eliminating prohibition districts, as well as licensing prostitution and
race track gambling and exempting itself "from numerous other provisions
of the Criminal Code. 11

In a letter to Raymond Robins a League spokes-

man warned that Chicago needed the protection of state laws to avoid
being handed over to the forces of vice and corruption and he laid the
94Abendpost, December 24, 1906; United Societies for Local SelfGovernment, Home Rule Bulletin 3 (January 5, 1907), One English language newspaper also covered this meeting but inaccurately identified
it as one called by the United Societies. In general, the ]11glish
press tended to make serious errors when reporting the events of the
city's ethnic groups, and often neglected major events altogether.
See Record-Herald, December 24, 1906.
95 charter Convention, Proceedings, December 26, 1906, p. 712-13.

blame squarely on the city's large immigrant population.

In another

twenty-five years, he explained, when "our foreign increment has been
digested," the situation might be different.

For now he urged Robins

to see the wisdom of allowing "the more conservative and more American
sentiment of the country to help us out rather than to leave the whole
matter to the population of Chicago. rr 96

It was reasoning such as this

which convinced the United Societies that the temperance movement was
an assault by the minority on the lifestyle and character of the majority.

And they deeply resented the equating of liquor with criminal

activities of all sorts and with "unAmericanism."
The Societies received unexpected support on this issue from convention member Alexander Revell.

Revell, a wealthy Republican furniture

manufacturer, was not associated with the Societies, nor did he have much
in common with its membership.

But in a lengthy speech to the convention

he argued that a true home rule charter must include the problem of
liquor regulation.97 ·
Then the people of Chicago can decide whether they want Sunday
saloons or not. And it is the people' s right, in a land of popular government, to have such laws as they desire ••.•We cannot go
before the world with the announcement that the people of Chicago
cannot be trusted to govern themselves. Such a policy and such a
declaration would invide disaster and contempt.
Revell was arguing that the right to popular government was the deeply
rooted principle, and that to use the law to regulate personal habits was
to misuse law and invite comtempt for it.
96Robert McCurdy to Raymond Robins, December 3, 1906, Raymond
Robins Papers.
97 charter Convention, Proceedings, December 27, 1906, p. 786-90;
United Societies, Home Rule Bulletin 3.
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It is difficult to ascertain from the sparse convention debate
exactly what individual delegates thought about this issueo

They did

not want to deny the validity of the arguments advanced by the United
Societies or Revell; the strongest opposing argument advanced was that
the issue did not properly belong in the charter because people would
use it as their sole reason for voting for or against the entire charter. 98 The delegates had very little else to say about this question
and it seems obvious that they were caught between the demands of the
United Societies, those of the Anti-saloon and Law and Order Leagues,
and their personal predilections.

The solution they arrived at was

to frame a separate bill, which, if accepted by the state legislature,
would Chicago voters to decide whether the city should have sole power
to regulate liquor.

The Societies accepted this compromise because

it believed that the majority of Chicagoans would quickly enact such a
law.
The compromise measure on liquor regulation concluded the drafting
of the charter and the convention adjourned until mid-February when it
reconvened to reconsider some of the more disputed itemso

On March l,

1907, the convention met for its final session to conduct a vote on
accepting the proposed charter as written.

While the majority of the

delegates were quite pleased with their efforts, several of them voiced
objections to the charter as written and the discussions over accepting
the charter portended a difficult future for it.

Most of the delegates

continued to believe that the majority of the citizens would accept the
98charter Convention, Proceedings, December 27, 1906, p. 790, and
792-9Jo
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charter even if they disagreed with some of its provisions.

Charles

Merriam spoke of compromise and principle; he declared that he never
thought beforehand that he would agree with everything included in the
charter, but that what was most important was that Chicago indeed have
this charter.

"Mr. Cole and I," said Merriam, "agreed to pledge our-

selves, if the other gentlemen would do likewise, to accept this charter from this convention.

I do not see how a man ca.11 act on principle

and do otherwise. "99
Louis Post dissented, both from Merriam's speech and from accepting
the charter. 100
Unlike Mr. Merriam, I did not come into this convention with any
determination to be absolutely governed qy its decisions. If it
had been a representative convention, elected by the people •••
and I had been selected to sit in it, then I should have considered that whatever conclusions that convention came to, I should
fall in with the rest of the members. I did come, however ••• with
the full determination, that i f the members, even though appointed
instead of elected, should formulate a home rule charter, a fair
and good charter, that even if I did not like it in many respects,
I would support it.
But, Post concluded it was not a home rule charter and it violated
many of the desires of groups outside of the convention, and he refused
to vote to accept the proposed charter.
Perhaps even more ominous for the charter's fate, seven of the nine
convention members who were also state legislators attending the final
session declined also to vote for the charter, saying they reserved the
right to vote for changes when the legislature considered the charter.
D~alegate

Jones resurrected all the fears which various groups in the city

99 Ibid., March 1, 1907, p. ll93-94.
100
fuQ.' p. ll94.
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had of downstate when he declared himself open to accept changes
suggested by downstate legislators.

"If the country members of the

Legislature were able to prevail upon my judgment, that some of the
Provisions of the Chartero •• were erroneous, founded upon wrong principles,
then I would vote in favor of change. "l.Ol Nothing could more anger
several groups in Chicago than the prospect of the state legislature-those

11

country members 11 --revising the charter with Chicago representa-

tives going along and voting against the wishes of the people they represented.

10

lrbid.' p. ll99.

CHAPTER VI

THE CAMPAIGN TO RATIFY THE CHARTER
I

Even after the convention had sent the proposed charter and liquor
bills to the General Assembly in Springfield, the issue remained important enough to Chicagoans to influence the mayoral contest in early
April of 1907.

This election was particularly important because the

new mayor would be the first to serve a four year term and both parties
worked hard to win.

The Democrats renominated Mayor Dunne who had been

very popular with Chicago's ethnic community two years earlier but ethnic
support for Dunne had waned after he tried to enforce some of the state
liquor laws in early 1906--the incident which had prompted the organizing
of the United Societies.

The Republicans, hoping to attract more ethnic

voters, chose Fred Busse, the

11

boss 11 of the north side.

Busse was a

German and he promised to go to Springfield and fight for passage of the
liquor bills.

The German press endorsed Busse as the friend of the
United Societies, 1 and this support combined with that of Chicagoans who
opposed Dunne's radical stand on municipal ownership elected Busse.

The

new mayor publicly thanked the United Societies for its support and immediately left for Springfie1d. 2
1
Abendpost, April 1, 1907.
2

Ibid. , April 3, 1907
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Other groups from the city also sent representatives to lobby
for their interests: a delegation from the charter convention and other
civic and business groups pleaded for the unamended passage of the
charter bill; and the United Societies worked to persuade the legislators
to ratify the liquor regulation bills.

But it soon became clear to

these people that the state legislature had its own ideas about acceptable legislation for Chicago.

Downstate legislators, with the vehement

support of their constituents who railed against Chicago's contemptible
attitude toward liquor laws, were determined to keep the city under the
jurisdiction of general state laws, particularly those on liquor regulation.
ing

The House charter committee immediately recommended against pass-

the proposed liquor bills, which were tabled without discussion.

Representative McGoorty from Chicago moved that the bills be reconsidered
but his motion was beaten decisively.3

Furthermore, the downstaters de-

manded some concessions from Chicago in return for ratification of the
charter.

As one student of Chicago-downstate relations put it, .down-

state legislators "looked upon the Chicago charter as a form of gift
which should be traded for some other measure more desired by the country people. 114 As they had done before, the Senators first tried to trade
the charter for a plan to restrict permanently the number of representatives from Cook County, but they could not get the two-thirds vote needed
for this measure.

The votes were cast along strict regional lines; of

the eighteen negative votes, fourteen came from Chicago and one was from
3Illinois, House Journal, May 2, 1907; Philip, p. 174-75.
4philip, p. 158.
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Cook County; 5 Chicago wanted a new charter but not at such a high costo
Having failed to get restricted representation the downstaters resolutely demanded that Chicago's representatives support a state-wide localoption bill or see the charter fail to pass the legislature.

Believirig

they now had no choice if Chicago was to get the badly needed new charter, the Chicago legislators either abstained or voted for the localoption bill which passed both houses.

6

Acquiescence on the local-option bill did not guarantee Chicago
that the legislature would pass the charter in its original form. 7
Claiming that electoral procedure was a state matter, the legislature
eliminated the direct primary method for nominating municipal candidates,
one of the most widely-supported reform measures of the charter, and
restored the old system of nomination by ward convention.

Although the

legislature promised that it would soon implement the direct primary
throughout the state--the General Assembly did enact such a law in 1910-many Chicagoans were skeptical and saw this move as further evidence
that the state could not be trusted not to interfere in local affairs.
The legislature also stripped the Council of the power to impose license taxes on all persons, firms, or corporations holding franchises
from the city thereby reducing potential revenue and emphasizing that
all authority to institute taxes lay with the state.

5Ibid.' p. 62.
6

Ibid.' p. 270-72.

7The original charter as passed by the convention, and the final
version as amended by the legislature can be found in the Charter Convention Proceedings, Municipal Reference Library, Chicago, Illinois.
The final version is also printed in Illinois, Senate Journal, 1907,
p. 1079-1160 •
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A final modification to the charter demonstrated both the state

legislature's absolute determination to maintain sovereignty over the
city and Chicago 1 s vulnerableness to state and party politics: the legislators altered Chicago's ward system.

Instead of seventy wards with one

alderman each the city was reduced to fifty wards and fifty aldermen, a
system

specifical~

rejected earlier by the charter convention.

process the legislature
and class lines.

flagrant~

In the

gerrymandered wards along political

Working-class Democratic areas of the city were distric-

ted into wards with two and three times the population of middle and
upper-class Republican wards.
protested

vigorous~

Several of Chicago's representatives

but their colleagues, particularly in the Senate,

remained intransigent and the Chicago men faced choosing between an
amended charter or no charter at all.

They chose the former alternative

and in ear]y May the charter was ratified by the legislature with most
of the dissenting votes cast by downstate legislators unhappy about
giving the charter to Chicago without exacting more in return.
The charter was returned to Chicago where a city-wide referendum
was scheduled for September ··17.

The state legislature 1 s conduct on this

issue, and the changes it made to the charter, played a signifinant role
in the subsequent charter ratification campaign.
II

As soon as the legislature returned the amended charter Chicagoans
began to declare for and against.

Civic, reform and business groups

general]y favored the charter because consolidation, the revised tax
system, and a modicum of home rule promised greater fiscal and administrative efficiency for the city.

Other supporters liked the charter
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because it satisfied their special interests: the Republican party stood
to benefit from the gerrymandered wards; and the Anti-5aloon League believed Sunday closings, and possibly total prohibition, could be effected
because the city would be inextricably bound to general state laws under
the charter.
The United Societies and the CFL quickly emerged as the leading
opponents of the charter.

Having secured absolutely no guarantee of

home rule on liquor regulation the Societies opposed the charter for precisely the same reasons as the Anti-5aloon League backed it.

Further,

the charter's lack of substantial home rule and popular democratic reforms disturbed the Societies which neither trusted the motives and
actions of the state legislature nor those of reformers touting less
voter participation as the means to more efficient municipal government.
The CFL thought the charter virtually devoid of popular democratic reforms and meaningful home rule also, and completely unfavorable to the
city's working-class; labor particularly objected to the provisions on
the education system and taxation.
Radical reformers, social reformers, the Democratic party, the
Independence League, and many women joined the Societies and CFL in
attacking the charter.

The failure to grant municipal suffrage angered

women; the Democratic party would be hurt by the ward gerrymander and
in general the charter seemed unfair to its working-class constituency;
the Independence League believed the tax reforms were designed to benefit the rich and the corporations while radical reformers such as Louis
Post predicted that the whole charter would hand the city government
over to the "Real Estate Board, the Merchants 1 Club, and the Cook County
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Republicans. 118 Finally, the more socially-conscious reformers like
Raymond Robins objected to the charter's paucity of meaningful social
benefits.
Many of the reasons advanced during the charter campaign for opposing· or supporting the charter sound like the complaints of special interest groups, and to an extent they were.

The Anti-saloon League wanted

prohibition and the United Societies wanted drinking on Sundays; the
Republican and Democratic parties were engaged in partisan politics.
But to dismiss these reasons as irrelevant and subsidiary to charter
reform, as did many contemporaries and those who later studied Chicago
history, is to misread critically Chicago's charter reform movement.
Most Chicagoans fully understood that the proposed charter would alter
significantly their municipal government.

The referendum therefore

provided them the opportunity to try to implement the kind of government
and urban environment they desired.

Their arguments and activities

during the charter campaign reveal the differing ways in which they
hoped to reform Chicago.
A debate sponsored by the City Club in mid-June is a good point
to begin eJq)loring these differing ideas.

Milton Foreman, Republican

alderman and chairman of the charter convention, flatly denied that the
state legislature had made any significant changes to the charter and
asserted that "every feature of the charter that Chicago really wants ..•
is in the charter. 11 9
8

That the legislature had redistricted and reduced

The Public, January 5, 1907.

9 city Club of Chicago, The City Club Bulletin l3 (June 19, 1907),
p. 3..47.

the wards and eliminated the direct primary, and that the proposed charter conferred strictly limited home rule bothered Foreman not at all. .
The provisions designed to make government more efficient by consolidating
overlapping authorities, increasing the city's taxing powers, and loeating almost all municipal responsibility in the City Council remained
intact and these were what interested Foreman.
Edward Noonan, representing the United Societies, presented a view
of the charter which differed significantly from Foreman's.

Persuaded

by the events in Springfield that neither Chicago politicians nor the

charter convention understood what the majority of Chicagoans wanted,
the Societies had voted to oppose the charter at its second annual
convention on May 26, 1907.

The threat of prohibition of course remained

a primary reason for opposing the charter: convention speakers predicted
that the proposed charter would subject all athletic, singing, social,
and benevolent societies to state saloon and special license laws as
well as close all saloons on Sundays; they accused the Anti-5aloon League
of helping tie the charter to the local-option bill and defeat the separate liquor bills; and they warned that the League was supporting the
charter as a victory in the cause of state->~de prohibition. 10

This was

not simply paranoia on the part of the Societies for the Anti-saloon
League was in fact proclaiming these very things. 11 But in an important
broadening of the Societies' position, several speakers protested that
the new form of municipal government--which Foreman was extolling--benefitted the state, the corporations, and the wealthy of the city while it

10Abendpost, May 27, 1907.
ll
J .C. Jackson, "The Work of the Anti-Saloon League," The Annals 32
(1908)' p. 485.
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placed a disproportionate burden of the new taxes on the small property
owner and taxpayer, reduced the equality of representation in the City
Council, and failed to grant Chicago adequate home rule. 12
Feeling as strongly as they did, the members of the United Societies did not intend to allow the charter to be ratified without a fight.
They resolved to show the ethnic strength to the rest of the city by
vigorously campaigning against the charter and to this end constituted
an anti-charter campaign committee.

Speakers called upon the member-

ship to remember that the ''world belongs to the strong" and by standing
firm and united by themselves they could make the rest of the city pay
attention to what they wanted.

An editorial in the Abendpost warned

Chicago that this meeting would have profound significance for the
city's political development, and the Societies went to work to defeat
the charter. l3
Noonan explained the Societies' reasons for opposing the charter
to the City Club.

First of all he emphatically denied accusations that

the Societies opposed the charter solely because it failed to provide
home rule on liquor regulation. 14 Rather the charter 1 s gravest 1'ault
was that it did not free Chicago from the dictates of a rural legislature--a body which had recently shown its contempt for the city by arbitrarily revising its ward system.

Instead of home rule, the charter gave

the City Council a few new powers in exchange for de facto recognition
l2

Abendpost, :t'J.BY Z7, lgJ?.

13 Ibid.

~his charge had been leveled against the United Societies in an
editorial in the Record-Herald, May 28, lgJ?.

of the state's ultimate authority over the city. 15

Noonan further re-

minded his audience that the charter directly contravened the wishes of
a majority of the city's voters.

In public policy referenda held from

1904 to 1907 Chicagoans had favored instituting direct primaries, electing members of the Board of Education, allowing local citizens to determine and adopt their own system of assessing and levying taxes, and
other measures designed to increase home rule and make local government
16
The charter provided none
more directly responsible to the citizens.
of these, and in the case of direct primaries the legislature had actually deleted this from the charter.
The third participant in the debate was Charles Merriam, a professor of political science at the University of Chicago and a delegate
to the charter convention.

Merriam favored adopting the charter but was

more perceptive than Foreman in recognizing and admitting the document's
shortcomings.

He regretted that the legislature had eliminated direct

primaries, redistricted the wards, and in other ways altered the charter,
but he maintained that "the fundamental difficulty with American city
governments and with the government of Chicago has not been the lack of ...
such statutes ••• [the] greatest troubles in city government have been the
lack of adequate power, and the lack of unity and responsibility. n 17 The
proposed charter, Merriam believed, rectified these shortcomings.

Unlike

the United Societies Merriam believed also that the charter conferred
15 City Club, Bulletin l3, p. 153-56.
16
see Daily News, Almanac (1905-1908).
17City Club, Bulletin l3, p. 152.
in The Voter (July 1907), p. 24-32. ·

Merriam's speech was reprinted

143
enough home rule and that "in granting broad powers of local government and in unifying the local governments, so that responsibility
cannot be evaded, it lays a foundation for efficient democratic government. n18
For Merriam and other charter supporters efficiency in municipal
government led axiomatically to democratic municipal government; or in
Merriam's words "given ample power, clear responsibility and local control, and democracy will obtain results. 1119

Merriam urged his audience

to support the charter because it delineated the clearer lines of municipal power and responsibility necessary to assure efficient, and hence
democratic government.

The members of the United Societies disagreed;

to them, fundamental American democracy required direct citizen participation in decision-making and because the charter failed to provide this
it violated their vision of democratic municipal government.
This fundamental disagreement about municipal democracy was one
of the prominent issues as the charter campaign proceeded into the summer.

The CFL had not been invited to the City Club debate but the organ-

ization was definitely leaning toward opposing the charter.

The CFL

18
city Club, Bulletin 13, p. 149
19 Ibid. For comparable ideas see Chicago City Club, Civic Committee Reports 1 and 2 (1907); Chicago Civic Federation, The New Charter:
Why It Should Be Adopted at the Special Election, September 17th (1907);
Walter L. Fisher to M.Ho Lebensohn, September 14, 1907, Walter L. Fisher
Papers.
Merriam's ideas are similar to those of reformers in other cities,
whom Martin Schiesl found equated democracy with efficiency. They believed that democracy was less a system to insure individual participation in decision-making, and more a method of making decisions which
insured efficiency, while requiring some measure of responsiveness to
to public opinion. The Politics of Kfficiency, p. 73-75 and 149-50.

set up a special committee to study all aspects of the charter and convene a conference composed of one representative from each union local
to recommend a course of action to the membership, and promised to keep
the membership informed through the monthly journal, the Union Labor
Advocate, and their individual unions.
The convention 1 s rejection of its proposals on initiative, referendum, and the school system had angered the CFL and the legislature's
changes only deepened this anger.

Consequently the special committee

decisively recommended that the CFL oppose the charter.

The revenue

provisions, it said, were designed to increase the tax burdens of the
renter and small property owner instead of formulating a system to compel the corporations and wealthy to pay their fair share of taxes; the
ward gerrymander would hurt the working-class representation on the City
Council while the lengthening of aldermanic terms to four years would
remove elected officials further from the people and give them more time
to indulge in graft; the "progressive" reforms of initiative and direct
primary \'ihich were being instituted throughout the country were missing;
and the charter failed to implement municipal ownership. 20
That the charter would b~nefit only certain groups within the city,
the CFL was certain.

It warned workers that "all the predatory, tax-

dodging, labor baiting interests ••• who fear the rule by the whole people
[and] seek to curb the power of the electorate" supported the charter because they could use several of its provisions to control labor better. 21
.<DCFL, Minutes, July 21, 1907. The committee's recommendations were
also printed in the Union Labor Advocate (August 1907).
2

~id.
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For example, the city's enhanced police powers to arrest and detain
people for disturbing the peace could easily be used to break up political or labor rallies and against strikers.

Even more pernicious, the

CFL feared, was the provision authorizing the city to examine and license
workers.

Without such a license they could not work and the CFL thought

it possible that the licenses could be withheld or taken away on any
pretext including striking.

22

Summing up the charter as containing

nothing that will give the people better control of their own
affairs,--nothing in the interest of democratic government,-nothing to preserve the liberties of the people against the encroachments of concentrated wealth and plutocratic greed .•.. it
is an insidious attempt to dress Chicago in a corporate strait
jacket and to bind labor to the chariot wheel of a power mad
plutocracy.
the CFL declared an all-out campaign to insure that no union man be
left unaware of the dangers posed by the charter. 23
The CFL's class fears and its vision of municipal democracy are
perhaps best exemplified by the controversy over the charter provisions
on the public schools.

The convention had chosen to stress fiscal and

administrative efficiency as demanded by the business community by
creating a strong superintendent with control of both the educational
and administrative apparatus of the system and an appointed board which
served at the mayor 1 s pleasure.

These provisions were largely in accord

with the views of the City Club which in April 1907 had instructed its
Committee on Public Education to continue seeking remedies which would
"secure more effective business administration and an education ••. more
2

~his issue provides an interesting example of new urban problems
which were not satisfied by an old catch-all incorporation act designed
for much smaller cities and townso
23

cFL, Minutes, July 21, 1907; Union Labor Advocate (August 1907).

in accordance with the demands of modern social and business condi-

tions.1124 Yet the CFL (as well as others in the city) wanted the citizens to have a greater say in how their children were being educated.
In order to accomplish this the CFL had proposed that the charter pro-

vide an elected and paid school board and give this board and the
teachers more power and authority in the system than the superintendent.
Mayor Busse's removal of the more liberal board appointees of former
Mayor Durme-including two members of the CFL, and Raymond Robins and
Louis Post, both of whom had supported the CFL proposals in the convention--soon after his election only strengthened the convictions of
the CFL.
The Chicago Federation of Teachers, which was affiliated with but
not an official member of the CFL, led labor's opposition to the charter's
educational provisions.

The largely female constituency of the Federa-

tion protested the position of the teachers in the system.

While the

Superintendent and regular board employees were amply protected against
arbitrary removal, teachers were specifically exempted from Civil Service and decisions about their retention, promotion, and transfer given
over to the Superintendent; and the charter contained no guarantee of
any salary stability for teacherso

Finally the teachers protested that

repudiating an elected school board and giving the Superintendent, with
advice from the Board, all power to decide educational programs and curriculum destroyed all hope of democratic participation by the citizens
or teachers in their school system. 25

The leadership of the CFT author-

24city Club of Chicago, Civic Committee Report 1 (1906-1907), po 34o

25Chicago American, June 16, 1907.
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ized a committee of 250 to work with the woman suffrage organizations
in the city to defeat the charter and, because they would not be able

to vote on the charter, asked the CFL members to vote in their interest.
The CFL hardzy. needed persuading on this issue.

The special char-

ter committee agreed wholeheartedly that the school system proposed by
the charter was undemocratic to both the people in general and the
teachers.

The primary question, the CFL told its members, was whether

the schools should be managed "by the people for their children or by
the financial interests."

It accused business of using the charter to

make the public schools "a cog in the capitalistic machine so that the
children may reach manhood's estate, content in a condition of abject
servitude" and of trying to thwart teacher allegiance with the CFL by
26
leaving them subject to arbitrary dismissal.
The CFL clearly envisioned a school system in which a strong Superintendent, undoubtedly handpicked by the rich and powerful of the city--whose children did not
attend the public schools--held the power to determine the curriculum,
textbooks, administrators, and the financial arrangements of the schools
with little control by the school board, teachers, or parents.

Lest

this happen, all workingmen were urged to vote against the charter.

To

augment the anti-charter campaign being conducted through the Union
Labor Advocate the CFL also began sending speakers out to all union
locals.
The Civic Federation responded to the criticism of the charter by
the United Societies and CFL in a pamphlet explaining why Chicagoans
26

CFL, Minutes, July 21 and August 4, 1907; Union 1abor Advocate
(August 1907), p. 11.

should ratifY the charter; this pamphlet stressed the themes of efficiency and economy which charter supporters made the cornerstone of
th~ir

ratification campaign.

Dismissing all criticism as selfish, bla-

.•

tantly political, or "uttered by persons of unsafe theories and principles, 11 the Federation characterized charges that the charter was plutocratic and framed in the interest of the corporations as "such as might
be expected from socialist newspapers and socialist street corner harangues ••• u 27 Having thus linked all opposition with radicalism the
Federation then extolled the fiscal and administrative efficiency promised by the charter's revisions to the city's revenue system.

More

revenue, extended borrowing power, and centralized tax assessments and
levies would be conducive to greater efficiency and economy in administration and would give Chicago the ability to undertake the municipal
improvements it desperately needed.
argued,

Such improvements, the Federation

make the city a better and more desirable place in which
28
to live and do business and consequently enhance property values."
'~11

The Civic Federation did not address in their pamphlet the issues of
popular democracy which so concerned the United Societies and CFL, except to urge that people not reject the charter simply because it did
not include the direct primary or because the wards had been redistricted
by the state legislature.
The basic dichotomy between the Civic Federation and the ethnic
groups and workers of the United Societies and the CFL on the important
27 Civic Federation of Chicago, The New Chicago Charter: Why It
Should Be Adopted at the Special Election s.eptember 17th ( 1907), p. 2
and 11.
28
Ibid., p. 1-2.
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question of home rule was also revealed in this pamphlet.

While the

latter groups argued that the new charter did not remove the state
legislature's ability to interfere in municipal affairs, the Federation
believed that home rule was simply synonymous with the consolidation of
governing and taxing bodies.

It acknowledged that the city would not

be allowed to change any of the charter provisions on revenue, public
schools, public utilities, and others, but proclaimed this a home rule
charter because it centralized in the City Council the power to pass
2
ordinances on all other municipal matters. 9
Revenue was so crucial an issue to the supporters of the charter
that once the charter passed the legislature they sought to strengthen
their position by backing a move by downstate legislators to repeal the
Juul Law which set the ceiling on tax rates.

While downstaters had their

own purposes in mind for removing the tax ceiling, some Chicago charter
advocates saw how this might work to their advantage and hence were
distressed when Governor Deneen threatened to veto this repeal.

Walter

Fisher apointed out to Deneen that as long as the old limit remained,
those who opposed the charter's new revenue system could urge voters to
stick with a tax system they already knew.

Without this safeguard

however they would have to choose between the "very definite and fairminded limitations" set by the new charter or put themselves at the
mercy of future laws enacted by the General Assembly.30

Frank Shepard

further argued with Deneen that the repeal of the Law was necessary in
29

Ib"d
_J._.'
P· 9 .

30Walter L. Fisher to Governor Deneen, May 16, 1907, Walter L.
Fisher Papers.
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case the charter failed.

In that event, Chicago would at least have

the possibility of securing the same kind of tax reforms through the
legislature.

Deneen rejected these appeals and vetoed the measure and

charter supporters turned their attention to convincing Chicago voters
that they had little to lose and much to gain by ratifying the charter.
Throughout the summer charter supporters participated in debates
at the City Club, gave speeches, and wrote articles stressing the benefits of the proposed revenue changes.
bates

obstensib~

Although the City Club held de-

to discuss all sides of the issues, in the main these

tended to be forums for promoting the charter for few anti-charter
speakers appeared.

When Frank Shepard and Frank Bennett praised the

advantages of the proposed revenue changes, for instance, there was no
speaker presenting the opposing view.
It was obvious from their arguments that Bennett and Shepard were
appealing to a specific audience--large property owners and businessmen.
Bennett spoke of how Chicago needed more money to be a greater and better
Chicago but vowed that the per capita tax increase would be minimal
because the new monies would result primarily from the consolidation
scheme.

Shepard seconded this assertion and reminded the audience that

taxpayers would be protected by the conservative limiting of the total
tax rate to five percent of assessed property valuation.

Nathan W.

MacChesney, attorney for the Real Estate Board, advanced the
tive note.

on~

nega-

He told the audience that the men he represented were upset

by the charter•s failure to eliminate the special assessment tax but he
also emphasized that despite this flaw the overall charter was so good
that he was sure it would be supported wholeheartedly by the realtors of
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the city.3l In closing his speech Shepard urged his listeners to approve the charter. 32
It means ••• greater resources through bond issues for permanent improvements for the city. It means a definite, precise and permanent, and at the same time conservative tax limitation for the
taxpayer, a limitation calculated to encourage prospective investors in homes and in property in this community, instead of
driving them, as the present uncertain tax rate must tend to do,
out of the community to invest their property elsewhere.
Charles Merriam, on the other hand, sought in a series of articles
appearing in the Record-Herald to assure people that all would benefit
practically and democratically from the new revenue system.

Merriam

pointed out that under the charter all new municipal bond proposals
would be submitted to a popular referendum, whereas current.J.y citizens
had little control over bond issuances.

According to Merriam, the new

system enhanced home rule because it gave the municipal government control of the entire debt unlike the present system where, for example,
the state controlled the bonded indebtedness of the park system.33
Few other people in the city however shared Merriam's ideas on this
issue.
Ill
Ey

mid-summer differences between charter supporters and oppo-

nents had manifested themselves quite clear.J.y.

The former were largely

wealthy businessmen and prominent professionals; they were Republicans
and generally members of prestigious clubs and civic organizations.
These men formed a committee of 300 to coordinate the charter campaign
3lcity Club, Bulletin 14 (June 20, 1907), p. 157-63.

3 2Ibid.' p. 161.
33Record-Herald, Ju.J.y 3, 1907.
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and its Committee on Oratory which was to "look after the aggressive part
of the campaign" was composed deliberately of representatives from the
Union League and Hamilton Clubs, the Real Estate Board, the Manufacturers 1
Association, and the Chamber of Commerce. 34 wrnile claiming to be nonpartisan and seeking only what was best for the entire city and its
future, in reality they sought an efficient municipal government most
beneficial to their economic, social, and political needs.
The city's three most prestigious newspapers solidly backed the
charter.

The Tribune represented the conservative Republican opinion

while the Daily

NIDm

and Record-Herald styled themselves as the spokes-

men of the liberal Republican or independent-minded good government
reformers.

All three papers actively promoted the proposed charter, re-

porting on pro-charter gatherings, events, and speeches and publishing
articles explaining why it should be ratified.

Charles Merriam wrote a

series of such articles for both the Daily News and Record-Herald while
the Tribune ran a series by convention member Alexander Revell.

The

Tribune backed the charter so ardently that Raymond Robins lambasted the
paper for being in league with "the brutal bosses in Chicago politics
and the big thieves in Chicago business. u35

Their opponents accused the

Tribune and Daily News of standing to profit financially from the charter; both papers held long-term, low-rent leases on some Board of Education property and the charter allowed the Board to continue its practice
of granting ninety-nine year leases.
34undated, unnamed newspaper clipping in Raymond Robins papers.
35 American, July 19, 1907.
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A broader spectrum of the city's social and economic groups opposed the charter; they tended to be drawn largely from the working-class
and ethnic population but they included middle-class professionals, and
they all attacked the charter's lack of democracy and the privileges it
bestowed upon the few.

They rejected both the supporters' claims to

non-partisanship and their vision of the city.
Several of the remaining daily newspapers opposed the charter.
William Randolph Hearst owned the Chicago American and Sunday Examiner.
The Chicago branch of Hearst's political organization, the Independence
League, was violently anti-charter and the newspaper produced a steady
stream of vitriolic editorials.

It also sympathized with the United

Societies and prominently announced all anti-charter activities throughout the summer.

The Chicago Journal adopted a more subdued approach;

until mid-september the paper confined itself to pointing out the charter's defects and then urging the citizens to vote no because the new
tax and ward schemes would only benefit the corrupt political bosses.
The Journal skeptically predicted that increased taxation would not result in more funds for badly needed municipal services, as charter advocates touted, but in "new vistas of riotous expenditures ••• [by] jobbing
politicians, leagued with dishonest contractors. u36

The Inter-ocean, pub-

lished by traction magnate Charles Yerkes, opposed the charter because it
opposed charter reform per se.

One can only be cynical about the paper's

stance that only the character of the men elected to office mattered,
not any kind of structural reform.

Yerkes after all had profited quite

nicely from the current system and its public officials.

6

3 Chicago Journal, September 13, 1907.
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The charter's fiscal provisions particularly incensed the Independence League.

Its members, although primarily lawyers, had neither

the wealth nor the prestige of the professionals who had sponsored the
charter refirm, attended the convention, and were now backing the charter.

The League accused these men of conspiring with big business to

design a charter from which they would benefit politically and economically while higher taxes "would fasten a yoke around the necks of the
people which they could never shake off. u37
The League was able to keep its anti-charter activities constantly before the public because of its connection with the American; managing editor A.M. Lawrence was one of the organization's leading figures.

The League and the American attacked the special privilege character of
the charter, charging that it sanctioned the corporate tax-dodging that
was responsible for the current lack of money to provide municipal services: "If the taxing bodies did their duty, " declared the League, "there
would be enough and millions to spare. 1138

They accused International

Harvester of dodging $2.1 million in taxes--enough to "educate 75,000
children, or raise firemen's pay, clean streets, open parks, build more
public baths, pay policemen more"--and declared that the "kings of Packingtown, convicted of a thousand offenses against the public from whom
they derive their revenue run a close race with the International Harvester gang of tax-dodgers .. o u39
37American, August 7, 1907 .

See Appendix V.

38 Ibid. , July 5, 1907.
39Ibid., July 4 and July 5, 1907.
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To support their contentions of corporate pressure behind the charter, the American reported campaign chairman Milton Foreman calling for
business to raise at least $100,000 to fight for the charter. The paper
.·
further quoted him as saying "it would be cheaper for the corporations
to put up $50 million than suffer a constitutional convention. "4D

There

is no way of ascertaining the validity of this quote; nevertheless its
printing in a daily newspaper helped fuel the suspicions of those already inclined to expect the worst from big business and the charter supporters.
Two of the more radical former convention delegates Louis Post and
Raymond Robins believed that Chicago deserved and could get better municipal reform and they worked hard against the charter.

Post followed

up his attack on the charter at the final meeting of the convention with
more criticism in his newspaper, the Public.
11

He assailed the charter as

a charter by politicians and corporations for politicians and corpora-

tions. 1141 He charged that the document had resulted from the fraudulent
and prejudiced selection of the delegates--by his calculations at least
fifty of his seventy-three fellow convention members had represented the
Republicans, corporations, and large property owners--and the interference
of the state legislature.

He continued to protest, as he had done during

the convention, the charter's unfair tax provisions, its school system,
and its lack of municipal ownership.

40 chicago Sunday EKaminer, July 7, 1907.

The CFL and other groups
in the city were already demanding a new constitution to give local governments complete control of their revenue and tax systems, presumably
to alter these systems to the detriment of the wealthy and the corporations.

4~e Public , May 18, 1907.
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Robins agreed with Post that the convention and legislature had
combined to produce a seriously flawed charter.

He charged that the

convention had been chosen by the same corrupt and incompetent officials the people had been railing against and that the legislature had
eliminated all of the provisions which had been forced into the charter
by the independent~ded convention delegates. 42

It genuinely dis-

tressed Robins that the result of this selfish maneuvering, as he saw
it, was so unf'air to and uncaring about the majority of the people.
Sitting in the convention and on the Board of Education had convinced
·him that children could not receive a decent education because the city's
powerful and influential citizens were more interested in fiscal accountability and securing good business deals for themselves when leasing
school property than in the schools providing a good education.

Robins

firmly believed the problem was one of class in which the children of
the working-class who made up the bulk of the public school population
would continue to be shortchanged until the citizens and teachers had a
greater voice in the schools.

Nothing that he could see in the proposed

charter moved the schools in this direction.
Robins disliked much of the charter as written--the schools, taxation, limited home rule--and the legislative changes intensified his
disapprobation.

One change epitomized to him the struggle between a

rich and powerful minority and the rest of the people.

When, over the

anguished cries about the sacredness of private property, he had persuaded the convention to empower the City Council to force landlords to

~blic Policy League, Bulletin 1 (September 1907). This was a
reprinting of a speech delivered by Robins to the Public Policy League
in July 1907.
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meet the municipal housing codes, Robins believed the city was taking a
giant step toward municipal responsibility.
ture thought

th~

Unfortunately the legisla-

rights of property owners more important and struck

this provision from the charter.

By the time the charter came back from

Springfield Robins could see little social or politicial benefit in it
and he began an earnest campaign to defeat it as the "deformed product
of political and business thieves. 1143
The Democratic party and women also joined the anti-charter crusade.

In early July the party finally decided after some in-fighting

among the various factions, to organize its own anti-charter committee.
William 0 1Connell, chairman of the Cook County Democratic Central Committee and former mayor Durme became two of the leading spokesmen of
the Coiliiiiittee which drew up a pamphlet on the "Reasons Why the Proposed
Charter Should Be Defeated. 11

'I'hese reasons closely resembled those of

the United Societies and the CFL though with distinctly more emphasis
on how the charter favored the "powerful Republican machine. n44
The women's groups which had petitioned the charter convention to
include municipal suffrage for women continued their fight by opposing
the charter.

The Illinois Equal Suffrage Association,

t~e

Woman's Club,

the Women 1 s Trade Union League, and various civic improvement groups
all complained they could neither protect themselves economically nor
secure their social and civic ends without the vote. 45

Union member

43American, July 19, 1907.

~is pamphlet can be found in the Charles Merriam Papers, Box 72
folder JD, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.
45 chicago Inter-ocean, September 9, 1907.
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Elizabeth Maloney told a meeting of the Women 1 s Trade Union League
that if women did not help defeat the charter it might well be twenty
years before they had another opportunity to attain suffrage.
all classes refused to wait that long.

Women of

They increasingly thought of

themselves as part of the community who were "not indifferent to Chicago 1 s welfare, 11 and they were demanding a more effective voice in
the city's affairs both as just and as a necessity.46
Finally, the activities of one more group are worth examining
here, though no absolute conclusions can be drawn about its stance on
the charter.

The black community seems to have participated very little

in the charter movement probably for the general reasons mentioned by
Allen Spear in his book BJack Chicago: first blacks mistrusted middleclass reformers and saw most progressive reforms as schemes to deprive
them of what little political clout they had in the party bosses; and
secondly no one had ever tried to include blacks in a reform coalition.

Blacks were deeply afraid however that the charter convention

might legally segregate the public schools and the Illinois Niagara
Movement persuaded Mayor Dunne to appoint a black delegate, D.R. Wilkins,
to present the case against segregation. 47

Other leaders in the black

community wrote the convention asking it to support the anti-segregation
provision which Wilkins had introduced.

Black fears on this issue proved

groundless as the convention easily passed the anti-segregation clause. 48

46American, August 4, 1907.

47Spear, p. 7, 86, and 121.
48Charter Convention, Proceedings, December 26, 1906, p.
December 28, p. 851.
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Outside of

this~

the only evidence of black interest in the char-

ter comes from the Broad-Ax, one of'the community's two newspapers, 49
which consistently attacked the charter's economic implications for
blacks.

The tax provisions, declared the Broad-Ax, were designed to

benefit the wealthy tax-dodgers at the expense of the small
small property

owner~

and laboring man.

businessman~

The paper agreed with the In-

dependence League 1 s position that Chicago needed fairer tax

collection~

not higher taxes, and urged "all those who have not been born with a
silver spoon in their mouth" to vote no. 50 Whether blacks heeded this
admonition cannot be said: on the one hand they might well have followed
the Republican party and voted in favor; on the other hand i f they believed that most progressive reforms were economically and politically
detrimental to blacks they might have voted against. 51
The various groups opposing the charter never formed a united organization for planning common strategy and activities.

Although the

Independence League and Democratic party each proposed such a move, the
leaders of the United Societies demurred. 52 Since the Societies drew
support from people with varying political allegiances, their leaders
49 The other newspaper, the Defender, began publishing in 1905 but
copies are not extant until 1909.
50The Broad-Ax, September 14, 1907.
5lrhe bulk of the black community lived in the second and third
wards which narrowly passed the charter. These wards however were respectively only sixteen percent and twenty-two percent black and the only
way to discern the actual black vote would be to identify primarily
black precincts, which I did not undertake for this project. Figuring
out the black vote is complicated by the fact that the Broad-Ax was a
Democratic paper and most blacks were Republicans.
52Record-Herald, August 9~ 1907; Abendpost, December 17, 1906;
Illinois Staats-Zeitung, August 9, 1907.
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claimed they did not want to link their cause with any political organization.
may

A more important motive for rejecting the coalition, however,

have been the desire to show ethnic strength to the city by cam-

paigning and defeating the charter largely on their own.
With its established and efficient organization, an overwhelming
desire to crush the charter, and the potential to mobilize a large number of Chicago voters, the Societies in effect led the anti-charter
movement.

Immediately following its May convention in 1907 the Socie-

ties had begun working to defeat the charter.

While sending Noonan to

speak before the City Club conveyed its ideas to the civic reformers and
charter supporters, the Societies knew that the real effort had to be
made among the ethnic community and workers.

To accomplish this it be-

gan distributing throughout the city pamphlets and circulars explaining
its position, sending speakers to ethnic society meetings, arranging
anti-charter rallies and speeches, and engaging in common activities
with other groups opposing the charter.

These facets of the Societies'

anti-charter campaign reveal much about what ethnic groups wanted from
their municipal government and how the charter not only failed to satisfy these desires but actually endangered them; they also reveal how the
Societies' ideas and goals meshed with those of other groups in the city.
The Societies made its most comprehensive statement of objections
to the charter in a pamphlet which it distributed throughout the city.53
In this pamphlet the Societies rejected the specific provisions on self-

government, schools, parks, taxation, public utilities, civil service,
53united Societies for Local Self-Government, Seven Reasons to
Vote Against the Charter (1907). Reprinted in Staats-Zeitung, August 1,
1907.
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and ward redistricting.

Taken together these objections show that the

Societies opposed the charter for three fundamental reasons: it left
the state too much control over municipal affairs; it failed to give the
citizens enough popular control over their government; and it favored
certain groups in the city at the expense of others.
Since the proposed charter neither ended Chicago's subordination
to general state laws nor granted the city complete control of its municipal affairs, the Societies rejected any notion of its being a home rule
document.

Freedom from state laws had been a goal of the Societies

since its inception for without this, Sundaf closings and ultimately prohibition were distinct possibilities.

After downstate legislators suc-

ceeded in passing a new state local-option law it hardly seemed the time
to abandon the existing protections afforded by the Cities and Villages
Act for a charter which explicitly acknowledged the superiority of state
laws except those it directly contravened.

The charter further violated

the Societies' ideas of home rule and popular democracy by denying voters
the right to revise certain provisions, among them taxation, public
utilities, and schools, without going ·through the legislature.

Not only

would the state continue to legislate for the city, warned the pamphlet,
it would also interfere in those areas which "directly touched the welfare and rights of Chicagoans." The redistricted ward system was simply
further proof, as far as the Societies was concerned, that the legislature disdained local self-government and could not be trusted to act in
Chicago's best interests.
Charter supporters believed that efficiency and economy would result from consolidating the governing bodies and centralizing decision-

making in the City Council.

Exhibiting both a distrust of the Council

and of centralization in ge..'leral the Societies thought the true result
of these measures would be
ment.

s~verely

curtailed popular control of govern-

For example, under the existing park system each of the three

park boards controlled its local parks and many people thought that this
decentralized system made each board more attentive to neighborhood
needs.

Now they were being asked to approve a system in which one park

board shared power with the City Council over all park lands and the
Societies dourly predicted in its pamphlet that giving the Council control of park property would probably result in the parks being sold
away from the people without their consent.

The pamphlet most vigorously attacked the charter's tax provisions
as distinctly unjust to the working people and small property owners.
The Societies simply did not believe the claims being made by some of
the charter's supporters that property tax increases resulting from the
new fiscal system would be either minimal or equitably distributed.

On

the contrary, the Societies had no doubt that these changes would significantly raise property taxes, while failing to eliminate the special
assessment taxes, and that this burden would fall disproportionately on
those who could least afford it.

Small landowners and landlords who had

few assets other than real property would be hit hard by tax increases
and would of course pass their higher costs on to their tenants while the
"rich would conceal their assets in cash and bonds, and the powerful corporations would, as usual, avoid taxes. u54

54staats-Zeitung, August 1, 1907.

Behind all of the Societies' objections lay a profound distrust
of the state legislature and a refusal to rely on its goodwill in any
dealings with Chicago.

This distrust was borne out by the activities of

certain legislators, who thrust themselves into the campaign and threatened dire consequences i f the charter failed.

State Senator Orville

Berry (Republican from Carthage, Illinois) promised the Republican
businessmen of the Hamilton Club that i f Chicagoans did not pass the
charter, they could expect no essential or desirable laws from the legislature in their lifetime, while House Speaker Edward Shurtleff (Republican from Marengo) declared that a vote against the charter would prove
the city incapable of governing itself and threatened to call a constitutional convention to restrict permanently Chicago's legislative
representation.

Prohibition forces further threatened that if the char-

ter lost Senator Berry would run as Republican-Prohibitionist candidate
for Governor and they predicted he would win.55
That many charter supporters accepted this reasoning instead of
standing up to the legislature further incited the Societies.

In dis-

cussing the charter's political features before the City Club Morton
Hull, a Republican state representative, told the audience that Chicago
could receive a new charter only by abject compromise.

In this instance

compromise had meant the local-option bill; if this charter failed any
future charter legislation could only be gained by paying a higher price,
most likely permanent restriction.

James Kittleman likewise declared

himself ready to let the legislature (of which he was a member) dictate
55Ibid., August 1 and August 8, 1907.
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terms to Chicago.

He dismissed all protests against that body's hand-

ling of the direct primary and ward districting provisions and warned
that the city would never again have the opportunity to secure so much

6

home rule from the legislature. 5

The Societies accused the downstate legislators and Chicago charter advocates of conspiring to force an undesirable charter upon the
city and ultimately prohibition; the legislators, said the Societies,
were "the newest threat to the local community which the charter supporters have thrown up. u 57

The Staats-Zeitung pointed out to its readers

that Senator Berry had both sponsored the new local-option bill and had
tried to bury the liquor regulation bills in committee and thereby stifle any open discussion on them. The United Societies could not help
but be suspicious about Berry's motives in supporting the charter.
over the ethnic groups found the now-or-never argument

tota~

More-

unaccept-

able, especially since they believed they had more home rule protection
against prohibition under the Cities and Villages Act.

For the United

Societies this reform movement had become a choice between ratifying a
charter with objectionable features and trusting the goodwill of the

.

General Assembly and the willingness of Chicago's representatives to
fight for the interests of the majority of their constituents, or reject
this charter and pursue more complete local self-government.

The ethnic

organization easily committed itself to the latter course; the charter
contained too many distasteful provisions and seemingly guaranteed Sun56city Club, Bulletin 15 (June 27, 1907), p. 165-67 and 173.
57Staats-Zeitung, August lD, 1907.

day closings and would conceivably give the temperance forces the
weapon they needed to bring about prohibition.

IV
In the final weeks before the scheduled referendum each side

stepped up its efforts to publicize its campaign and attract new supporters.

Despite the backing of the three major newspapers, the Repub-

lican party, civic organizations, and prominent citizens the pro-charter
drive was faltering and suffering defections.

George Cole, a former

convention delegate and founder of the Municipal Voters League, decided
he could not accept the altered charter and declared his willingness to
wait instead "for a constitutional convention that will give every
municipality in the state thorough home rule and leave to the legislature
merely the enactment of general legislation for all the state. 1158 When
the Real Estate News predicted that property owners of all types could
not be counted on to vote yes because they were so disgruntled over the
impending tax increases, the charter forces experienced another shock.
They had expected the official organs of the real estate community to be
enthusiastic backers of the charter; while the paper did not outright reject the charter it did conclude sympathetically that "the owner of real
estate cannot be blamed for looking upon the inevitable growth of his
tax bills as conclusive reason for voting against ••• 1159

A further blow

came when the commissioners of the South Park Board, which would disband
58American, August 17, 1907. While this paper was partisan in its
anti-charter coverage, there is no reason to suspect they made this up;
in fact Cole was still advocating this approach a year later. RecordHerald, Spetember 4, 1908.
59Real Estate News, August, 1907.
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with consolidation, urged their constituents to vote against the charter. 60
A frustrated Mayor Busse, now an ardent backer of the charter,
lashed out at the United Societies denouncing the organization as a tool
of the brewers.

He threatened to invoke the state law and close all
61
saloons on Sunday if the charter was defeated.
This, in turn, out-

raged the leaders of the Societies who emphatically denied any collusion with brewing interests. 62 Nicholas Michels, secretary of the organization's anti-charter campaign, accused Busse of personally insulting the group 1 s JDO,OOO members, who were "opposed to the charter on
principle. " Michels predicted that rather than intimidating ethnic
voters Busse's threats would strengthen their determiniation to vote
down the charter. 63
While the pro-charter campaign was faltering their opposing numbers were growing.

The various opposition groups organized rallies and

speeches to keep both their membership and the rest of the city informed about their cause up to the day of the referendum.

The Independ-

ence League and the Democrats concentrated on attracting support on the
ward level while the CFL and United Societies worked through their
natural constituencies, although the Societies did send members of its
anti-charter committee to attend and sometimes address rallies organized
by other groups.

The CFL continued to work hard against the charter by

60AmerJ..can,
.
August 27, 1907 •
6

~ecord-Herald,

62

September 6, 1907o

Two members of the executive committee did own small breweries.

6
3staats-Zeitung, September 7 and September 8, 1907.
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disseminating information through its member locals.
The Societies conducted an all-out assault on the charter in the
two weeks before the referendum. ·The executive committee barraged its
membership with messages reminding them that it was important to remain united to "show that it was they who were responsible ior the char-

ter 1 s defeat. u 64
ethnic societies.

They also worked hard to recruit new support among
After listening to Nicholas Michels exhort them to

stand united with others in the ethnic community on this issue the
Chicago Turngemeinde adopted a resolution labeling the charter the "offspring of selfish politics, ruthless capitalism, narrow-minded bigotry,
and loathsome hypocrisy. 11

Its official publication, Die Harmonie, urged

the membership to reject the charter because its gravest defect was its
failure to grant the democratic right to self-government.

Representa-

tives from eighty affiliated societies of the Deutsch-Amerikanischen
Nationalbundes (most of whom did not belong to the Societies) likewise
adopted a negative stand against a charter they labeled a "shameful
proposal which rural legislators and a few selfish local politicians
might thrust upon the Citizens. 116 5
Because the Societies was strongest among the city's Germans and
Bohemians it made a special effort to reach more personally other ethnic
groups.

On Saturday September 7 it sponsored a gathering for ethnic

families at Riverview Amusement Park, and the next day distributed literature outside churches after services.

Several aldermen sympathetic to

the Societies campaign were also working to secure the ethnic vote in
64Ibid. , September 1, 1907.
65Ib"d
-~_., August 25, August 27, and September 5, 1907.

168
their wards and kept the Societies apprised of their progress.

For

example, Alderman Bowler (D-19th) reported that he had instructed the
Germans and Bohemians of his ward about the dangers of the charter, and
that although Yom Kippur began on the evening of voting day, the Jews
of the ward strongly opposed the charter and he would work hard to see
66
that they got to the polls.
The final campaign activities of both sides contrasted in style.
The pro-charter forces were less visible to the rest of the city as they
maneuvered among themselves collecting last minute endorsements.

They

were worried about Governor Deneen's lack of vocal support for the charter; he was apparently being cautious because people from his southside
home area were unhappy about the park consolidation.

Supporters breathed

a sigh of relief when Deneen finally endorsed the charter for its home
rule features, placating his constituents with assurances that any defects
in the charter could be corrected later. 67

The Hyde Park Protective

Association and several Protestant pastors around the city reaffirmed
their support for the charter because it would better regulate liquor
consumption in the city.
Not all of the supporters' activities were circumspect however.
The Republican party controlled several important municipal offices
and the opposition forces charged that last minute anti-charter rallies
were being raided by the police and that the post office was failing to
68
deliver their literature.
(Mayor Busse was formerly the postmaster of
66

Ibid., September 7, 1907.

67 rnter-0cean, September ll, 1906; Tribune, September 16, 1907.
68
Inter-ocean, September .14, 1907.
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the city and presumably not without lingering influence over in the
post office.)

These charges remained unsubstantiated but three days

before the referendum the charter supporters did petition the election
board (composed chiefly of Republicans) to reverse its earlier ruling
and designate the referendum a special and not a general election.

This

was extremely important because in a special election workers were not
entitled to two hours off work for voting.

Despite the protests of the

United Societies, the CFL, and others that this was a blatant attempt
to hinder working-class voters and thereby diminish turnout among those
most likely to be voting no, the election board made the change. 69
The three newspapers supporting the charter ran last minute editorials and endorsements, all of which appeared to confirm the opponents'
suspicions that this was an elitest charter.

Mayor Busse, for instance,

was quoted as saying "the best thought of the best citizenship in this
community approves the Charter.

It is demanded by the press, the pulpit,

the COIIIIII.ercial and industrial interests. n70

The editorials were in the

same vein, stressing the progressive nature of the charter and those favoring it, and dismissing again the validity of all protests about the
legislature Is changes.

The Daily News characterized opponents as part

of the world-wide movement against progress which was being stirred up
by interests who operated best under weak, disorderly, and confused government. 71 The Tribune printed a cartoon with a hand labeled "Progressive
Citizen" casting an affirmative vote and bearing the caption "Tonight the
69

staats-Zeitung, September 14, 1907; Examiner, September 15, 1907.

7°Record-Herald, September 14, 1907.
7lnaily News, September 16, 1907.
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city will know whether it is under the control of progressives or reactionaries. 11

Finally, Alexander Revell, in a series of Tribune articles,

specifically discounted the loss of the direct primary using reasoning
which contradicted his eloquent defense during the convention of popular
democracy and the competence of the people to govern themselves.

The

direct primary, remarked Revell, could only work when the people acquired
"a sufficient knowledge of public affairs and sufficient independence to
act for themselves independent of the leadership of the bosses."

Since

such conditions did not prevail, it was "useless to legislate too far
in advance of popular conditions. n7 2
The Independence League and United Societies concentrated their
final energies on holding large public rallies on the weekend before the
referendum.

For a week preceding its rally the Societies and the two

major German language dailies increased their coverage of the anti-charter campaign.

The newspapers repeatedly exhorted Germans, as· the impor-

tant leaders of the United Societies, to turn out at the rally in great
numbers, and also printed every day the Societies' announcement of the
demonstration and the notices of individual German societies urging their
members to at-tend the rally.

In its announcement the Societies pro-

claimed that the time had come for Chicago citizens to vote on whether
they will "preserve their hard-earned progress on the difficult questions of personal liberty" or whether they will subjugate themselves to
the dictates of rural fanatics and hypocritical lawmakers. u73
7

~ibune, September 1.6 and September 17, 1907.

73staats-Zeitung, September 11 thru September 17, 1907.
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The Societies then climaxed its campaign at a rally in Grant Park,
just east of the city's downtown area, attended by more than 35,000
people. 74

Half of the participants assembled at various points near

downtown and paraded through the streets with banners, flags, and bands.
Ten thousand Germans, Swiss, and Luxemburgers, marching with eight
bands and six drum and bugle corps converged on Grant Park from the
near north side, while 5000 Bohemians, 5000 Creations, and members of
Danish, Polish, Belgian, and Italian societies, all with marching bands,
came from the southwest and other areas of the city.

Speakers addressing

the crowd in several languages urged their listeners to vote in spite
of the hardship it might entail because the proposed charter threatened
them persona.lly and working people in general.

They charged that the

taxation scheme of the charter "deprived the masses for the benefit of
the few because what really was needed was a scheme to compel all to pay
their fair share and not a higher tax rate"; that Sunday closings were
a real threat if the charter was ratified; and that redistricting "deprived the working man of his vote. n75

Nothing new T..ras said at this

rally but its size and enthusias!II. should have told charter supporters
quite clearly that they faced a tough fight at the polls.
Two days later the voters soundly defeated the charter J21, 935 to
59,786; on~ four of the city's thirty-five wards ratified the charter
and two of these wards contained a high number of Republican middle and
upper-class voters.

The Democratic wards voted heavily against the

74A.bendpost and Staats-Zeitung, September 16, 1907. The 35,000
participants were almost exclusive~ male and hence potential voters.
75 staats-Zeitung, September 16, 1907.
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charter and the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth wards where the
United Societies was very strong defeated the charter by a margin of
almost four to one. 76
The losers responded with a mixture of bitterness and resignation,
but with little understanding or feeling for the concerns which had
been expressed by their opponents and had led to the charter's defeat.
A kee~ disappointed Walter Fisher charged that the charter had been
beaten by a "combination of selfishness and stupidity with which every
constructive movement has to contend ••• "; this was the same man who
four days earlier had expressed supreme confidence in the people 1 s integrity to always reject political bosses. 77 The Tribune declared that
the city had proved "it does not want home rule ••• that it does want a
patchwork of taxing bodies ••• that it does not want uniformity, efficiency, and sanity in government. u 78 Only the Record-Herald attempted a
more even-handed assessment, attributing the loss to the citizens' fear
of increased taxation and Sunday closings. 79 Charles Merriam, a month
later, suggested that while these fears may have been real, they were
unwarranted and irrational and that "political juggl.;Lng" had organized
and played upon these fears.

(Precisely what "political juggling 11

meant, he did not explain.)

He could not understand why men such as

Post and Robbins had opposed the charter, and he was saddened by the
76Daily News, A1manac (1908), p. 495. Referenda conducted at special elections tended to produce a lower voter turnout than those held
at regular elections. See Ibid., 1900-1908.
77Record-Herald, September 18, .1907; Walter Lo Fisher to MoHo
Lebensohn, September 14, 1907, Walter L. Fisher Papers.
8
7 Tribune. September 18, 1907.
79Record-Herald, September 18, 1907.

173
charter's defeat. 80 Finally one anonymous loser suggested that the
"uplifters" such as Fisher and Milton Foreman would have to be shaken
81
off before Chicago could compromise on charter reform.
On the other side the anti-cnarter forces were elated by their

success.

The Broad-Ax called it a "Giant Victory for the common people."

William O'Connell declared it a sign that "the men of Chicago will not
accept a charter prepared for them by a convention of special interests
and given its finishing touches in a legislature dominated by party
politics."

The American proclaimed victory for the Independence League,

United Societies, Democratic party, CFL and other labor groups over the
82
But no
wealth of the corporations and the Republican organization.
group was happier than the United Societies.

The organization assumed

credit for engineering the charter's defeat proclaiming that the people
of Chicago realized the threat to personal liberty and the other dangerous provisions "thanks to the work of the charter opponents, especially the United Societies. n83
Over the next few months both sides began planning their next
steps in trying to bring political reform to Chicago, for no one was
content to allow prevailing conditions to continue.

The day after the

referendum the United Societies warned the city that the charter's
80

Charles Merriam to H.B. Chamberlain, October ll, 1907; Charles
Merriam to G.A. Cuthbertson, October 17, 1907, Charles Merriam Papers.
The charges of political juggling were echoed by Milton Foreman in
"Chicago New Charter Movement--Its Relation to Municipal Otmership, 11
The Annals 31 (May 1908), p. 1-2.
8

lrnter-0cean. September 18, 1907.

8

~oad-Ax, September 21, 1907; Record-Herald, September 18, 1907;
American, September 18, 1907.
83staats-Zeitung, September 18, 1907.
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defeat had only been the first round. ''We have not only won," said
Nicholas Michels, ''we are preparing for a second fight ... We will not
rest until our citizens have secured personal liberty forever." 84

CHAPI'ER VII
CHICAGO REMAINS "UNREFORMED"
Efforts to reform the municipal government did not cease immediately, but a new charter was never again presented to Chicago voters.
Disregarding all evidence to the contrary the reformers hoped that the
disagreements of the previous year could be overcome i f they tried again.
But the group alignments which had developed in 1907 as well as the po-

sitions these groups had assumed remained firm and hampered compromise.
Also, the antagonism between the city and state seemed worsened after
the city rejected the legislature 1 s amended charter, as important members of the legislature had promised during the campaign.

Equally im-

portant for the fate of subsequent reform efforts, and the city's future
political development in general, the United Societies had emerged from
the 1907 campaign as a political force which could not be ignored.

And

the Societies was resolutely determined to promote and protect ethnic
interests in all municipal affairs.
I

The warning signs that these conflicting ideas could not be overcome easily were evident soon after the referendum.

The CFL continued

to call for municipal reform based on the extension of popular democracy.
Encouraged by the charter's defeat the labor organization again demanded
a new state constitution rather than a municipal charter.
175

The primary
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issue of reform, argued the CFL, was who controlled government, the
people or ''PIRATICAL wealth."

Since the old constitution gave control

to the wealthy and the corporations-the same groups the CFL believed
to be the most avid supporters of a new charter-such a new charter was
simply an amendment which transferred some power to the municipality
but kept control of the government in the hands of the privileged few.
Only a new constitution, drafted by a popularly elected convention,
would give the citizens a real voice in enacting both state and local
reforms.

The CFL once more urged its membership to oppose any measures
1
which would not satisfy the goal of popular democracyo
other groups were less adamant about the idea of a new charter,
but they too stressed that such a reform would never be accepted if it
ignored the wishes of the majority.

In a speech before the City Club

in late October Raymond Robins admonished the reformers for underestimating the independence and intelligence of the citizens.

The people re-

jected the charter, Robins said, because they "intend to govern Chicago.
They intend to make Chicago what they want it to be, and if they don't
want it to be what you want it to be your wise policy will be directed
toward changing their desires. "

They would not accept reforms gene-

rated by a body which neither represented nor was directly responsible
to them, warned Robins, nor would they accept the "dishonest and corrupt"
work of the legislature on the basis that it was the best that could be
gotten. 2
lcFL, Minutes, October 6, 197.
2City Club, Bulletin 19 (October 23, 1907), Po 219-18.
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No group was more encouraged by the charter's defeat or more
determined to influence any future-reform attempts that the United Societies.

The charter campaign, Nicholas Michels told the same gather-

ing of the City Club, was a "great lesson for those who thought they
could control the city and the votes of the ethnic groups. u3

It had

also been a great experience for the ethnic groups themselves; they
had learned how to organize, strengthen their ranks, and to publicize
and fight for their interests.

From now on Chicagoans could expect

to hear from the Societies on every issue of importance to its members.
Any future charter, according to Michels, had to provide for free and
equal elections, a uniform and equitable system of taxation, and most
importantly home rule on all questions "dear to the majority of our
people. 114
In the succeeding months the United Societies sought to capital-

ize on its success.

First it consolidated its position as the voice of

the city's non-Irish ethnic community.

By

May of 1908 the organization

claimed that eighty-eight societies with over 23,000 members had joined
since the charter campaign for a total of 628 member societies--315
German, 173 Bohemian, eighty Polish, thirty-three Italian, and twentyseven Danish, Belgian, and other ethnic societies.5

Secondly the Socie-

ties outlined a political program it would follow in the future.

An

important component of this program was a decision to enter directly the
political arena, either by running their own candidates or actively sup3Ibid.' Po 216 o

4Ibid.' p. 217.
5staats-Zeitung, May 24, 1908.
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porting and opposing others.

As its first step in this direction the

political action committee requested all candidates in the April 1908
aldermanic contest to support the Societies' stand against Sunday closings, high saloon licenses, and all temperance measures in general; it
then urged ethnic voters to defeat all those who refused to give such a
pledge.

The election results cheered the Societies which claimed that

twenty-two of the thirty-five aldermen elected had supported the group's
•t•~on. 6

pos~

The decision to support candidates had not been made without resistance, however, and at the third armual convention several delegates
at tempted to temper this policy by proposing that no officer of the
organization be allowed to hold public office.

The delegates making the

proposal were primarily German and among the original founders of the
Societies.

While they had genuine doubts about the wisdom of this new

political course their proposal was also a thinly veiled attempt to
limit the influence of Anton Cermak, the Bohemian state legislator who
had become the organization's Secretary.

The opponents of the proposal

countered by arguing that electing members of political office would facilitate the Societies' goals and the proposal lost decisively with many
Germans joining the almost solid opposition of the Bohemians, Poles, and
other ethnic groups. 7 The German influence in the Societies was diminished somewhat after this incident, although by no means eliminated as
Germans continued to occupy
years.

many

important offices in the following

After this convention the Societies experienced little opposition

6Record-Herald, February 27 and April 8, 1908.
7staats-Zeitung. May 25, 1908.
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from within its ranks over the new political activities.
The Societies' political program was aimed at promoting cultural
and political democracy in Chicago by instituting municipal self-government and popular decision-making.

It was rooted in a profound dis-

trust of the rural state legislature which time after time had attempted
to impose unpopular restrictions upon the city; a resolve to fight prohibition and any other attacks on their way of life; and a refusal to rely
on any other

group~

including political

bosses~

to protect ethnic in-

terests.8 The Societies was determined to fight any future reform proposals which violated any of these tenets. ·
Despite these signs of strong and possibly irreconcilable desires
among the various groups in the conmrunity several of the more ardent
supporters of the old charter renewed the campaign in the fall of 1908.
They knew that as long as the 1904 enabling amendment was in effect the
city could continue to prepare a new charter and they decided to reconvene the old convention and try again.

Forty-four members of the old

convention thus met in September to consider the best way to go about
writing another charter.

They appoirlted a committee of sixteen to re-

draft a charter by comparing the original as written by the convention
with the legislature 1s version and arrive at "just compromises" on the
disputed provisions. 9 The committee was then to bring their proposals
to the full convention.
Some spirit of compromise did exist for awhile among the members
of the reconvened body.

They agreed, for instance, that the provisions

8For examples see Ibid., January

;;!>,

February 10, and May 25 ~ 1908.

9Record-Herald, September 4 and October 13, 1908o
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in the old charter which had raised the most objections--e.g. revenue,
Sunday closings, ward redistricing-needed to be redrawn to satisfy
more of the citizens.

Further, in response to a request from Catherine

McCullough of the Illinois Equal Suffrage Association, the convention
decided to

aiiow non-members

an opportunity to appear before the con-

vention, thereby reversing one of the hotly disputed policies of the
earlier assembly. J.D
Women immediately availed themselves of this opportunity and
representatives of professional, club, and working women's groups
once again appealed to the men to give women an official voice in municipal affairs.

The majority of the convention still balked at includ-

ing woman suffrage in the charter however and instead they agreed to
submit a separate bill on suffrage to the legislature hoping to appease
women enough to keep them from opposing the charter.

This maneuver dis-

heartened women who suspected, as Charles Merriam told the convention,
that suffrage needed to be incorporated into the charter because the
legislature would surely defeat any separate measure.

ll

The United Societies, on the other hand, was not disappointed.
Vowing that it would not countenance another separate bill on liquor
regulation, the United Societies sent representatives to speak before
the convention on this matter, and to counteract the demands of the Law
and Order League's spokesman that the matter be left entirely to the
state legislature.

The Societies asked that the charter give the City

J.DCharles Merriam to Catherine W. McCullough, November 4, 1908,
Charles Merriam Papers.
llaecord-Herald, November 17, 1908.

181
Council sole power to control and regulate the sale of liquor along
with providing that any ordinances changing the charter provisions on
this matter were to be submitted to popular referendum. 12 Arthur
Farwell of the Law and Order League asked that the convention turn
down the Societies' request because "the farmers of the ·state are
stronger on moral questions than is the council. 11 1.3 Most members of
the convention acknowledged the role this issue and the Societies had
played in the earlier defeat and they were inclined to dismiss Farwell' s
request and accept the proposal of the United Societies.

Walter Fisher

had in fact reversed his previous stance and urged his colleagues to
give the city broad home rule powers on this and other issues. 14 The
convention therefore agreed to include the Societies' proposal in the
charter.
The convention made other substantive changes to the original
charter which it hoped removed the major objections enough to convince the voters to adopt it in its new form. 15 To lessen fears of
higher taxes they reduced the limit of allowable bonded indebtedness
from five percent to four percent of full property valuation and replaced a vaguely worded section with one that specified that for general
tax purposes assessed valuation would be one percent of the full value.
The new charter reinstated the old ward system of thirty-five wards with
12Ibid. , December 1, 1908.
13 Ibid.
lh.rbid., October 28, 1908.

14chicago Charter Convention,

An Act to Provide a Charter for the
City of Chicago (1909), unpublished, Chicago Historical Society.
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two aldermen each and mandated that any ordinances changing this system
could be submitted to a referendum by petition of fifteen percent of
the voters.

The convention also heeded requests to place the security

and health of the people ahead of private property rights and gave the
City Council power to force owners to make necessary improvements in their
property.

In a final gesture to the United Societies, the convention

agreed to include a provision that specifically exempted Chicago from
any future state laws on liquor regulation.

16 Several sections of the

original charter including the all-important consolidation bill remained
unchanged in this new version.
Just when it appeared that the convention had agreed on a municipal
charter which not only reflected the wishes of the majority--there was
still hope that the CFLwould find enough popular democracy in the new
charter to support it-but also promised to give Chicago a solidly
reformed and progressive government, several of the more conservative
convention members intervened.

Led by B.F. Sunny, these men proposed

a further compromise: instead of submitting the complete charter to the
legislature it should be broken down and presented as separate bills. 17

.

The legislature would then be free to reject any provisions to which it
objected without Chicago once again being deprived of all the benefits of
reform.

In despair over this new development, Walter Fisher pleaded

that the new charter "is a compromise.

Every provision is a compromise, 11

and he asked the convention to reject Sunny 1 s proposal because it was

16chicago Charter Convention, "Resolutions and Communications
Received at the Meeting Held January 29, 1909, 11 unpublished, Chicago
Historical Society.
17Record-Herald, February 8, 1909.
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time for the city to demand exactly what it wanted from the legislature.18 Fisher believed that this new proposal, i f accepted, would
undo all the careful compromises 1t1hich had been worked out.
was right.

Fisher

The convention voted by a margin of nineteen to seventeen

to submit eleven separate bills 19 and this decision combined with legislative maneuverings combined to doom charter reform altogether.
The United Societies was outraged; it had already warned the convention that it would not accept a separate liquor bill because the
legislature was certain to defeat it as it had done in 1907.

Feeling

betrayed the Societies announced it would not support the separate bills.

'We are not going to vote for a lot of measures for these so-called reformers," proclaimed Anton Cermak, "and then get stuck ourselves. 1120
The Societies feared that some Chicago legislators who had no strong
feelings on the liquor question could be persuaded by prohibition legislators to vote against the liquor bill by promises of support for other
measures which were more important to them.

Furthermore, before the

liquor bill was sent to Springfield its article on general state laws
was amended.

Rather than stating outright that any new state laws on

liquor would not apply in Chicago, the amended version said such laws
would not be presumed to cover the city if they conflicted with the
liquor bill unless the legislature expressly declared that the law would
cover the entire state. 21 The conservatives were able to change this
18Ib'd

-~--,

February 23, 1909.

19The most important of these were consolidation, home rule, Sunday
closings, woman suffrage, education, referendum, and public utilities.
20

Record-Herald, March 16, 1909.
21Ibid., March 24, 1909.
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section as well as win on the question of separate bills largely because attendance was quite erratic and what measures passed at any one
meeting depended on which members were present.
It did not take long for the charter package to unravel completely.
When the bill to consolidate the city, parks, and board of education was
introduced several legislators once again introduced yet another bill to
limit permanently Chicago's representation and announced a trade-off:
consolidation for restriction. 22 Then other Republican legislators
attempted to amend the bill to give the Governor power to appoint the
park board members rather than the Mayor-a blatant partisan move based
on the presumption that the Governor was more often a Republican and the
Mayor a Democrat--and Representative Cermak vowed to vote against the
consolidation bill, and all hope for charter reform vanished. 23 The
consolidation bill failed by one vote in its first Senate vote with all
but one of the downstaters voting against it as well as United Societies
member Cyril J andus.

The final defeat in the legislature was decisive:

the bill lost in the Senate twenty-one to twenty-six, and thirty-four
to ninety-eight in the House where Cermak and twenty-three Cook County
Democrats either voted no or did not vote.

Their votes could not have

passed the consolidation bill but they gave downstaters an excuse to
reject this and other charter bills on the grounds that they could hardly
be e..'"q)ected to know what Chicago wanted when the city itself did not seem
to know. 24
2

~ilip, p. 66-72. The restriction bill failed by a vote of thirtyone to nineteen in the Senate, all negative votes cast by Chicago Senators.
23Record-Herald, May 6 and May 12, 1909.
~ilip, p. 178.
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Consolidation had been the heart of the charter reformers' program for without it they could not change the revenue system and when
it was defeated this second time they were too disheartened to begin
again.

But the municipal problems persisted and the heavy hand of the

state legislature continued to be felt in municipal affairs.

In 1913,

for instance, it placed all public utilities under the Jurisdiction of
a state commission, a move that completely severed the city's control
of the utilities.

While other states had also created such regulatory

commissions and there were applauded by some reformers who believed
they would greatly enhance efficiency, to many in Chicago this was yet
another example of the state usurping legitimate municipal powers.
Since the defeat of the 1909 charter the City Council had been
considering the question of charter reform but had taken little action.
Then in early 1914 it created a thirty-member commission--fifteen aldermen, four state representatives, and eleven private citizens--to draft
a charter which would consolidate the taxing bodies and give Chicago the
home rule powers to control public utilities and completely overhaul the
revenue system. 25

This effort was as ineffectual as the previous two;

the state legislature passed only the bill to consolidate the parks
with the city and refused to pass any others.

The minor consolidation

bill was subsequently defeated in a referendum vote and the issue of
charter reform faded from public view.
25 chicago, Journal of the City Council.
January 20, 1913, p. 3353; February 14, 1913,
p. 4362-63. For details of this Commission's
the Permanent Charter Commission (1914-1915),
Chicago, Illinois.

July 22, 1912, p. 1644;
p. 3730; March 9, 1914,
work see Proceedings of
MUnicipal Reference Library,
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The quest for home rule powers that nearly everyone professed to
favor was in reality, as those who study the Progressive Era realize, a
struggle over who was going to rule at home.

The good government forces

wanted to revise the revenue and governing structures for greater efficiency, to increase potential tax monies, and to centralize the decision-making powers of the municipal government.

The CFL and the United

Societies wanted to make that government more directly responsible to
the voters through extensive local self-government, initiative and referendum powers, and direct elections of more governing officials, while
women wanted an official voice in municipal affairs.

Charter reform

failed in Chicago, in the final analysis, because the citizens could not
agree on the purposes and objectives of such reforms.
Cities throughout the country faced similar problems and yet enacted
reform charters during the Progressive Era; why were these problems insurmountable in Chicago? First of all, any charter legislation for the
city had to be submitted to popular referendum, a technical problem
which other cities did not face.

For example, in Pittsburgh (1911),

Galveston (1901), and Houston (1904) influential businessmen wrote new
charter bills which were then passed by their state legislatures and
automatically enacted because there was no requirement that they be put
before the voters.

Half of Boston 1 s charter of 1909 was simply enacted

by the legislature while the rest went to popular referendum.

In Chicago

on the other hand the charter convention of 1902 had specifically written
a clause in the enabling amendment which stipulated that any charter
legislation for the city had to be ratified by the voters.

This clause

meant that the disagreements among Chicagoans on their aspirations for

the city could become an insurmountable obstacle to the enactment of a
new charter.
The referendum gave Chicagoans the opportunity to reject a charter
they disliked; the substantive reasons for its defeat

1~

of the feelings that divided them.

example~

Class

tremely important in Chicago politics.
as shown

earlier~

to the 1880s.

of industrial strife had

issues~

for

labor

were ex-

Class antagonisms here went

H~ket ~ Pullman~

provided~

in the strength

believed~

back~

and other instances

ample evidence that

business intended to use government to further its own interests--partieularly to keep the working people powerless and oppressed.

Although the

Socialists and the more moderate elements of the labor movement remained
divided on

policies~

tactics~

and ultimate

goals~

all agreed by the early

twentieth century that every municipal issue was potentially a class
issue.

These fears were clearly manifested throughout the charter cam-

paign as the CFL proffered for one issue after

another~

solutions which

differed dramatically from those favored by leading business and professional groups.

In the end the CFL would denounce the proposed charter

as an "insidious attempt to dress Chicago in a corporate strait jacket
. .
26
and to bind labor to the chariot wheel of a power mad plutocracy. 11
A similar story can be told of conflicts between prohibition and
ethnic

forces~

which were also common throughout the United States.

In this case the intensity of the struggle was heightened by the unre-

lenting antagonism between Chicago and the rest of the state.

Ethnic

groups firmly believed that the majority of Chicagoans were against prohibition and that this sentiment should determine all temperance decisions
26

cFL~

Minutes, July

21~

1CfJ7.
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within the city.

Once the proposed charter threatened to place the city

back under general state laws and the legislature forced passage of a
new local-option act in return for the charter, the United Societies
was convinced that being in the majority in the city meant nothing.

The

ethnic community envisioned being overrun by the rural Protestant temperance forces in the rest of the state and could not accept any charter
which increased this possibility.

For its part the state tied its effort

to impose its will on Chicago to the charter--and this quite probably
meant stricter temperance laws--and in 1907 the United Societies had
the power to thwart this.
The eagerness of the legislature to impose prohibition on Chicago
was typical of relations between the city and state.

Chicago was a huge,

growing industrial and immigrant city in the early twentieth century.
No other urban area in Illinois could begin to compare with it and the
rural and small-town elements of the rest of the state were t·errified of
being dominated by the city.

The state legislature thus tried to use the

charter movement to control the city by making it clear it would grant
only limited home rule, by attempting once again to trade passage of the
charter for permanent restriction of Chicago's representation in Springfield, and by rejecting the separate bills on liquor regulation and forcing Chicago's representatives to accept the local option-bill in return
for the charter.

Indeed most of the men who write the 1907 charter ac-

knowledged that certain provisions could not be put into the charter
even though highly desired by the majority of the city because the state
legislature would not accept them. The people of Chicago resented the
legislature's attempt to interfere in municipal affairs as they had re-
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sented all earlier incidents, and groups such as the United Societies
and the CFL were prepared to fight for extensive home rule as the only
way to insure their municipal objectives.

Whatever chance there may

have been for Chicagoans to compromise among themselves on the charter
was virtually destroyed by the enmity between the city and the rest of
the state.
The charter reform movement played an important role in Chicago's
history.

First, because the charter failed, Chicago, unlike other large

cities in the Progressive Era never experienced the structural reforms
which consolidated overlapping and wasteful governing bodies, encouraged
government by experts, and diminished the influence of party politics in
municipal government.

The ward-based decentralized structure persisted

and municipal government remained the preserve of party politicians who
garnered personal and party loyalty in return for personalized governmanto

Furthermore, without charter reform the city had to wait until

the new constitution of 1970 to secure any measure of home rule.

Without

home rule Chicago, in the twentieth century, has continued to have certain municipal affairs directed by the General Assembly and because the
antagonism between city and state has also continued, this situation has
often worked against the city.
Another important consequence of the charter movement was that it
politicized the city's ethnic groups and organized workers--the people
who would form the backbone of the political machine.

The CFL had al-

ready been moving toward increased political participation and the tenor
of the charter reform

~ovement

further convinced organized labor of the

absolute necessity of continuing in this direction if they were to avoid
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being crushed by the city's powerful business interests.

In the United

Societies ethnic groups had learned the value of organization and political activism for getting what they wanted.

Under the leadership of

Anton Cermak the United Societies, in the ensuing years, worked to elect
men sympathetic to its causes and to thwart all attempts to impose prohibition measures on Chicago.

By

1931 when Cermak was elected the first

non-Irish ethnic mayor, ethnic groups had come to know and understand
the necessity of standing up for themselves.
Finally Chicago's charter reform movement is important because it
reveals what the various groups which comprised the city wanted from
their municipal government.

Charter reform was not the concern of any

single social, economic, or political group nqr were those groups who ultimately opposed the charter simply playing negative roles.

The various

groups clearly understood their interests and realized that the provisions of a new charter would in fact determine the distribution of
political power within the city.

In the charter movement women, ethnic

groups, and organized labor declared themselves legitimate members of
their community entitled to help write the laws and shape the municipal
government under which they would live and work.

In the process the

United Societies and the CFL led their constituencies in formulating a
vision of political and cultural democracy based on municipal selfgovernment and popular decision-making which was incompatible with the
goal of a government run with business-like efficiency and expertise
desired by many reformers and businessmen.

The charter failed because a

majority of Chicagoans did not like the municipal government which it
would have established and these people had the power and the incentive
to reject this charter.
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UNION LOCAlS AFFILIATED 'NITH

CHICAGO FEDERATION OF

LABOR-1907

Analgamated Association of Street Railway Employees - 4 locals
Amalgamated Street Railway ~nployees - 2 locals
Amalgamated Street Car Men - l local
Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin Workers - l local
Associated Vaudeville Artists - l local
Asphalt Pavers and Helpers - l local
Bakers Union - l local
Bakery and Confectioners - 2 locals
Barbers - l local
Bartenders - l local
Beer Bottlers - l local
Bill Posters and Billers - l local
Bookbinders - l local
Bookkeepers Association - l local
Boot and Shoe Workers - 5 locals
Bottlers Protective Union - l local
Blacksmiths and Helpers - 3 locals
Brewers and Malters - 2 locals
Brewers Laborers - l local
Brickmakers - 7 locals
Brush Makers - l local
Car Workers - 2 locals
Carpenters and Joiners - 23 locals
Caulkers - l local
Chicago Trades Union Label League
Cement Finishers - l local
Cement and Construction - l local
Cement Workers - 2 locals
Cigar Makers - l local
Cigar Packers - l local
City Firemen's Association - l local
Clerks (Retail) - 2 locals
Clo.th1 Hat and Cap Makers - l local
Conduit Trench Laborers - l local
Coopers - 4 locals
D~ain Layers and Helpers - l local
Egg Inspectors - l local
Electrical Workers - 5 locals
Elevator Conductors and Starters - l local
Firemen, Stationary - l local
Flat Janitors - 2 locals
Freight Handlers - 4 locals
Gardeners and Florists - l local
Garment Workers - 7 locals
Gas and Electric Fixture Hangers - l local
Gas Fitters - l local
Glove Workers - 2 locals
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Grocery Employees - l local
Hod Carriers - l local
Horse Shoers - l local
Horse Nail Makers - l local
Hair Spinners - l local
Hat Finishers Association - l local
Hoisting Portable Engineers - l local
Iron Moulders - l local
Iron Workers - l local
Jewelry Makers and Workers - 2 locals
Laundry Workers - l local
Lithographers - 2 locals
Machinists - 7 locals
Mailers Union - l local
Marble Workers - l local
Marine Cooks - l local
Marine Firemen, Oilers and Watertenders - l local
Metal Polishers - l local
Musicians - l local
Municipal Water Pipe Layers - l local
Piano Workers - l local
Painters and Decorators - l local
Paper Hangers - l local
Pattern Makers - l local
Photo Engravers - l local
Photographic Employees - l local
Plumbers - l local
Postoffice Clerks - l local
Pressmen - l local
Printers' Roller Makers - l local
Seaman's Union- l local
Sheet Metal Workers - 4 locals
Shipwrights - l local
Sprinkler Fitters - l local
South Chicago Trades and Labor Assembly
Spring Workers - l local
Sewer Cleaners - l local
Steam Engineers - 3 locals
Steam Fitters - l local
Steam Pipe and Boiler Coverers - l local
Stove Mounters - l local
Stone Pavers - l local
Suspender Workers - l local
Stable Employees - l local
Sub Paving Inspectors - l local
Stereotypers - l local
~~tchmen - 2 locals
Tailors - l local
Chicago Federation of Teachers
Teamsters - 13 locals

Telegraphers - 1 local
Theatrical Employees - 1 local
Tugmen - 2 locals
Typographical Workers - 3 locals
Tuckpointers - 1 local
Upholsterers - 2 locals
Watchmakers - 2 locals
Water Pipe Extension Laborers - 1 local
Waiters - 1 local
Waitresses - 1 local
Wallpaper, Machine Printers and Color Mixers - 1 local
Wax and Plaster Model Makers - 1 local
Webb Pressmen - 1 local
Well Drillers - 1 local
Women 1 s Trade Union League
Women 1 s Trade Union Labor League
Woodworkers - 5 locals
Wood, Wire and Metal - 1 local

APPENDJX II

MEMBER SOCIETIES OF THE UNITED
SOCIETIES FOR LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT MAY 1906

Schwaben-verein von Chicago
Gesangverein harmonie
Concordia Minnerchor
Junger Mannerchor
Korner Loge, 64
Seneselder Liederkranz
Chicago Stamm No. 286
Freundschaft Loge No. 6
Verein der Braudenburger
North Chicago MBnnerchor
Arion ~erchor der Sudseite
Sozialer Turnverein
Liedertafel Eintracht
Teutonia Mannerchor
Nordwestseite Turnerschaft
Alter Wirthsverein
Turnverein Eiche
Katholisches Kasino
Hessen-verein von Chicago
Schweizer Mannerchor
North Chicago Wirthsverein
Hamburger Klub
W·estseite Harmonie
Richard Wagner MBnnerchor
Deutscher Verein der Westseite
Gemischter Char "Fritz Reuter"
Verein der Hannoveraner und
Brauschweiger
Deutsch-Amerikanischer KrankenUnterstutzungs-Verein
Central-Turnverein
Gesangverein 11Frohsinn 11
Geneva Klub
Sud-Chicago Turnverein
LaSalle Turnverein
Grosspark Liederkranz
Nordwest Chicago Concertina Club
Kaiser-Friedrich Unterstutzungverein
Deutscher Klub von Chicago
Liedertafel Vorwarts
Prinzessin HeinrichUnterstutzungsverein
Verein des Ost-und Westpreussen
Trierischer Unabh. Bruderbund
Olympai Mannerchor

Schiller Mannerchor
Lessing Loge
Nordseite Badtscher
Lincoln Loge No. 569
Trierischer Unterstutzungsverein
Westseite Sanger kranz
Turnverein Einigkeit
Sudseite Liederkranz
Douglas Gegens.Unterstutzungs.
Verein Saxonia
Gemischter Char Unabh.
Chicago Loge No. 1
Deutsche Krieger-Kameradschaft
Deutscher Kriegerverein von Chicago
StSktion 1.4, Gegens.Unterstj.itzungs.
Deutscher Freundschafts-Bund
Order Mutual Protection No. 47
Brighton Park Loge
Chicago Turngemeinde
Altdeutscher Unterstutzungs.
Vorw~ts Loge No. 137
Badischer Unterstutzungsverein
der Sudseite
Hoffnung Loge
Deutscher Fleischer Unterstutzungs.
Oesterreicher und Bayern-Verein
Gegenseitiger Unterstutzungs
Verein "Bavaria"
Oesterreicher Verein "Stock im
Gisen"
Gegens. Unterstutzungs.-Verein
von Chicago
Deutscher Kreigerversin Sud-Chicago
Chicago Fraternal League
Chicago Frosch Klub
Beckmann Loge No. 188
Union Mannerchor
Schiller Liedertafel
Pf alzer Verein
Turnverein Vorwarts
Reuter Liedertafel
Sozialer Arbeiterverein der Sudwestseite
Aurora Turnverein
Rheinischer Verein
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Treue Bruderloge No. 325
GrUtst-Verein
Lincoln Park Loge
Kurhessischer UnterstutzungsVerein
"Fidelia" Gemischter Char
Teutonia.MBnnerchor
Fritz Reuter Council
Prinz Heinrich Unterstutzungs.
Progretz Loge
Deutscher Verein Prinz Heinrich 1
Garfield Unterstutzungsverein
Orvheus Mannerchor
Schleswig-holsteiner Verein
Deutscher Kranken Unterstutzungs.
Schwabischer Sangerbund
Klub Frohsinn
Vorwarts MBnnerchor
Kurhessischer Unterstutzungs.
Liedertafel Einigskeit
Orden der Hermanns-sohne
Deutscher Landwehr Verein
Verband der Veteranen der Deutschen
Armee

Sehleswig-holsteiner Sangerbund
Harugari MBnnerchor
Bayrisch-Amerikanischer Verein von
Chicago und 1D zweig vereine
Deutscher ~den Harugari und untergeorduete Logen
Plattdeutsche Grotz-gilde und 45
Gildern
Teutonia Turnverein
Wicker Park MBnnerchor
Chicago Quartett Klub
Euphonia Gesangverein
Douglas Loge No. 177
Typographia No. 9
Vereinigte Schweizer Vereine
W•3st Chic~o Wriths-Verein
Columbus Mannerchor
Verein Deutscher Wassengenossen
Erster Bohmischer Katholischers
Unterstutzungs., 16 IJJgen mit
6000 Mitglieders
Nordfelles Supreme IJJge
Kroatian Liberty Society
Kroatian Sloga Society

Brindisti di Montagna
Singing Society 11Zora 11
Lodge Jan Nernecke No. 181
Polish Mechanics Society No. 8
Hungarian Singing Society of Chicago
Plzensky Sokol
Bohemian Saloonkeepers Association
Prytiti So. Kiri
So. Vaclerva 65
Rav Praka--cis--13
Bohemian Foresters
The Danish Veterans
Turning Society Slvanska Lipa
Firu Hungarian Social and Benevolent Society
Leif Erickson No. 9
Montezuma Benevolent Association
Sokol Chicago
Lodge 24 Firi Podebradsky Bohemian Benevolent Association
The Polish Turners No. 1
St. Prowsims 1
Svithiod Lodge No. 1
47 Societies of the Polish National
Alliance
26 Lodges of the Bohemian Benevolent Association
Nera Fryge No. 1
Norwegian Bjorgrein Singing Society
Independent Order of Svithiod
22 Lodges
Singing Society Magnetio
Grotz Society
Italienische Gesellschaften
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APPENDIX III

2fJ7

UNITED SOCIETIES FOR LCCAL

SELF-GOVEfu~T

OFFICERS AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 1906
OL<'FICERS

Irish
Charles C. Gilbert - lawyer

German
Franz Amberg - liveryman
George Pfeiffer - occupation unknown
John P. Rickard - conductor
Felix wYsow - bookkeeper
Bohemian
John A. Cervenka - saloonkeeper
Croatian
Steve Popovich - saloonkeeper
Polish
S. W. Haremski - lawyer
Hungarian
Berthold Stark - foreman
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

German
William Arens - post office superintendent
John Arndt - lumber worker
Hans Borg - carpenter
Horace L. Brand - President, Brand Brewing
L.E. Brandt - insurance
Otto Ernst - President, Colonial Laundry
August Eschemann - occupation unknown
Fritz Glogauer - President and Editor, Abendpost
Max Haenel - saloonkeeper
Heinrich Hartung - physician
Emil Hoechster - deputy sheriff
M.J. Huss- lawyer
John Koelling - Koelling & Klappenbach, Booksellers
G. Landau - cigarmaker
C. Linnemayer - solicitor
Conrad Linz - painter
August Lueders - agent
George A. V. Massow - editor, Illinois Staats-Zeitung
Walther R. Michaelis - business manager Freie Presse
Nicholas Michels - lawyer
Christian Muth - ironworks

2J8

Fritz Nebel - stone contractor
John Neumann - agent
Eugen Niederegger - Niederegger and Thomas liquors
T.G. Richter- saloonkeeper
Julius Schmidt - Schmidt Dancing Academy
C. Siemsen - saloonkeeper
Enil A. Tauebert - printer
William Vocke - lawyer
Louis Wreden - insurance agent
Bohemian
Joseph Babka - occupation unknown
Michael Brichak - saloonkeeper
John Filas - saloonkeeper
Joseph Hladovic - saloonkeeper
Cyril R. Jandus - lawyer and state senator
Anton Kocka - presser
Vincent Kolar - clerk
Thomas Polivka - janitor
V. Roubal- coalman
Polish
Nicholas Budzbaum - saloonkeeper
Cornelius Frey - laborer
Theodore Helinski - bank cashier
Franz J. Karch- conductor
W. Lachkowski - driver
John F. Smulski - lawyer and banker
S'rriedish
C. Hjalmar Hedin - clerk
John D. Lindstrom - toolmaker
Swan P. Norman - draftsman
A.P. Olson - machinist
S1dss
J. Bodemann- President, Chicago Embroidery Co.
Xavier Walther - secretary
Belgian

A. Landa - leather goods
Danish
Max Henius - brewer, chemist
Croatian
Tony Ravich - saloonkeeper
Irish
Edward Noonan - lawyer, ex-congressman
Italian
Vincenzo Lavieri - tailor
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APPENDJX IV

DELEGATES TO CHICAGO CHARTER CONVENTION: 1906-1907
~

Joseph Badenoch

Occupation
grain merchant

Political
Affiliation
Republican

William Ho Baker

coal merchant

Republican

Sanitary Trustees

Sanitary Trustee

Walter E. Beebe

lawyer

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

A. W. Beilfuss

printer

Republican

City Council

Alderman

Frank I. Bennett

lawyer
real estate

Republican

City Council

Alderman

Z.P. Brosseau

grain commodities

Democrat

Public Library

Library Board

William M. Brown

food merchant

Republican

Legislature

State Senator

Richard E. Burke

lawyer

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

State Representative

Thomas Carey

unknown

Democrat

City Council

Alderman until 1906

Chester W. Church

lawyer

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

B.F. Clettenberg

real estate

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

George E. Cole

President, George
Independent
Cole & Coo, printing Republican

Governor Deneen

none

Daniel F. Crilly

real estate

South Park Board

none

Aoooint5!d b~
City Council

Other
Public Offic~li!
Alderman, Board of Election Commissioners
'

Republican

1\)

b

Name
~~
Daniel L. Cruice

Occupation
lawyer

Political
Affiliation
Democrat

ApQointed b~
Mayor Dunne

Other
Public Offices
none

William E. Dever

lawyer

D•3mocrat

City Council

Alderman

George W. Dixon

lawyer

Republican

Legislature

State S'ilnator

Thomas J. Dixon

general manager
Arthur Dixon Co.

Republican

City Council

Alderman

B.A. Eckhart

manufacturer

Republican

Governor Deneen

President, West Park
Board; former state
senator

John W. Eekhart

President, J.W.
Eckhart & Co.

Democrat

Public Library

President, Library
Board

Henry F. Eidmann

real estate

Republican

City Council

Alderman; Sanitary
District Trustee

F .E. Erickson

salesman

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

Walter L. Fisher

lawyer

Republican

Governor Deneen

none

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

none

**

John J. Fitzpatrick plumber, President
of CFL
Milton J. Foreman

lawyer

Republican

City Council

Alderman

F.H. Gansbergen

lawyer

Republican

Lincoln Park Board

Lincoln Park Commissioner

*attended
~~~

one meeting; replaced by

~nil

Ritter on December 13
1\)

attended no meetings; replaced by Walter Michaelis on December 28

~

Name
Andrew J. Graham

Occupation
banker

Political
Affiliation
Democrat

Appointed b;I
Mayor Dunne

other
Public Offices
W~st Park Board
Commissioner

_ _Greenacre

unknown

unknown

Mayor Dunne

unknown

John Guerin

unknown

unknown

Mayor Dunne

Board of E:iucation

Joseph F. Haas

merchant

Republican

Legislature

County Clerk; former
Senator until 1906

Carter Harrison

lawyer

Democrat

Governor Deneen

former Mayor

John W. Hill

lawyer

Republican

legislature

State Representative

Frank G. Hoyne

real estate

Democrat

Governor Deneen

none

Thomas M. Hunter

broker

Republican

City Council

Alderman

Alexander J. Jones

lawyer

Democrat

Sanitary District

Sanitary District
Trustee

James Kittleman

manufacturer

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

Bryan Lathrop

real estate

Republican

Lincoln Park Board

former Lincoln Park
Commissioner

James J. Linehan

janitor, CFL

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

none

Carl Lundberg

broker, real estate

Republican

Legislature

State Senator

Thomas MacMillan

clerk, U.S. District
Court

Republican

West Park Board

former State Representative

R.R. McCormick

lawyer

Republican

City Council

former Alderman

1\)

~

Name
John P. McGoorty

Occupation
lawyer

Political
Affiliation
Democrat

Appointed by
Mayor Dunne

Other
Public Offices
State Representative

M. L. McKinley

lawyer

Democrat

Legislature

State Representative

Charles E. Merriam

university professor

Republican

Governor Deneen

none

Walter Michaelis

business manager

unknown

Mayor Dunne

none

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

former State Representative

Joseph A. 0 1Donnell lawyer
Theodore Oehne

President, Conrad
Seipp Brewing

unknown

Mayor Dunne

none

John E. CMens

lawyer

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

former city attorney

political
leftish gadfly 11

Mayor Dunne

former Commissioner of
Public Works

Joseph M. Patterson* newspaper editor
(Medill family)

11

G.W. Paullin

fur manufacturer

Republican

Legislature

Sanitary District
Trustee

Robert E. Pendarvis

lawyer

Republican

Legislature

State Representative,
Chairman of House Committee on Charter Legislation

Louis F. Post

newspaper editor

Democrat
Mayor Dunne
{ 11 single-taxer 11 )

Board of Education

John Bowers

politician

Democrat

Alderman; State
Senator

City Council

1\)

*attended

one meeting; replaced by Mr. Greenacres on December 28

~

Edward J. Rainey

Occupation
undertaker

Political
Affiliation
Democrat

Appointed by
Legislature

other
Public Offices
State Senator

Walter J. Raymer

manufacturer

Republican

City Council

former Alderman

Alexander H. Revell furniture manufacturer Republican

Governor Deneen

none

Lewis Rinaker

lawyer

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

Emil Ritter

unlawwn

unknown

Mayor Dunne

unknown

Raymond Robins

social worker

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

Board of Education

Lessing Rosenthal

lawyer

Republican

Governor Deneen

none

C.O. Sethness

President, Sethness
Company

unknown

Board of

unknown

David Shanahan

lawyer, real estate

Republican

Legislature

State Representative

John G. Shedd

President, Marshall
Field's

Republican

Governor Deneen

none

Frank L. Shepard

lawyer

Republican

Cook County Board

Cook County Board
Cormnissioner

John F. Smulski

banker, lawyer

Republican

W•:3st Park Board

former Alderman; former city attorney

Bernard W. Snow

crop expert

Republican

City Council

Alderman

B.E. Sunny

business manager
General Electric Co.

Republican

Governor Deneen

none

George B. Swift

President, Swift &
Company

Republican

Governor Deneen

former Mayor;
former Alderman

Name

~iucation

l\)

t=

Political
Affiliation
unknown

Appointed b~
Governor Deneen

Other
Public Offices
none

cigarmaker

unknown

Governor Deneen

none

C.J. Vopicka

President, Atlas
Brewing

Democrat

Mayor Dunne

former park Commissioner

Edwin Ko Walker

lawyer

Republican

Cook County Board

Cook County Board
Commissioner

Charles Werno

lawyer

Democrat

City Council

Alderman

R.A. White

minister

unknown

Board of Education

Board of Education

D.R. Wilkins

printing company
president

unknown

Mayor Dunne

none

John P. Wilson

lawyer

unknown

Governor Deneen

none

Edward Co Young

manufacturer

unknown

Governor Deneen

none

Michael Z:i.mmer

lawyer

Democrat

City Council

Alderman

Name
Graham Taylor

0-:!cupation
social worker,
professor

George Thompson

l\)

~

216

APPENDIX V
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MEMBERS OF THE INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE

Men listed in the Book of Chicagoans*
Henry M. Ashton: lawyer~ Democrat
Miles J. Devine: lawyer~ Democrat
John T. Donahue: lawyer~ Democrat
A.D. Gash: lawyer~ Democrat
James J. Gray: lawyer~ Democrat
A.M. Lawrence: newspaper editor~ Democrat
John E. Owens: lawyer~ Democrat
Howard S. Taylor: lawyer~ Democrat (former Populist)
Joseph F. Triska: lawyer~ Democrat
():.her members
John T. Bowers
M. C• Buckley
William A. Dudley
Robert Dus sman
J.W. Ernst
John C. Harding
W.H. Holly: lawyer
John Kantor: lawyer
Sam Koenigsberg
C.J. McGurn
Charles H. Mitchell
P. J. Moloney
Theodore Nelson
W. J • Nevin: lawyer
Thomas J. 0 t Hare
Edwin J. Raber

*nine

of these twenty-five men were listed in this biography of the
leading men 11 of the city while fifty-one of the seventy-seven charter
convention members were listed
11

218

APPROVAL SHE:h."'T

The dissertation submitted by Maureen Anne Flanagan has been read
and approved by the following committee:
Dr. James L. Penick, Director
Professor, History, Loyola
Dr. Lewis A. Erenberg
Assistant Professor, History, Loyola

Dr. William J. Galush
Assistant Professor, History, Loyola
The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that
any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the committee with reference to
content and form.
The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

lr:J I / cr "6--o

(/

